AUSTRALIAN PEACE MOVEMENT 1960-67: A STUDY OF DISSENT

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ABSTRACT

The thesis purports to examine a movement of political dissenters - the Australian peace movement - from the time of the November 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress to approximately one year after the November 1966 Federal elections. After a definition and exploration of basic terms and concepts used throughout the text, the study is divided into three major sections.

The first section briefly reviews the history of the Australian peace movement prior to the 1959 Melbourne Congress, before delving into a detailed account of that Congress - an event that laid the foundation for the formal, organised movement that emerged.

The second part undertakes to describe and analyse the organisational framework, policies and activities of the movement in two states, Western Australia and Queensland. The *modus operandi* of the groups in these two states are viewed as two distinct prototypes of organisational patterns existing in other states.

Finally, the thesis depicts the broad developmental pattern of the Australia-wide movement during the first eight years of the past decade. In this respect, the main theme concentrates on the organic nature of an evolving movement where changes were registered in issue-orientation, types of dissenters, sources of financial support, degree of social control encountered from the macro-society, and in the militancy of the tactics and outlook of the movement's participants. This description *cum* analysis centres mainly on events that occurred in New South Wales and Victoria. It concludes with an account of the schism affecting the entire movement that followed in the wake of the 1966 election dénouement.

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INTRODUCTION

From the time of the Australian & New Zealand Congress for International Cooperation & Disarmament, held in Melbourne during the week of 7-14th November, 1959, to the aftermath of the Australian Labor Party's decisive electoral defeat on 26th November, 1966, the Australian peace movement experienced what might be called a moderate rate of growth and degree of success - although its strength was frequently exaggerated by friends and foes alike, and it never directly effected a single change in policy. Yet its close relationship with an important section of the ALP meant that it always possessed the potential to influence policy making; moreover, it is probably unfair to evaluate the movement in terms of empirically verifiable achievements, since most of its activities were directed towards affecting the society's values and attitudes - that is in fulfilling a long term educative function. It might also be asked if success should be judged solely on the basis of the movement's 'outputs' into the political system. Instead, an equally important component of success is the effect that the movement has had on the personal lives of the participants themselves.[1]

Since neither of these last two components of success can be adequately measured, it is not the intention of this dissertation to

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1. Such a view to gain saliency need not be carried to Sorelian extremes where true change is seen as coming from the victory that each individual in consort with others achieves in the exercise of his will, this transfiguration being idealised above all else. (See George Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (1905) Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1950.)

render any sort of 'box score' analysis of the movement's efficacy; rather the central aim will be to trace and explain the peace movement's developments and changes over the first seven years of the past decade, by stressing: (1) the distinct categories of persons who supported the movement; (2) the projects undertaken; (3) the movement's issue orientation; (4) the types of tactics employed; and (5) the organisational framework by which the movement operated. With regard to the first point, the participants are classified as either pacifists or pacificists, with a further subdivision into class dissenters, intellectual dissenters, humanitarian dissenters, religious dissenters, and youth dissenters. While the individual supporter may be categorised as more than one type of dissenter - indeed, a few may even fall into all five categories - the typology is useful in analysing changes in the movement's constituent parts. No detailed examination of the categories *per se*, however, will be attempted other than to explain briefly their meaning in Chapter I.

The description *cum* analysis of the movement's developments will be set out in the following way:-

The whole of Chapter I will be devoted to the definition and exploration of basic terms and concepts involved in the study. Terms such as 'dissenter', 'pacifist', 'pacificist', 'attitudinal group', 'movement', 'sectarian', 'militant', *etc.* will be examined and prepared for their usage in the main body of the text. As well, certain general characteristics of peace movements will be introduced to help clarify the collective behaviour subsequently attributed to the Australian movement.

Chapter II will begin with a review of the background and history of the Australian movement prior to the period under examination. This will be done to place the subject in historical perspective, to show it as a continuous movement, and to depict the origins and developments of some of the peace groups that continued to operate in the 1960's. The main part of the chapter, though, will delve into a detailed account of the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress, an event that is important not only because it serves as the starting point of this study, but because it laid the foundation for the formal, organised movement that emerged. The Congress is the only peace project that will be microscopically analysed, and, as such, constitutes a model of the type of problems that the movement encountered.

In the next chapter it is proposed to analyse broadly the movement's organisational structure as it existed throughout Australia, and to provide a specific descriptive analysis of the West Australian peace groups, participants, and activities - viewed as the organisational prototype of a state where no 'core group' dominated peace activities.

Chapter IV will be linked closely to the preceding one. It will seek to examine systematically the peace groups, participants, and activities in Queensland within an organisational framework that serves as a prototype of a state where a 'core group' *did* dominate peace activities.

The next three chapters (Chapters V, VI and VII) will undertake to denote the broad developmental pattern of the movement between the Melbourne Congress and the period immediately following the 1966 elections. Most of the references cited will pertain to events that occurred in New South Wales and Victoria. The three chapters will look at the peace groups as forming a dynamic, evolving movement where changes occurred in the nature of issues pursued, in the number of groups and types of dissenters comprising the movement, and in the militancy of tactics and outlook. Chapter V will deal with the movement in the period after the Melbourne Congress and extend into the period of Chapter VI (no clear demarcation) which will treat the events leading up to the dénouement of the 1966 elections. In this chapter it is intended to outline the factors that precipitated a more dynamic movement, and describe the movement's rôle in the 1966 election campaign - emphasising the increasing militancy in tactics and the rising expectations of many of the participants. Chapter VII will examine how the movement reacted to the overwhelming election defeat it suffered and to the society's hostility which was expressed in countless forms. It is at this point that the movement bifurcates into two distinct factions.

The final chapter will draw out and bring together the main points that have been made, and, at the very end, suggest an endemic problem that every peace movement must resolve in order to maintain its philosophical integrity and perhaps its structural unity.

A persistent problem that has dogged this study from the beginning is how to determine what persons and groups should actually be included in the movement. The difficulty stems from the fact that the appeal of peace is almost universal, not delimited to a clearly defined segment of the community. Almost everyone says he is *for* peace. Defining the Australian movement's constituency is further complicated by the loose nature of its structure. For instance, official rules are not prescribed as a basis for belonging; membership is not restricted to a particular class of persons; nor is it possible, in all cases, to determine the supporters from membership lists, since most of the groups do not offer formal membership, and - even if they did - the basis of a group's support cannot be reduced to the names in an office filing cabinet.

The constituency problem contains two parts: Who are the individuals that belong? And what organisations should be included in the movement? With regard to the first question, it has been decided that an individual belongs to the movement if he participates regularly in the activities of one or more of the peace groups. While such a definition constitutes a form of question begging - since participation is left undefined - the words 'participates' and 'regularly' are meant to imply a positive commitment and sense of identification with the organisation. Thus more is required from an individual than the mere signing of a protest petition or the attending of a meeting.

Despite the imprecision of such a definition it at least provides guidelines that conform to the way the peace groups themselves assess

their supporters. The more difficult question - leading on from the first - is to determine which of the organisations come within the ambit of the peace movement. The problem has been resolved here on the basis of four criteria, some of which a group must satisfy to a significant degree. The first two criteria pertain to what a group specifies as its objectives and the type of solutions it proposes, while the third and fourth pertain to outside evaluations made about the group.

The first criterion involves the checking of an organisation's stated objectives. If resolution of international conflict by peaceful means appears high among its list of priorities, then the group qualifies, providing it is not rejected by any of the subsequent criteria. The Women's International League for Peace (WILPF) is an example of an organisation that clearly meets this criterion. It asserts that its principal objective is to bring "together women of different political and philosophical tendencies...to study, make known and help abolish the political, social, economic and psychological causes of war, and to work for a constructive peace".[2] While this statement has been taken from the official aims of the international body, the Australian Federal Secretary of WILPF explains the objectives of the local body in a similar vein: "Our policy has always been to seek an end to all wars through negotiation and mediation and, because we believe that war is outmoded by more humane and intelligent methods of ending disputes, we

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2. International Congress of WILPF, *Aims, Principles and Policies*, 1965.

urge our countries and their governments to implement these methods and to eliminate those conditions which create wars."[3] Another quite different type of organisation (different in the sense of its composition and activities), the ANZ Congress in Melbourne, also qualifies under the first criterion since its basic tenets placed a high priority upon the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Stated its charter: "...the objective of all nations should be total disarmament...the first steps towards this should be taken at once...we urge the immediate banning of nuclear tests....We deplore any breach of international peace, and affirm that there are no differences between peoples which cannot be settled by negotiation."[4]

WILPF and the ANZ Congress are or have been organisations with general peace objectives. If an organisation's objectives were more limited or it was formed on an *ad hoc* basis to contest a specific issue, a second criterion has been applied. Does the organisation's primary objective centre on a fundamental *aspect* of war and peace, and does the organisation in question reveal a pacific bias in its approach to the problem? For example, the Save Our Sons group (SOS) was formally only concerned with a single issue, "oppos[ing] conscription of youth into the armed services to serve in overseas wars"; and its objections were based "either on humanitarian, religious or pacifist grounds".[5] In other

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3. Lorraine Moseley, Australian Federal Secretary of WILPF, quoted in *The Australian*, 14 October, 1966.
4. ANZ Congress, *Declaration of Hope*, November 1959. See Appendix A.
5. *Statement of Aims of SOS*, N.S.W., *c.* 1965.

words, the opposition to the single issue of conscription for overseas duty was based on a pacific philosophy and not on some grounds like *raison d'etat* or improvement of the economy. Neither did SOS propose that the strains it perceived in the society should be resolved by such policies as building up the nation's armaments or 'negotiating from strength'. Amnesty International is an example of a more permanent group dealing with a limited aspect of war and peace from a pacific bias. If either of these groups also qualifies under the third and fourth criteria, they are considered to come within the scope of the study.

The third criterion asks the question as to whether the organisation leans towards the politics of left wing dissent on issues of international affairs. Unlike the peace politics prevalent in some other countries, in Australia "peace as a concept...is something reserved for 'conchies', for parsons, for 'commies'",[6] *i.e.*, the idealistic left. It is an abstraction traditionally shunned by the right wing and establishment oriented groups when formulating their foreign policy objectives. Thus no right wing group is seen as qualifying for membership in the peace movement. As an example, the League of Nations Union (the League), which operated in Australia between the two World Wars, was considered to be a part of the peace movement, because it tended to adopt so-called

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6. Dennis Altman, *'Australia and Vietnam: Some Preliminary Speculations'*, *The Australian Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 2, June 1970, p. 63.

progressive-leftist, peace dissenting policies,[7] whereas its successor, the United Nations Association of Australia (UNAA), controlled by moderate conservative and even DLP personnel, has seldom (if ever) attempted to undercut establishment aims and principles.[8] All of the

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7. Although the League proclaimed aims and principles to which the Australian Government was already *verbally* committed and attracted citizens of high status, its policies and actions were progressive in terms of the nation's thinking as a whole and the *actions* of the Government.
   The League initially emphasised the issue of disarmament, playing an instrumental rôle in stimulating Australian interest in the 1932 International Declaration on World Disarmament. However, during the middle thirties it shifted its ground to advocate strong use of collective security, including military force when necessary, as a means of arresting the growing number of outbreaks of aggression. In the degree and type of force that it was condoning it came closer to the international policy of the Soviet Union than it did to that of the Australian Government. Indeed, in 1936 at Brussels, the League and the communists joined forces in a world-wide movement called the International Peace Campaign (IPC). Although a number of absolute pacifists in Australia withdrew their support from the new movement, because of its advocacy of the use of military force through international collective security, the IPC was still considered a part of the peace movement by a large majority of the other peace groups.
   Another case where the League fostered a more 'advanced' line than the prevailing national mood can be seen by the protests it organised against the excesses of the 'hate campaign' being conducted in the press and on the radio against the Japanese in 1941. The League was also active in holding national conferences during the war years - which were aimed at preparing the nation for a radically different world after World War II.
   Thus by adopting policies that ran the gamut from disarmament to support for the Atlantic Charter that emphasised Australia's obligations, the League was never labelled - even by the most radical of dissenters - as a tool for the implementation of establishment policies.

8. *Cf.* the following remark by George Cook, an official of the UNAA: "The attitude of UNAA...is that...as far as disarmament is concerned, UN documents show that the consistent use of the veto by Russia on U.S. proposals over the past ten years is the reason why more progress has not been made towards this goal." (*Observer*, Sydney, 6 February, 1960, p. 39.)

organisations previously mentioned - WILPF, ANZ Congress, SOS, and Amnesty International - have opposed important establishment policies from a position left of centre. These groups also meet the condition set down in the final, closely allied criterion.

This fourth and final criterion concerns the attitude that the organisations have to one another. Is a particular organisation generally recognised by the other peace groups as a part of the movement? Or, obversely, does the particular group want to be identified with *the* peace movement? The Quaker Peace Committee, while in typical Quaker fashion not attacking or condemning the UNAA, does not regard it as a part of the peace movement.[9] Yet many non-pacifist groups are accepted by the Quakers and other pacifists. The pacifists are inclined to regard as their colleagues (and *vice versa*) the supporters of such organisations as SOS, the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD), the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), *etc.* - though none of these groups advocated pacifism (instead, falling into a category called pacificism to be discussed in the first chapter).

Again, returning to the example of the old League of Nations Union, it is interesting to compare WILPF's reaction to that body with its attitude to the UNAA. While it disagreed with some of the League's policies, it was still willing to become an affiliate of that body. Yet

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9. Mrs. Jean Richards, Convenor, Australian Friends Peace Committee, in interview with writer, 20 January, 1966.

it has never sought to form an association with the current UNAA. Similarly, the UNAA is not interested in joining the peace movement,[10] whereas the old League clearly was.

In conclusion, an organisation will pass under the review of this study, if it or one of its sub-groups manifests to a significant degree some of the characteristics specified in the above criteria. There are a few groups or committees, however, that *do* meet the conditions of the criteria, yet have been excluded because they were too small, inactive, or ephemeral to warrant serious attention. Also excluded, on the basis of definition, though they may be mentioned in terms of their relationship to the peace movement, are those organisations with broader or different objectives that ally themselves from time to time with the peace organisations or that delve independently into activities paralleling the endeavours of the peace movement - *e.g.*, the ALP, the CPA, the Fabian Society, the Lambrakis Youth League, the Australian Council of Churches, the Humanist Society, *et al.*

The main organisations that formed the movement during the years of this study have been listed in Appendix B.

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10. *Cf.* the response of the UNAA to one of the peace movement's major projects: "Money", maintained spokesman George Cook, "spent on sending delegates to ANZ [the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress] would have been better spent on UNAA's International World Refugee Year Appeal." (Cook, *op.cit.*)

CHAPTER I

PEACE MOVEMENT CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY

This chapter explains some of the basic terms and concepts contained in the main body of the text as well as in some of the scholarly literature on peace movements *qua* social movements.

Peace

In its most literal sense the term 'peace movement' is a misnomer. Most of the groups and individuals within the movement do not subscribe to strictly pacifist principles, nor in some cases do they even assume peaceable attitudes. For example, some of the supporters have openly expressed hopes of a National Liberation Front victory in Vietnam and have openly applauded its victories which come from force of arms. Similarly, voices have been raised within the movement advocating the overthrow, by military means, of the Smith Government in Rhodesia. And in one small but influential quarter of the movement the world's chief exponent of guerrilla warfare, the late Che Guevara, has been practically lionised as patron saint, and an organisation was even formed to raise military aid for the NLF.

Yet all the above persons, according to common usage, generically belong to the peace movement (though the super militants are certainly pressing the movement's outer limits). More precisely, these people constitute the supporters of a dissenting movement professing a strong pacific doctrine. In common, they display a propensity for thinking

that man fundamentally desires and is able to create a peaceful, co-operative world community, and that it is a highly worthwhile endeavour to work towards the achievement of this goal. Although in the immediate situation they are inclined to set a low valuation on the use of force in international affairs, and conversely to place a high valuation on the reasonableness of men to reach accommodation through negotiations, they are capable of qualifying this attitude - depending on the individual and the occasion - by stipulating that certain structural and valuative changes must precede such a possibility. With the exception of the absolute pacifist, every peace dissenter, if provoked, has a threshold of violence, despite his initial pacific outlook. In terms of the types of dissenters to be discussed shortly (class, intellectual, youth, humanitarian, and religious), the threshold of counter violence *tends* to be lowest with the youth and class dissenters and highest with the humanitarian and religious dissenters.

During the first seven years of the past decade all categories of peace dissenters invariably stood united in their call for negotiations, disarmament, greater influence for the United Nations, cultural and scientific exchanges, nuclear free zones, and increased economic aid to underdeveloped nations without benefits accruing to the donor nations. Moreover, with only a few exceptions they endorsed the principle of national self-determination, the dismantling of all overseas military

bases, and a non-alignment policy for Australia conjoined with an active non-military rôle for her in South-east Asia.[1]

Movement

The term 'movement' is used to encompass all groups and individuals engaged in collective behaviour in the name of a generalised belief.[2] In the case of the peace movement that generalised belief constitutes a direct challenge to the established Australian and Western 'free world' foreign policy, because it seeks a revision based upon the principle of little or no use or threat of force in the conduct of international affairs. An element of potential challenge is contained in all collective behaviour, for it only arises in situations of perceived dislocation, which may lead to the disruption of the usual, routinised norms of behaviour, causing the development of new norms and new values.[3] When collective behaviour is "functioning as an organised mass

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1. As a supporter of the peace movement approaches the centres of political power, he is inclined to qualify or refine some of the general policies. Thus the prominent peace activist, Dr. J.F. Cairns, MHR, despite his sometimes bitter denunciation of American foreign policy, still lodges his criticisms from within the American-Australian alliance. (See J.F. Cairns, *Economics and Foreign Policy*, Victorian Fabian Society Pamphlet No. 12, Melbourne, 1966.) That Dr. Cairns can be considered as belonging to the Australian peace movement is confirmed by his long record of association with peace groups (he was a charter member of the Australian Peace Council), as well as his own statement: "I do consider myself a part of the peace movement...." (Letter to author, 14 January, 1966.)

2. See Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behaviour*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1962, pp. 8 & 382; pp. 79*ff*. for meaning of 'collective behaviour' and 'generalised belief'.

3. See Ralph H. Turner & Lewis M. Killian (*eds.*), *Collective Behaviour*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1957, pp. 3-11.

effort directed toward a change of established folkways or institutions",[4] then a movement is born. This movement usually involves large numbers. Its generalised belief need not require a qualitative break in the continuity of the society's development, that is be revolutionary. Still, much of the tensions, both within and outside a movement, tends to centre on the problem as to whether a movement's generalised belief has revolutionary implications. To sum up: a movement is usually characterised by large numbers or the masses; it entails organised collective behaviour involving "the less stable, less predictable, less formal aspects of group life";[5] and it receives direction from a generalised belief, perhaps never explicitly formulated.

While movement politics tend to manifest a syndrome of many common modes of behaviour, the following constitute some of the more salient characteristics. The adherents, in their pronouncements and activities, are inclined to replace the compromises and machinations of 'realpolitik' with a faithfulness to principle. Long term considerations prevail over short term expediencies. The societal strains posited by the generalised belief are articulated with a sense of catastrophic urgency demanding immediate solution. Nevertheless, far more emphasis is characteristically placed upon the danger of the existing situation than on studying how to resolve the problem or on how to reach a utopian goal. It is as if the

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4. Theodore Abel, *Why Hitler Came Into Power*, Prentice-Hall, N.Y., 1938, p. 348.

5. Martin Oppenheimer, *Urban Guerrilla*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, England, 1970, p. 17.

means will appear not because someone envisages them or deduces them on the basis of abstract principle; but because they are necessary. At the right moment the supporters will know and decide what to do.

Finally, irrespective of whether a movement's objectives are of a revitalistic or innovative nature, a movement is usually considered to pursue one of two courses of action. It is either revolutionary or reformist. However, in most English speaking countries there is a tradition which the author sees as incorporating both of these types - *viz.*, the mildly tolerated dissenting movement. It is from the pre-analytical assumption of a dissenting movement that this study of the Australian movement has been conducted.

Dissent

A.J.P. Taylor defines the dissenter as someone who does more than merely disagree with Establishment policies. In the context of the Church of England he sees the dissenter as the type who advocates that bishops should not exist, whereas the conforming member would never go beyond the point of mild disagreement with the bishops.

"And so", explains Taylor, "it has been with foreign policy in this country (Great Britain) - and also in the United States: dissent is a quality peculiar to English speaking peoples. A man can disagree with a particular line of British foreign policy, while still accepting its

general assumptions. The Dissenter repudiates its aims, its methods, its principles."[6]

In other words, the dissenter is opposed to every aspect of the foreign policy, save one - *viz.*, the right of the Government to actually make foreign policy, though he may challenge the legitimacy of a particular group to dominate the Foreign Office. Similarly, from within the Church of England, he may call for the overthrow of the bishops, but he does not reject the Church's fundamental theological beliefs, as he has interpreted them. In this respect he is closer to being a reformist (albeit an extreme one) than a revolutionist, yet in the sense that he is not averse to changing the power structure he is acting in a revolutionary manner. The interesting point is that the society or institution, for the most part, tolerates the dissenter, may even boast about his presence, and does not regard him as a threat to its fabric of social order and the natural evolution of its norms, as long as he does not seek to forcibly impose his views.

Taylor proceeds to describe some of the characteristics of the dissenter: "...he claims to know better and to promote higher causes; he asserts a superiority, moral or intellectual. Sometimes the Dissenters have accused the Foreign Secretary and his advisers of ignorance, sometimes of corruption - usually class-selfishness rather than personal dishonesty. The Dissenters have differed widely in their

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6. A.J.P. Taylor, *The Trouble Makers*, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1957, p. 13.

practical conclusions. They have advocated everything from complete non-intervention to universal interference. But they have all been contemptuous of those in authority."[7] The point to underscore about the dissenter is his sense of morality and the necessity to act forthrightly in accordance with his convictions (*cf.* religious sectarian). Since he tends to experience reality through the internal impulse of conscience, he takes his standpoint as a self-determining human protagonist rather than as a recipient of an impinging environment. He speaks the language of personal effort, responsibility and commitment.

While dissenters tend to display the syndrome of above characteristics, not all dissenters, naturally enough, gravitate towards the peace groups. Some appear in the opposite camp[8] - in groups like the Defend Australia Committee whose members John Playford has referred to as "Australia's own latter day Anabaptists".[9] Or they may appear in

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7. *Ibid.* *Cf.* the remark of J.F. Cairns: "I don't believe the Government is for peace at all. Like all Tories, fundamentally, they meet serious challenges by force." (Letter to author, 14 January, 1966.)

8. For an excellent composite account of the peace movement's opponents on the right, see R.W. Connell & Florence Gould, *Politics of the Extreme Right, Warringah 1966*, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1967, Chap. 4 *passim*. Also helpful are: K.D. Gott, *Voices of Hate*, Melbourne, 1965; *The Bulletin*, 15 October, 1966; I. Leibler, *'Australia's Radical Right'*, *Quadrant*, March-April 1966; and J.D. Playford, *'The Radical Right and the Rhodesia Lobby'*, *Outlook*, August 1966.

9. J.D. Playford, *'The Defenders'*, *Dissent*, No. 18, Spring 1966. Unlike Playford, Connell and Gould do not consider DAC "an expression of the extreme Right movement" (*op.cit.*, p. 47), though this, of course, does not exclude the Committee as a dissenting body.

the right-wing migrant societies,[10] the Australian branch of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade (CACC),[11] or Eric Butler's League of Rights.[12] Other dissenters, with right-wing or left-wing proclivities,

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10. These include such groups as The Croatian Liberation Movement, the Croatian National Council, Lithuanian Information Alliance, and the Anti-Bolshevic Bloc of Nations. The migrant organisations have been highly vocal opponents of the peace movement, countering the "peace propaganda" with projects like Captive Nations Week.

11. Although CACC in Australia does not operate on the grand scale of the parent body in the United States, its fundamentalist, anti-communist ideology comes from the leader of the U.S. organisation, Dr. Fred Schwarz, who was born, reared and educated in Australia. For a sociological analysis of the kinds of people that participate in the Crusade, see Raymond E. Wolfinger *et al.*, *'America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology'*, D.E. Apter (*ed.*), *Ideology and Discontent*, Free Press, Glencoe, N.Y., 1964, pp. 262-288. Probably the most detailed descriptive account of Dr. Schwarz and the Crusade (though largely outdated by now) can be found in the Anti-Defamation League's publication called *Facts*, November-December 1962. The CACC has been written about in almost every American national magazine, and books on the radical right usually devote at least a chapter to its activities.

12. For accounts of Mr. Butler's activities, see *Nation*, 26 September, 1959; *Observer*, 1 October, 1960 and 26 November, 1960; *The Bulletin*, 7 October, 1961, 16 June, 1962 and 15 October, 1966; Gott, *op.cit.*; and Connell & Gould, *op.cit.* Butler was once a leading Douglas Creditor. Today, he and the League of Rights are probably Australia's most outstanding champions of anti-semitism and racism (excluding the Australian Nazi Party). Their views are expressed editorially through the *New Times* and at one time also appeared in the now defunct *Australian and International News Review*. This latter journal was distributed from the public newstands. While it adopted an extremely anti-communist stance, it never went to the extremes of some of the U.S. rightist organisations, and accused the Federal Government of being headed by communists and pro-communists who were operating a conspiracy against the nation and its people. It did, however, promulgate an extreme racist posture - particularly in its support of South African 'Apartheid'. And its most prominent editorial writer, Sir Raphael Cilento, once stated that Australia is in greater danger from "foreign germs from Indonesia than from foreign arms". Its racism went in tandem with an extreme form of anti-semitism. *The Bulletin* (15 October, 1966) reported that Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher was considered a "good anti-communist until it discovered that he was a Jew...". The AINR's attack on Dr. Knopfelmacher prompted severe criticism from another anti-communist journal, Mr. B.A. Santamaria's *News Weekly*.

may be uninterested in the issues of world peace and foreign policy, and concentrate their energies upon the problems of education, fluoridation, equal opportunity for Aboriginals, free speech, *etc.* However, the type of dissenter examined in this dissertation is the one who is concerned with the problems of international relations and who analyses them and acts upon them in terms of either a doctrine of pacifism or pacificism.

Pacifism and Pacificism

The distinction between these two terms is explored, in part, by David Martin in a recently published work on pacifism.[13] The pacifist believes that war (not necessarily physical force) under all circumstances is wrong and will admit of no exceptions, whereas the pacificist is one who qualifies his opposition to war and under certain conditions will take up arms. In fact, when he finally does capitulate and go to war, the pacificist is apt to be quite zealous, elevating the war above the level of common survival and into a crusade for the spiritual salvation of mankind. Thus he readily responds to such rallying cries as "making the world safe for democracy", "the war to end all wars", and "preserving the four freedoms". However, before he has committed himself to war, the pacificist manifests a strong inclination and moral superiority for the ways of co-operation and peace rather than conflict and violence, but his morality tends to be utilitarian in outlook. He values peace largely because it is an instrument of human

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13. David A. Martin, *Pacifism, An Historical and Sociological Study*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1965, pp. 201-207.

survival. Consequently, it is consistent for him to apply one set of standards to the relations between the West and the Soviet Union, and another to questions of "colonial wars of liberation". When an ambivalence arises, forcing him to decide between the morality of his pacific doctrine or the pragmatism of survival, he usually resolves the dilemma by appealing to a higher morality.

On the other hand, to the pacifist, peace is a moral good *per se*, an imperative, not to be transgressed under any circumstances. He has no 'favourite' or 'just' wars, and he draws an absolute line against the use of physical force in the conducting of state affairs. Some pacifists even extend this proposition further. They subscribe to the belief that not only should formal warfare be renounced but all forms of violence rejected. They might be described as absolute pacifists.

Categories of Dissenters

The two doctrines of pacifism and pacificism are practised by all types of dissenters - that is by class dissenters, intellectual dissenters, youth dissenters, humanitarian dissenters and religious dissenters. Nevertheless, the pacifist is more apt to be found among the religious dissenters than in any of the other categories, while most of the class dissenters will be pacificists. This dissenter typology, though, is not meant to delineate different doctrinal approaches to peace politics, as much as it is to indicate the various sociological groupings within the peace movement and how a change in these groupings affects the attitudes of the movement as a whole. Thus a movement

dominated by youth can be expected to be predisposed to the more volatile forms of protest activity; one weighted heavily with class dissenters will no doubt stress the economic aspects of war and the society's power structure, and strategically seek the involvement of the workers, the trade unions and possibly the ALP; one containing a large number of religious dissenters presumably will be concerned with the moral implications of war, as well as the broader question of the rôle of the church in modern society; one composed largely of humanitarians will probably be projecting a middle class image that emphasises morality and perceives social stratification in terms of a "consensus model" rather than a "conflict model";[14] and if the movement is dominated by intellectuals presumably it will be anxious to research the issues, uplift the quality of debate, and perhaps develop cultural activities around the movement. Therefore, what type or types of dissenters provide the movement with its impetus affects the broad pattern of its collective behaviour. The categories of supporters are not intended to be mutually exclusive; indeed, many of the peace participants will fall into two or more groupings; it is even possible that a few may be classified into all five categories.

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14. See Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1959. The models constitute two different ways in which people perceive the structure of their society. In the case of the class-conflict model a sharp dichotomy is seen as existing between those who exercise power and those who are subjected to it. Little opportunity exists for moving from one group to the other. The consensus-status model, on the other hand, envisages gradations of power in the social structure and an opportunity for the members of the society to move up and down the hierarchy on the basis of their skill, fortune and energy.

The class dissenter generally refers to the Marxist idealogue and/or the trade unionist who perceives the issues of war and peace in terms of irreconcilable and enduring class conflict. The source of conflict - which in its extreme form may lead to war - lies in a class dichotomy where one class attempts to exploit the other. A corollary of this class dualism is the sometimes fierce competition that occurs amongst the oppressors for the right to do the exploiting. The only way, therefore, to abolish war ultimately is to remove the inherent class antagonisms which derive from the unjust distribution of power and resources that are associated with the present economic and social system.

With such a class-conflict analysis of society, the class dissenter, then, does not expect to alter the basic foreign policy of the 'oppressive state' through peace movement protest - at least not directly. He voices a peace protest, because he envisages the peace movement as an instrument for exposing the malversations of the 'oppressors' and raising the class consciousness of the workers, thus increasing the potential for industrial militancy, *the* vital step towards victory in the class struggle and the abolition of war.

The class dissenter, in many cases, is also an intellectual dissenter. An intellectual stratum's involvement appears to be essential to the success of a mass movement. As Parkin indicates: "Intellectuals are needed to formulate policies and programmes and to create inspirational symbols and appeals. Without an intellectual élite to

offer leadership and a coherent set of goals, popular demands or general discontents are rarely able to translate themselves into effective political movements on a mass scale."[15] Still, needing the intellectual does not ensure that he will be accepted into the movement, particularly in a leadership rôle. Yet it is more likely that he will be accepted into a movement such as the peace movement which has a set of demands aimed at benefiting the whole of society rather than just a particular section, because it is exactly this kind of altruistically oriented movement that is usually open to universal participation and requires the inspirational articulation of its ideas.

Obversely, the intellectual presumably is attracted to a dissenting movement because it provides him with a forum for expressing his critical views of the status quo. Why, though, the intellectual should be oriented, in the first place, towards dissent, especially left-wing dissent, is an unresolved question that has preoccupied a good many social theorists.[16] Perhaps he is more sensitive and cognitive of the society's ills, but at the same time one would expect him to be more appreciative of the various nuances involved which would have an 'immobilising effect'. Parkin notes that in Britain the majority of intellectuals are *not* dissenters - an observation that would appear to

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15. Frank Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 93.

16. For example, Roberto Michels, Karl Mannheim, William Kornhauser, C. Wright Mills, Eric Hoffer, Edward Shils, Frank Knopfelmacher (a very mixed collection).

be equally valid for Australia. Among the minority that become susceptible to radical politics and mass movements, he finds that most of them can be classified as "socially unattached intellectuals". By this term he is referring to "those who are not employed in cultural and educational institutions, but whose general economic position tends to be somewhat marginal and precarious...freelance journalists, writers, artists, dramatists and others who are expected to sell their cultural products or services under market conditions, and who are exposed to the frequent incompatibility between the aesthetic considerations of the seller and the commercial considerations of the buyer".[17] In the 1930's the intellectual dissenters tended to be the poets and writers whose creative efforts were unrecognised. "However", notes Parkin, "when CND appeared on the scene some twenty-five years later, this earlier generation of dissenting intellectuals had themselves been integrated into cultural and other institutions, and consequently took no part in this new wave of radical protest."[18] The intellectuals recruited into CND were like their counterparts of the thirties drawn mainly from the stratum of the "socially unattached intelligentsia".[19] While no survey (that the writer is aware of) has been conducted in Australia that would confirm these findings with regard to the Australian peace movement, the writer's own close observations would lead to the hypothesis that

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17. Parkin, *op.cit.*, pp. 97-98.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 98.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 99*ff*.

Australia's intellectual peace dissenters very definitely fell into the sub-category of the "socially unattached".

Closely linked with the rôle of the intellectual dissenter is that of the youth dissenter. The period of this study has witnessed - as predicted by C. Wright Mills in 1960 - the emergence of "new generations of intellectuals around the world as real live agencies of historic change".[20] The phenomenon of the 'youth revolt' affected governments throughout the world: in affluent Western societies, in Communist states, and in the underdeveloped nations of the 'Third World'. While by international standards Australian youth were (and still are) comparatively inactive in politics, their political radicalism, especially in the universities, grew to the extent that they frequently captured headlines in the media, became the subject of many journal articles and TV commentaries, and provoked the wrath of politicians. After the precipitating factors of Vietnam and conscription, youth dissenters flocked into the peace movement, and, as will be shown in the last section of this dissertation, profoundly affected the nature of its development. Unfortunately, general inquiries into the sources of the upsurge in youth involvement,[21] as well as a detailed

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20. C. Wright Mills, *'The New Left'*, in *Power, Politics and People*, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1963, p. 259.

21. For some of the theories offered to account for the fluctuations in the political activity of youth, see: Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*, Princeton University Press, N.J., 1949; Rudolph Heberle, *Social Movements*, Appleton Century-Crofts, N.Y., 1951; B. Berelson *et al.*, *Voting*, University of Chicago Press,

[*Footnote 21 continued on next page*]

examination of their grievances and demands,[22] must be omitted for reasons of space.

The humanitarian dissenter denotes that type of individual whose opposition to governmental policy is based upon a highly integrated set of secular moral values. Although these values may not contravene the values of the society, they are interpreted in such a way as to promote policies that deviate sharply from establishment practices. The humanitarian dissenter usually presents himself as a reformer. He argues that the basic tenets of the society (particularly the democratic and humanistic ethos) are not being fulfilled. He calls for normative changes that will preserve or regain the threatened or lost values. Since a "dialectic of disorder"[23] is arising from a widening of the gap (in his

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[*Footnote 21 continued from previous page*]

Ill., 1954; H.H. Hyman, *Political Socialization*, Free Press of Glencoe, N.Y., 1959; S.M. Lipset, *'Student Opposition in the United States'*, *Government and Opposition*, Vol. I, No. 3, April 1966; S. Putney & R. Middleton, *'Some Factors Associated with Student Acceptance or Rejection of War'*, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27, No. 5, 1962; Lewis S. Feuer, *The Conflict of Generations*, Basic Books, N.Y., 1969; *'Bringing Up Baby'*, *Newsweek*, 23 September, 1968; Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth*, Harcourt, Brace & World, N.Y., 1968; and Raymond Aron, *The Elusive Revolution: An Anatomy of Student Revolt*, Pall Mall, London, 1969.

22. Perhaps the best of many treatises here are Raymond Williams (*ed.*), *May Day Manifesto 1968*, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968; and Perry Anderson & Robin Blackburn (*eds.*), *Towards Socialism*, Fontana, London, 1965. This writer has compiled a synthesis of 'New Left' ideas in *'The New Left: Old Wine into New Bottles Controversy'*, *World Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, University of Queensland Press, July 1970.

23. A term used by Arnold Kaufman in *'Where Shall Liberals Go?'*, *Dissent*, N.Y., Vol. XIII, No. 5, September-October 1966, pp. 553-624; and in *The Radical Liberal: New Man in American Politics*, Atherton Press, N.Y., 1968.

opinion) between the rhetoric of the establishment and the reality of its actions, he joins the peace movement and appeals to all who will listen for a closing of that gap.

He rejects out of hand the contention of the so-called 'liberal realist' that concern for morality in political judgment and action is "mere moralism". In the words of Arnold Kaufman - a pleader for the narrowing of the gap - this "attitude [*i.e.*, that moral considerations are irrelevant to matters of policy because they require political, not moral judgment] leads to an identification of national security with *any* national interest, and then to identification of national prestige with national security".[24]

Thus the humanitarian dissenter shows great disdain for the pragmatic politician who sacrifices principle for the sake of power and position. At the opposite end of a moralist/opportunist continuum, he, himself, rejects political compromise even when he knows that the advocacy of his morality at the expense of expediency may mean that his principles will never be implemented.

Nevertheless, such a failure to compromise and achieve concrete results does not mean that he is acting irrationally and is unable to "maximise his utilities" in the Downsian sense.[25] Although his rewards

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24. *'Where Shall Liberals Go?'*, p. 577 (parenthesis added).

25. Downs's economic theory of democracy stipulates that rationality in the political as well as the economic sphere "refers solely to a man who moves toward his goals in a way which, to the best of his knowledge, uses the least possible input of scarce resources per unit of valued output". (Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, Harper & Row, N.Y., 1957, p. 5.)

from political activity are not received in economic, material or status benefits, he does achieve certain psychological satisfactions which may be important to his well-being.[26] Thus his political actions may provide quick rewards in "establishing his self-identity and confirming his notion of the sort of person he sees himself to be".[27] Parkin, who found much political behaviour in his surveys of middle class CND supporters motivated by these kinds of considerations, has labelled such behaviour "expressive politics" in contradistinction to "instrumental politics" where the emphasis is on achieving concrete and specific goals.[28]

The humanitarian dissenter can also be characterised by his tendency to examine each problem separately. He does not tend to relate it to some doctrinal or all-embracing theory other than a vague corpus of liberal humanitarianism. The individual issue is tested against a pattern of secular moral values.

Closely allied to this selective and non-doctrinal approach to political issues is the fact that the humanitarian dissenter's perception

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26. For example, note this description by a frequent participant at Melbourne's peace vigils: "Sometimes there is a remarkable, almost indescribable atmosphere, depending on one's mood....The vigil provides an excellent opportunity for meditation, prayer, reflection, creative thinking. One can become so immersed that one just doesn't notice the surroundings. One's psychological moods vary of course. Usually, however, participation proves essentially refreshing." (Geoff Forster, *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 29, Nos. 10 & 11, October-November 1967.)

27. Daniel Katz, *'The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes'*, *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1960, p. 173, quoted in Parkin, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

28. *Ibid.*, Chap. 3 *passim*.

of society tends to conform to the "consensus-status model".[29] He finds no need to construct elaborate doctrines to replace the prevailing one when differences can be settled and goals achieved within the existing framework. In his conception of the political system it is not only possible for the capable and industrious individual to register his views but also to have them implemented. The political system for him is one of diffused power in the Western democracies; and, through an array of voluntary associations that reach a political apex in the nation's parliament, he is able to influence decisions.

Since it is very difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile such a perception of the political system to a style of "expressive politics", the upholding of principle and a refusal to compromise, the humanitarian dissenter is inevitably left with four possible courses of action if he hopes to resolve his dilemma. On the positive side, he can alter his style to "instrumental politics", in which case he probably leaves the peace movement; or he can adopt a "conflict-class" perception of society and embrace a radical doctrine. Negatively, he can decide to retreat from political activism into cynical apathy; or he can simply dismiss the contradiction and confine his efforts *solely* to the achieving of psychological rewards.

The religious dissenter in Australia - a nation with relatively few non-Christian churches - is almost invariably a person opposing

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29. See *supra*, p. 11, fn. 14.

establishment practices on the basis of a Christian doctrine.[30] If he joins the peace movement, his commitment will probably be based upon one of two major doctrinal arguments: either he will be rejecting war totally in the long standing tradition of Christian pacifism,[31] a position that derives its arguments chiefly from a literal interpretation of the "Spirit of Christ" and the church's primitive history; or he will be resorting to the theory of the "just war" developed by St. Thomas Aquinas and others.[32] Two of the conditions for a war to be 'just' are that it must hold out a clear chance of victory, and it must distinguish between combatants and innocent non-combatants. Since wars conducted with ABC weapons and a particular war like Vietnam fail, in the minds of some Christians, to meet these criteria,[33] the post World War II period has seen the involvement in peace politics of many Christians other than the traditional pacifists.

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30. There are some notable exceptions. Thus the joint editors of the pacifist journal *The Peacemaker*, Shirley and Vivienne Abraham, are both Jews. The former told the author that she based her pacifism on the teachings of Judaism (Interview, 22 August, 1966).

31. For an historical analysis of the pacifist wing of the church, see G.F. Nuttall, *Christian Pacifism in History*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958.

32. For a history of the evolution of the "just war" theory, see R.H. Bainton, *Christian Attitudes Toward War and Peace*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1960.

33. For example, an active supporter of the Australian peace movement, the Rt. Rev. J.S. Moyes, an Anglican bishop, declared in a sermon in early 1966 that Australia was fighting an "unjust war" in Vietnam because: "He would be a bold man who prophesied that the success of the U.S. armies in Vietnam was even likely, much less assured"...and "we are at best playing for safety for ourselves at dreadful cost to a tiny nation". (Quoted in *The Australian*, 4 April, 1966.)

On the other hand, some of the peace movement's most bitter opposition comes from the Christian church. Some of the clergy and laity believe that society by tolerating the peace movement is encouraging pro-communist and atheistic forces bent on destroying the ecclesiastical church and the spirit of evangelicalism, thus ultimately depriving the individual of the right to worship as he sees fit.

Most churchmen, though, would appear to be unresponsive to the appeals for political involvement from either contingent - preferring to concentrate on the pietistic Christian values of "individual salvation", "right relationships", "personal responsibility", *etc.* For them, involving Christianity in contentious politics would undermine not only the unity within the churches, but the other institutions that stabilise the society as well. If they helped to create social instability, they would be acting, in many cases, against non-religious interests which they wish to preserve and promote.

Sectarianism

Amongst all types of dissenters one is apt to find some peace activists who display the characteristics of the religious sectarian. If one might use the term these persons are secular sectarians. That is, their reaction against the society's alleged betrayal of its values or of Western humanitarian ideals leads them to a position of "normative purism". They strive to close completely the gap that they maintain exists between the professed ideals and the perversion of the implementing programmes - not just to narrow the gap.

Sectarianism in Christianity manifests the same phenomenon. The sects are not rejecting the religion of the ecclesiastical church; on the contrary, they are seeking to restore it to its original, purified and spiritual form from which it has fallen through compromise with the secular world. "The sect", explains Troeltsch, "appeals to the... performance of the moral demands, which, at bottom, are founded only upon the Law and the Example of Christ."[34] In contrast, "the world with all its ordinances came to be regarded as a solid and unchangeable mass of evil, a system which could only be accepted or rejected en bloc".[35] Denominationalism, too, constitutes a reaction against the way in which the ecclesiastical church has adapted God's absolute law to the relativities and necessities of worldly concerns, including the politics of the state; yet the denomination, as shown by Niebuhr, is a stage removed from the sect, since its perfectionist demands have been ameliorated, and compromises of sorts entered into with the temporal world.[36]

Like their religious counterparts, the peace denominationalists and the peace sectarians are reacting against the practices of power politics and *raison d'etat*, wishing to recapture the 'true' spirit of Western man and re-establish the society's higher, guiding humanitarian or

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34. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1931, p. 334.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

36. See H.R. Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism*, Henry Holt, N.Y., 1929.

Judaic-Christian principles - all, of course, as they have interpreted them. In the case of the peace sectarians, who are rejecting *in toto* the evil of the establishment and its practices, their inability to compromise the logic of their position with the social realities of power and conflict conforms in many ways to what Karl Mannheim has described as "utopian thinking". That is, they become "so strongly interested in the destruction and transformation of a given condition of society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition of society....Their thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a direction for action".[37] If such a description seems particularly harsh, it at least accounts for the *volte-face* of proclaimed pacifists like Lord Bertrand Russell and John Middleton Murry, who traversed from a 'soft line' towards Germany in 1936, to - when the A-bomb was monopolised by the U.S. and Great Britain after the War - advocating that the West threaten Russia with nuclear incineration if she did not agree to the international control of atomic energy,[38] to returning to a 'soft line' of unilateral nuclear disarmament once the Russians had exploded their own bomb.

Within the Australian peace movement the peace sectarians represent only a minority of the total number of supporters, yet it is generally

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37. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth & Edward Shils, Harcourt, Brace & Co., N.Y., 1936, p. 40.

38. Russell and Murry were strongly condemned for taking this position by the Australian pacifist journal *The Peacemaker* (January 1949).

the sectarians who occupy the positions of leadership. The hierarchical structures of most peace groups, especially the *ad hoc* and less durable groups, are mobile enough to reward effort and talent with leadership responsibilities; and it is exactly those volunteers with clarity of vision, not beset with doubts - *i.e.*, the sectarians - who usually have the greatest determination and motivation.

Peace Movement Pressure Groups

Within the peace movement the various peace organisations, whether they recognise it or not, are engaged in pressure group activity. In the capacity of non-partisan party organisations they ostensibly seek to influence a phase of public policy, yet they are "never themselves prepared to undertake the direct government of the country".[39]

On the basis of a fairly recently adopted classification of pressure groups into two ideal types - interest groups and attitude groups[40] - the peace bodies decidedly fall within the ambit of the attitude group. The distinction between the two types is drawn from objective criteria pertaining to an organisation's aims, characteristics and *modus operandi* rather than its subjective motives, *i.e.*, whether it is 'self regarding' or 'other regarding'; 'selfish' or 'altruistic'. The interest group

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39. S. Finer, *Anonymous Empire*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1958, p. 2.

40. See Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1960; Allen Potter, *Organised Groups in British Politics*, Faber & Faber, London, 1961; and Francis G. Castles, *Pressure Groups and Political Culture*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1967.

contrasts with the attitude group in that it is designed to protect and advance the shared interests of a clearly defined section of the community - an occupational, economic, racial, ethnic, *etc.* section. Its potential membership is delimited by the number of people actually belonging to the section. Acting in the capacity of the section's representative, it will continue in this rôle theoretically no matter what the outcome of a single issue. (Of course, this excludes the ad hoc interest group formed with only one objective in mind.) A primary characteristic of the interest group is that it measures success by tangible achievements rather than the upholding of moral principles or ideals. Thus it tends to concentrate its activities at those points of the power structure where immediate and decisive results can be obtained. It conforms, for the most part, to the norms of pluralist democracy; the lobbying of legislative bodies, executive bureaucracies and political leaders ranks high among the order of its tactical operations.

On the other hand, the attitude group is set up to achieve a specifically delimited objective or generally articulated cause defined in terms of its members' shared attitudes. Since the source of support comes from the common attitudes that people have and not from their sectional interest, the precise limits of the potential membership are difficult to fix. The attitude group is at best semi-permanent, in that it only exists as long as its objective or cause is unattained.

While a variety of universal factors condition and influence the course of every pressure group's activity,[41] the attitude group *qua* attitude group still has its preferred methods of operation. For example, the group is not necessarily structured to function in accordance with the political institutions through which power is normally exercised in the society. Due to the unlimited nature of its potential constituency, the usually limited state of its wealth and expertise, the trans-sectional nature of its demands, *etc.*, the group is constrained to activate third parties on its behalf and to recruit additional supporters through the techniques of 'grass roots' campaigning. Its activities tend to concentrate on feeding out information to both its own supporters and prospective converts rather than operating directly on the centres of power - the strategy being to effect a shift in public norms that will eventually be reflected in the decisions of the power holders.

The attitude and the interest group are, of course, ideal types. The particular peace group will manifest an admixture of both types, and there will be marked differences of degree from group to group. Yet despite the nuances all the peace bodies discussed throughout this thesis conform basically to the attitudinal type of pressure group.

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41. For example, the sort of determinants Smelser applies to collective behaviour: the society's structural conduciveness, structural strains, the group's effectiveness at communicating its views, the appearance of precipitating factors that highlight structural strains, the ability of the group to mobilise its resources and exert pressure, and the social controls countered by the society. (Smelser, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-18.)

Prototypes of Militant and Moderate Tactics[42]

This typology of political behaviour with regard to tactics is adumbrated on the basis of three main characteristics. Firstly, the militant is reluctant to compromise or make *quid pro quo* deals, either with his fellow dissenters or with opponents outside the movement. He persists in holding to a maximum set of demands, which he relates *inter alia* to integrity, principle, refinement of ideological position, or analysis of the co-optive and vitiating devices at the command of the power structure. He tends to diabolise his opponents, resorting to the battle rhetoric of calling them 'enemies', 'war-mongers', 'crypto-fascists', or the like. At best they escape with the epithet of 'bloody opportunists'. He sees them as united in their opposition to his cause, and deems them intractable and impervious to reason. By contrast, the moderate seeks incremental gains and is more apt to evaluate others in terms of gradations. He wants to concentrate his efforts on persuading the more tractable, influential members of the society. Assuming the rôle of bargainer, he is inclined to consider his opponent, not as an 'enemy' but as a 'counterpart' merely expressing a different point of view. If this 'counterpart' is fair-minded, he will respond to argument once the discrepancy between the establishment's rhetoric and the reality of its actions is pointed out.

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42. The prototypes have been constructed, in part, from James Q. Wilson, *Negro Politics - The Search for Leadership*, Free Press, N.Y., 1960, pp. 214-250. See also Lawrence Grauman Jnr., *'The Goals of Dissent'*, *Nation* (American), 11 December, 1967.

Secondly, consistent with the first characteristic of non-bargaining and the 'package deal', the tactical militant advocates confronting authority directly, instead of utilising the established intermediary institutions and abiding by rules and mores devised (he claims) by the manipulative power holders to thwart 'genuine' change. Since his opponents compose an "undifferentiated bloc of corporate and political leaders who act largely in unison towards agreed goals out of essentially identical motives",[43] his radical demands will never penetrate this wall of opposition unless he is able to destroy the legitimacy of the régime. Thus non-violently or violently he resorts to the counteraction of compulsion, and to the threat of sanctions or deprivations. In contradistinction, the moderate, stressing the pliability of the system and displaying more faith in the amenability of men as well as in his own ability to persuade them, chooses the way of reconciliation and compromise. When confronted with an issue impasse, instead of calling for a mass assault upon the establishment's citadel, the moderate speaks the language of delay, reconsideration, conferences, fact-finding committees and the like.

The third aspect of the militant's syndrome is that he undertakes actions designed to lead to the mobilisation of a mass movement. He wants to proselytise aggressively at the 'grass roots' level, so that an incorruptible, *vox populi, vox Dei*, power base can be forged capable of

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43. Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 226.

effectively challenging authority. If the politics of access is futile, then the only alternative is to generate mass pressure from the 'rank and file' below. The militant also ascribes an ennobling quality to the commitment of large numbers of individuals to an idealistic cause. Not only does mass action have an intrinsic value all its own, but pragmatically it serves as a process for involving people in the movement - an important step in the building of the movement for the long term struggle ahead.

The moderate, on the other hand, is apt to regard mass action as dangerous, uncontrollable, even vulgar. Instead of mobilising aggressively at the 'grass roots' level, he seeks entrée into selective areas. The peace movement moderates frequently directed their efforts at gaining the support of ALP parliamentarians and of church, university and other community leaders. Securing the names of distinguished persons as sponsors, speakers and participants - it was thought - would build the movement's prestige, hence bring more 'respectables' into it, and eventually provide the power necessary to bargain with.

The militant is inclined to have great contempt for these 'genteel' sort of tactics. He insists that people must accept him as he is. He has no intention of compromising his principles or behaviour for the sake of winning a few converts, who, in the end, when the government applies counter-pressure, will only prove untrustworthy. In the polar terminology of Harold Lasswell who speaks about agitator and negotiator

types, the militant displays many of the characteristics Lasswell has ascribed to an agitator called "Mr. A":

> *"A leading characteristic as moralist, socialist and pacifist has been his truculence in public. Mr. A speaks rapidly, with great fervour and earnestness, and his discourse is studded with abusive epithets, sarcastic jibes, and cutting insinuations. He confesses that he has taken an unmistakable pleasure in 'rubbing the fur the wrong way'. He enjoys nothing better than accepting an invitation to lecture on social and economic subjects before conservative audiences, and scandalising them...."*[44]

Inasmuch as the militant is disposed towards behaving like "Mr. A", it is not too surprising that when peaceful and legal means have failed (such as after the 1966 Federal election), the militant sometimes feels justified in resorting to illegal methods and even using physical force and violence. The moderate, of course, continues to espouse the need for compromise and to maintain operations within the gamut of the law - even when efforts in this direction appear doomed to repeated failure and there might be a fair measure of success through the use of coercion.

There are some peace activists who engage in militant tactics, yet do not fit, in many respects, the foregoing description of the militant prototype. Unlike "Mr. A", the agitator, they are extremely docile. Moreover, they express love for their opponents. They are not interested in mobilising a people's movement to challenge the legally constituted power structure. What they do share with other militants is a

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44. Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1930, p. 80.

reluctance to negotiate and compromise and a propensity for engaging in acts of civil disobedience and other forms of direct confrontation. However, rather than their motive being to challenge authority, they commit militant acts as an expression of personal conscience and as a means of bearing witness to the cause of peace. Their intention is to define themselves through their actions and to persuade others (including authority) through the example of their testament. Since the effect of this tactic - apart from the motive - is to operate outside pluralist orthodoxy and to assert 'moral rightness' above legal authority, such actions have the potential of weakening the existing political system and undermining its legitimacy. Hence they are basically militant.

CHAPTER II

THE 1959 MELBOURNE PEACE CONGRESS AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT THAT PRECEDED IT

Throughout this study it is advisable to bear in mind the distinction between the movement's pacifist and pacificist wings. While these two sections shared a general peace ethos, agreed on many policies, and frequently co-operated in joint projects and campaigns, the differences in their credos on the use of physical force, as well as the differences in their historical origins and developments, set them generically apart and assured their organisational and operational autonomy.

During the 1960's the pacifist wing[1] continued to function in much the same way as it had since the beginning of the century,[2] and its numbers and political influence, if any, did not substantially alter.

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1. The pacifist organisations - many of which were co-ordinated by the Federal Pacifist Council (the Australian Section of the War Resisters' International) - included the various independent state branches of the Peace Pledge Union, Fellowship of Reconciliation, Quaker Peace Committee, Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (though WILPF is not strictly speaking a pacifist group), and the Victorian based Pacifist Movement.

2. For a personalised but thorough and fascinating account of the first fifty years of *pacifist* organisations in Australia, see Eleanor M. Moore, *The Quest for Peace - As I Have Known It in Australia*, Wilke & Co., Melbourne, 1949. The two main pacifist journals, *Peacewards* (1915-1942) and *The Peacemaker* (1939 to present), provide the most detailed record of the past fifty-five years.

The pacifists did manage to gain a few new recruits following the passage of the 1964 Amendments to the National Service Act, when they set up Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committees in each of the six states, the New England area, and the A.C.T., but the major, long established bodies generally remained static. On the other hand, the pacificist wing not only constituted numerically and politically the main stream of the movement but underwent some far-reaching changes and rapid growth (to be discussed in the final four chapters).

The origins of the pacificist wing of the 1960's are difficult to assess precisely, a factor which has aided greatly the conspiratorial arguments of the movement's opponents. One critic, J. Normington-Rawling, has argued that a direct lineal ancestry can be traced as far back as the years between the World Wars. In order to prove communist control in the peace movement of the early 1960's, he has asserted that "the Australian Peace Council of these days, under whatever name it goes, derives, in authentic apostolic succession from the League Against Imperialism (LAI) of thirty years ago".[3] This was an organisation which he knew from personal involvement to be dominated by the Communists. Normington-Rawling has even projected the argument further back to an antecedent of the LAI, a little known group operating in the 1920's called The Hands Off India Committee. While the theory of direct lineal descent and its corollary of overlapping membership has formed the

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3. J. Normington-Rawling, *'Recollections in Tranquillity'*, *Quadrant*, Sydney, September 1961.

central theme in the anti-communist attacks upon the pacificist section of the peace movement,[4] few of these critics have traced the continuity-line as far back as the 1920's. What the movement's opponents do uniformly contend - nor is it generally disputed by the movement's protagonists - is that most of the contemporary pacificist groups have links of varying degrees with the Australian Peace Council (APC), organised in Melbourne in 1949.

After a series of peace congresses in the 1950's, the pacificist groups that emerged at the beginning of the last decade consisted mainly of the various permanent state committees formed out of the 1959 Melbourne Peace Congress' state preparatory committees. Many of the

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4. For some of the many examples of this approach, see B.A. Santamaria, *The Peace Game*, National Civic Council, Fitzroy, Vic., November 1959; R.G. Casey, *Press Statement*, External Affairs Department, 16 June, 1959; Garfield Barwick, *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 6 October, 1959, p. 1750; also 27 October, 1959, p. 2280; 10 November, 1959, pp. 2524-28 & pp. 2530-31; 17 November, 1959, p. 2784; and 24 November, 1959, p. 3059; R.G. Menzies, *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, pp. 2345-46; Peter Kelly, *'Peace Movements in Australia'*, *The Bulletin*, 23 June, 1962; Denis Strangman, *'The Peace Movement'*, *Social Survey*, XIII, October 1964, pp. 261-263; also XIII, November 1964, pp. 293-295; and XIV, February 1965, pp. 21-23; *The Bulletin*, 7 November, 1964; Fred Wells, *The Peace Racket*, Ambassador Press, Sydney, 1964; Harold Crouch, James Jupp, Leon Glezer, Peter Samuel (eds.), *The Peace Movement*, 2nd edition, Dissent Pamphlet, Melbourne, 1964 (the 1st edition of this pamphlet is described as "mainly the work of Harold Crouch...the 2nd edition is a composite work"); B.N. Snedden, *CPD, HR*, Vol. 43, 3 September, 1964, pp. 969-972; J.P. Forrester, *Fifteen Years of Peace Fronts*, McHugh Printery, Sydney, *c.* 1966; Anon., *'Who Are the Demonstrators?'*, *The Bulletin*, 26 March, 1966; H. Holt, *CPD, HR*, Vol. 56, 17 August, 1967, pp. 241-243; Fred Wells, *'A Comment on Mr. Guyatt's Chapter'*, Roy Forward & R.H.C. Reece (eds.), *Conscription in Australia*, Univ. of Qld. Press, 1968, Chap. 9; and P.T. Findlay, *Protest Politics and Psychological Warfare - The Communist Role in the Anti-Vietnam War and Anti-Conscription Movement in Australia*, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1968.

critics of this 1959 Congress claimed that the setting up of permanent continuing committees was the chief aim of the Congress' organisers from the very beginning. For instance, writing immediately after the Congress, Frank Knopfelmacher charged: "Yet the main political objective of the Congress has been achieved: the setting up throughout Australia of a network of permanent 'Peace' committees controlled by the warlords in Moscow and Peking, through their agents in the World Peace Council and supported by a significant section of the ALP."[5] Despite the unproven nature of these charges about motives and manipulation, it is true that as a consequence of the Melbourne Congress, every state by mid-1960, with the exceptions of Western Australia and Tasmania,[6] had established a continuing committee.[7] The bases of support of these committees reflected some of the broader backing which had been secured at the 1959 Melbourne

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5. F. Knopfelmacher, *'More Than A Stunt'*, *Observer*, 28 November, 1959. See also *Prospect*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Melbourne, 1960, which asserted that the aim "to set up a permanent peace movement to join the Asian movements in spreading communist propaganda throughout Asia" had been achieved; and Peter Kelly's statement in *The Bulletin*,, 23 June, 1962, that "the main purpose of the Melbourne ANZ Congress *has* been achieved: the institution throughout Australia of a network of permanent 'Peace' committees, controlled by Mowcow through their agents in the World Peace Council and supported by a section of the ALP". (Note similarity with the comment of Dr. Knopfelmacher.)

6. Tasmania did have a group primarily interested in discussion called the Launceston Peace Quest Forum which maintained communicative links with the ANZ Congress in Melbourne. Western Australia continued its branch of the Australian Peace Council which quickly established ties with the new bodies on the East Coast.

7. In Victoria, the Australian and Victorian Peace Councils continued to exist alongside the newly formed ANZ Congress and were not formally disbanded until 1967. Shortly thereafter, the ANZ Congress changed its name to the Congress for International Cooperation and Disarmament (CICD).

Congress beyond the traditional left-wing trade union support. More clerical pacificists, ALP members, and intellectuals now endorsed the activities of the movement. Thus the 1959 Congress represented a milestone in the history of the peace movement in the sense that it stimulated the movement's growth and greatly influenced its form, character and direction during the first half of the 1960's. Even in the middle of the decade, when new peace groups proliferated in response to the Vietnam and conscription issues, the Congress' continuing committees or their lineal descendants tended to dominate the peace scene. Not only were the new groups lacking in experience and resources, but most of them were linked through personnel and 'common cause' to the scions of the Melbourne Congress. Moreover, among the few pacificist groups managing to operate outside the Congress' orbit, some could trace their origins to minority sentiment expressed at the Congress - *e.g.*, the Victorian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (VCND) and its offshoot, the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). In one form or another the 1959 Congress stamped its mark on the movement of the 1960's.

The Congress was also important in its own right, for it represented one of the largest, most controversial, and best publicised projects that the peace movement had undertaken since the anti-conscription campaigns of World War I. For all of these reasons it is worth examining in great detail, but first it is proposed to outline briefly a history of the Australian peace movement, so that the Melbourne Congress - indeed, the entire period of the study - might be seen in the form of an overview.

More specifically, a synopsis of the movement's history will reveal the genesis of some of the current organisations (particularly, the pacifist bodies which seem to be more durable than their pacificist counterparts), and will accent the dichotomy between the pacifists and pacificists as well as the difference between the class dissenters and bourgeois protesters, which traditionally has pervaded the movement.

Synopsis of Peace Movement's Pre-'59 Congress History

Under 19th Century conditions of an *Australian Felix* the need for a peace movement was not urgently felt. Although a few Quaker families had emigrated to Australia and established in the capital city of each colony a Friends' Meeting House, where they could practise the creed of "living in the spirit that taketh away the occasion of all war", it actually took a war - the Boer War - before any real enthusiasm was generated for a peace movement.[8] In addition to the Quakers, opposition to Joseph Chamberlain's call to 'Empire and Imperial Interests' came

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8. Not surprisingly, peace groups and movements are more apt to thrive when the community is either threatened by, engaged in, or suffering the after-effects of a war. Thus going back to the genesis of some of the early pacifist sects, the Quakers gained their strength while England was still in the divisive hatred of the Civil War; the Bohemian Brethren only gathered about Peter Czelcicky after the destruction of their fortified hill of Tabor in 1453 (see G.F. Nuttall, *Christian Pacifism in History*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958, p. 26); and the Anabaptists in 1535 retreated to bear pacifist witness under the leadership of Dutchman Menno Simons (hence becoming known as Mennonites) only after having themselves committed holy slaughter at Munster with "an excess of fanaticism which shocked the civilised world". (R.J. Smithson, *The Anabaptists*, J. Clarke & Co., London, 1935, p. 85.) And, in the present age, the Vietnam War has induced not only a spate of peace organisations but a pacific ethos that has permeated a large section of the society.

from a middle class organisation called the Peace and Humanity Society, most of whose members did not consider themselves strict pacifists but were inclined to regard this particular war as unjust and inhumane,[9] and from *The Bulletin*, as well as from "a small group of parliamentarians (Labor) and a fairly large group of unionists (most importantly the leaders of the A.W.U.)".[10]

The War's conclusion brought about an early end to this first Australian peace protest. Nevertheless, in 1905, Branches of the London Peace Society were formed in both Sydney and Melbourne. While the Peace Society's formal aims did not completely outrule military defence, the executive officers and more active members consistently steered a pacifist line. The President of the Melbourne Chapter, Rev. Dr. Charles Strong, a staunch pacifist, founded the small pacifist journal *Peacewards* in 1915, which served as the main pacifist organ until his death in 1942. Its rôle was subsequently assumed by the Federal Pacifist Council's publication, *The Peacemaker*.[11]

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9. Eleanor M. Moore, *op.cit.*, p. 19.

10. Ian Turner, *Industrial Labor and Politics - The Dynamics of the Labour Movement in Eastern Australia, 1900-1921*, A.N.U. Press, Canberra, 1965, p. 68.

11. In 1949, the Curator of the Swarthmore College Peace Collection in the U.S.A. deemed *Peacewards* had the longest life of any pacifist journal in the world (noted in Moore, *op.cit.*, p. 32). *Peacewards'* record as a continuous pacifist publication has, of course, now been surpassed by a number of journals, including its Australian successor, *The Peacemaker*. This journal, which began in 1939, was taken over, following the outbreak of World War II, by the Federal Pacifist Council of Australia, a co-ordinating body for various pacifist groups. It is currently being published monthly in Sydney under the editorship of Vivienne Abraham, a Jewish pacifist.

When the Cook Fusion Government in 1910 introduced compulsory military training for schoolboys between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, a group known as the Australian Freedom League arose to fight the compulsory aspects of the new Defence Act, and to assist in court action as many boys as possible who contested their involuntary enrolment.[12] While the Freedom League's manifesto stated it was "not opposed to a Defence Force enrolled upon the voluntary principle",[13] most of its leaders, as in the case of the London Peace Society, were avowed pacifists. They were extremely successful in building up the League's membership, which by 1914 numbered some 55,000 persons.[14] However, the League was quickly disbanded at the outbreak of the War. The atmosphere in Australia, noted Jauncey, "was so strongly patriotic that members of the league felt that anything that they might do would be misunderstood".[15]

While a few class dissenters had rallied their support behind the League, most of the 'political left' had endorsed the position of ALP leaders Mr. Andrew Fisher, Mr. W.M. Hughes, and Mr. George Pearce, who

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12. The Defence Act's compulsory clauses met stiff opposition. Between January 1912 and June 1914, 27,749 prosecutions were instituted for non-registration. Most of these resulted in fines paid by the parents, but 5,732 youths were imprisoned in fortresses and other military places or in civil prisons for failure to register. (See L.C. Jauncey, *The Story of Conscription in Australia*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1935, p. 53.)

13. Moore, *loc.cit.*, p. 24.

14. See K.S. Inglis, *'Conscription in Peace and War, 1911-1945'*, Forward & Reece (*eds.*), *op.cit.*, p. 28.

15. Jauncey, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

were adamantly committed to the idea of a 'citizen army'. Such an army, it was argued, would provide the country with a democratic defence system and stem the growth of a professional 'military class'. For a time these parliamentarians were able to carry with them the industrial wing of the Party. It was only after the overseas conscription crisis of World War I that the ALP was led to renounce, in 1919, all forms of compulsory military service. This was followed by an ALP request in the 1920's to a Royal Commission on the Federal Constitution that military conscription should be outlawed. Yet, when the Party regained office in 1929, Prime Minister J.H. Scullin did not repeal conscription. He merely suspended it on economic grounds.

The greatest victory ever achieved by the Australian peace movement occurred during World War I over the two conscription referenda. The two campaigns against conscription for overseas service represent the only occasions when peace dissenters have confronted the Australian Establishment on matters of major policy, and won. Since the history of these campaigns has been well chronicled[16] and is far too complex to

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16. For some of these accounts, see *ibid.*; Turner, *op.cit.*, pp. 97-121; Inglis, *op.cit.*, pp. 29-45; J.P. Fletcher & J.F. Hills, *Conscription Under Camouflage*, Adelaide, 1919; Ernest Scott, *'Australia During the War'*, Vol. XI of the *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918*, 9th ed., Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1943; A.E. Davies (on behalf of the Anti-Conscription Jubilee Committee), *The Peacemaker*, Melbourne, October 1966; L.F. Fitzhardinge, *William Morris Hughes, A Political Biography*, Vol. I: *That Fiery Particle*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1964; F.B. Smith, *The Conscription Plebiscites in Australia 1916-1917*, Victorian Historical Association, Melbourne, 1965; and Peter Heydon, *Quiet Decision, A Study of George Foster Pearce*, Melbourne Univ. Press, Carlton, Vic., 1965.

reconstruct here, only the base and peripheral support of the movement will be mentioned. The most important point is that although the pacifists, the religious dissenters and the intellectual socialists were very active in the campaigns, they did not exercise a dominant rôle. The force of the 'anti' movement came from the trade unions - that is, from a coalition between the militant class dissenters, which included the I.W.W. and the Victorian Socialist Party,[17] and the conservative A.W.U., whose leadership was still imbued with that union's traditional 'spirit of nationalism' and 'freedom from old world entanglements'. The coalition took root in a power struggle within the ALP between its industrial and parliamentary wings. Important criticism also emanated from a section of the Catholic Church. The Coadjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, Dr. Mannix, who was deeply critical of the wrongs inflicted upon the Irish during the Easter Rising, led a condemnation of this "sordid trade war" and the men who would call up Australian youth to fight it for them. And finally, as Turner points out, although the normally anti-ALP farmers never participated actively in the movement, their 'NO' vote was a decisive factor in the outcome of the referenda.[18] To many of these farmers a shortage of labour on the farms meant the loss of good seasons, so they were unwilling to support the conscription of more valuable labour. Besides, the farmers had a grievance against the Government for not being able to market their products abroad. On the

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17. Turner, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 113-116 & p. 165.

other hand, the labourers, who worked on the farms and normally voted ALP, displayed less support for the 'NO' vote than did their counterparts in the cities, but the drift of their votes from the anti-conscriptionist cause was more than offset by the votes of their employers. When a 'crisis' vote took place fifty years later in the general elections of 1966, the ALP was unable to capitalise on the fortuitous defection of a rural vote.[19]

The Great War had stimulated the formation of countless peace organisations. These included the Melbourne based Australian Peace Alliance which eventually spread to all the mainland capitals except Sydney, the Australian Union of Democratic Control for the Avoidance of War which was located in Sydney and took its name and principles from the Union of Democratic Control in England, the various Anti-Conscription Leagues, the No-Conscription Fellowship, the Women's Peace Army, and the Sisterhood of International Peace. Only the last-named survived the War by more than a few years, and in 1920 it changed its name to the Australian section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom.[20] The Australian WILPF is still active today with chapters in all six states.

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19. An exception was the support the ALP received from some W.A. farmers over the failure of the Government to implement fully the Ord River Scheme.

20. The Sisterhood also linked up for a short period with the World Union of Women for International Concord, a body inaugurated in 1919 in Switzerland under the leadership of Madame Clara Guthrie D'Arcis.

Following the second conscription referendum, the trade unions and the Labor Party were distracted from the immediate issues of war and peace, when they became increasingly involved in an intensified class rivalry between capitalists and workers. The class dissenters were very suspicious of the newly formed League of Nations Union (LNU), which began with a subsidy from the Government and propagated a line to which the Government was at least officially committed. The LNU relied heavily upon the support of establishment figures and veteran middle class peace campaigners. In 1928, this same coalition spearheaded the formation of the Australian section of the World Disarmament Movement (WDM), which four years later (one year before its demise) sponsored a collection of over 100,000 signatures, including those of Sir John Monash and Prime Minister Scullin, as its part of the longest petition ever assembled in the world, for presentation to the World Disarmament Conference in Geneva.[21]

Meanwhile, the 'political left' had decided to set up its organisation, the League Against Imperialism (LAI), in Sydney, towards the end of 1930. The LAI met with little success in gaining popular support, so that in 1933 some of the more active left-wingers formed a Provisional National Anti-War Committee[22] which convened a series of state conferences and a

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21. Moore, *op.cit.*, pp. 86-93.

22. Included among the list of members on the Provisional Committee were Senator A. Rae and E.J. Ward MHR; Rev. A. Rivett of the Congregational Church; A.E. Chapman, Secretary of the ARU; J.B. Steel of the ALP and Howard Prison Reform League; and E.M. Higgins of the Communist Party.

national conference. Out of these conferences came the Movement Against War, with the word 'fascism' later appended to form the title MAW&F. This group, like its predecessor, made little pretence at disguising its opposition to the 'entrenched' class structure. The opening lines of each conference's resolution would read: "The workers by hand and brain united in this Conference...." There were constant admonitions about the perfidy of the capitalists: "...the Conference warns the public against placing faith in Government institutions and especially the League of Nations, which functions at Geneva as the immediate mouthpiece of the Imperialist Powers."[23]

A few years later the MAW&F abruptly changed its attitude towards the League of Nations and the 'Imperialist Powers'. The *volte-face* was connected with the rise of German militarism, and the decision of Russia - the leader of a large section of the International Left - to join the League of Nations and to work for armed collective security. In Australia, as throughout the world, the two wings of the peace movement, the League of Nations Union and the MAW&F, converged into a gigantic movement called the International Peace Campaign (IPC), though the two founding organisations also retained their separate identities. The IPC had evolved out of an international peace congress convened in September 1936 at Brussels by Pierre Cot, the Minister for Air in the French Popular Front Government, and by Lord Robert Cecil, the President of the

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23. Quoted in Moore, *op.cit.*, p. 114.

LNU in Great Britain and the Dominions. The congress was openly supported by the Comintern.

The Brussels congress produced a document setting forth four cardinal points to be accepted by all affiliating bodies. The third of these points, which, as Lord Cecil explained, sanctioned the use of collective military action as a last resort, proved unacceptable to many pacifists, who therefore refused to join the IPC. Instead, nearly one thousand Australians took the famous pledge of the Peace Pledge Union: "I am determined not to support *any* war, and will work for the removal of the causes of war."[24] The leader of the British Peace Pledge Union, Canon 'Dick' Sheppard, interpreted the pledge to mean a rejection of "the internationalism of the League of Nations and of collective security [which] is a larger patriotism...the tribal spirit magnified, but unchanged in essence".[25] By accepting this interpretation the Peace Pledge Union groups that sprang up in Melbourne (May, 1938), in Sydney (September, 1938), and in Adelaide (the following year) stood in direct opposition to the IPC.

Thus the IPC drove a breach into the long standing alliance between the pacifists and the *non*-class dissenting pacificists, whereas it cemented the alliance, which had fallen apart at the end of the Great War, among the various types of pacificist dissenters. However, despite

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24. *Ibid.*, p. 127.
25. Quoted in *ibid.*

the wide pacificist endorsement that the IPC received, it did fail to gain the support of a vital section of the trade union movement which remained opposed to the concept of collective security and the implementation of League of Nations' sanctions, largely for reasons of traditional nationalism.

Meanwhile, an attempt was made to revitalise the MAW&F by changing its name to the League for Peace and Democracy, but this group did not survive the hectic events of 1939. Nor did the larger composite body of pacificists - that is, the IPC - continue after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the expulsion of Russia from the League of Nations for her invasion of Finland. In fact, when the Second World War broke out, almost the entire pacificist wing of the peace movement disintegrated. Only the communists pursued a consistent policy of moderation in defence matters prior to the invasion of Russia, but after June 1941 they became ardent supporters of the war.[26]

Alienated from other groups and with few individual sympathisers, the pacifist groups, which had proliferated in the years immediately preceding the War, persevered in their peace work.[27] Yet the number of

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26. Four thousand communists are reported to have served in the armed forces during the War, a much higher figure comparatively than from any of the other political parties. (John D. Playford, *Doctrinal and Strategic Problems of the CPA, 1945-1962*, Ph.D. Thesis, ANU, 1962, p. 22.)

27. Some of the larger pacifist groups, in addition to the Peace Pledge Union, were the Christian Pacifist Movement, the Legion of Christian Youth, the Christian Service Legion and the Goodwill Service Fellowship. All had religious roots.

their own supporters even drastically declined as the war progressed. The nation was engaged in what was generally considered a war of survival, and few peace-oriented issues arose around which to mobilise support for a doctrine of pacifism. The most potentially explosive issue - that of anti-conscription - was astutely muted by the Labor Prime Minister, John Curtin,[28] who gained from ALP Conference approval for an extension of the perimeter in which conscripts could serve, thus isolating the opposition from A.A. Calwell and E.J. Ward that operated within the Parliamentary party. The way in which Curtin handled the sensitive issue of compulsory overseas service is contrasted by K.E. Beazley with the procedures adopted by Hughes twenty-five years before:

> *"Where Hughes had ignored the movement as a whole and had dealt only with the Parliamentary party, Curtin assumed that the outside movement could be won to his policies ....The attacks made on him in the Parliamentary party were neutralised. There are, of course, differences of situation in the two World Wars. The battle-fields of 1914-18 were remote, of 1941-45 near. But the fundamental difference is that Curtin was profoundly trusted in the Labor movement."*[29]

Despite the blunting of the conscription issue (or perhaps on account of it), the ostracism and persecution of the pacifists never reached the intensity that occurred during World War I. While some persons claiming

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28. Curtin possessed excellent credentials for diverting the anti-conscription attack within his party, because during the World War I 'anti' campaigns he had served as the Secretary of the Interstate Trade Union Anti Conscription Congress, the key body through which the unions had mobilised their opposition.

29. K.E. Beazley, *Canberra Times*, 1 March, 1966.

conscientious objection did go to gaol, a major victory for the pacifists was achieved in the amending of the law relating to conscientious objection.[30] A second notable achievement, of an organisational nature, was the national consolidation of pacifist activities through the establishment of the Federal Pacifist Council (FPC) in June 1942.

In the years immediately following the War's end, the peace movement passed through a phase of relative quietism. Pacifist activity was limited to the usual round of conferences, letter writing to newspapers and politicians, and the publication of numerous pamphlets. The issues taken up by the pacifists extended over a wide range, and included: condemning the use and manufacture of atomic bombs, protesting the establishment of the Woomera Rocket Range in Central Australia, exposing the scandal of the Yoizuki (the little ship in which the Australian Government crammed 1185 Japanese internees for their voyage home), criticising the creation of NATO, praising the United Nations and the principle of world government, and campaigning for the establishment in Australia of a Ministry for Peace.

The other strand of the peace movement, the pacificists, was almost non-existent and certainly undirected. The left wing of the ALP had little time or inclination to align itself with the peace societies, since it was chiefly preoccupied with promoting and implementing Chifley's

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30. This fight was led mainly by the newly formed Christian Pacifist Movement and Federal parliamentarian Maurice Blackburn. In addition, the pacifists could always count on a fair hearing from parliamentarians Dr. W. Maloney (MHR, Melbourne) and Frank Brennan (MHR, Batman).

domestic programmes and Evatt's foreign policies, which emphasised world security through a strong United Nations Organisation. Similarly, the energies of the communists were channelled in other directions: initially in electing their members to Parliament, and then in renouncing the Browder policy of 'class collaboration' and embarking on very militant tactics in the trade union movement as well as waging unremitting war against the ALP.

However, by 1950, both the communist and non-communist left began drifting back into the peace movement. The reasons for this reversion of strategy are multifarious and complex, but basically they can be traced to the series of severe set-backs suffered by the entire political left, as the Cold War heated up. The communists had been routed in a number of strikes, culminating in the disaster of the June to August 1949 coal strike in New South Wales. As well, three of the CPA's officials, including the General Secretary L.L. Sharkey, had been prosecuted under the Crimes Act and given prison sentences; and the Party itself had been banned in the Communist Dissolution Bill of 1950, though this was subsequently invalidated by the High Court and then rejected in a constitutional referendum by the Australian people.

The class and intellectual dissenters in the ALP were also beset with their special tribulations. The ALP had lost the 1949 election, cutting off an important avenue for effecting peace policies, while inside the Party a polarisation of ideologies had developed between 'Groupers' and 'Leftists' that frustrated any promulgation of pacificist

ideas. Furthermore, outside the Party, the Evatt policy of a forceful rôle for the small nations in the United Nations had been shattered by the complete dominance of the Great Powers acting through the Security Council, or - what was considered worse - acting unilaterally outside the United Nations.

As the political left retreated into the attitude groups of the peace movement, they were joined by a contingent of religious pacificists, clergy and laity, who discerned a discrepancy between their Christian morality and the society's political immorality reflected in the condoning of the atomic testing on the Monte Bello Islands, in the serious contemplation of an attack on the Chinese mainland, and in the West's inflexibility at the disarmament table.

The renascence of the pacificist wing of the Australian movement was linked to a series of international peace congresses and organisations - most significantly, to the World Peace Congress in Paris during April 20-25, 1949, which set up a continuing committee that eventually became known as the World Peace Council (WPC). The first formal step in the inauguration of an Australian section of the WPC was taken on July 1, 1949 at a meeting held in the Melbourne home of Unitarian minister Rev. Victor James. Apparently, the only persons present at this meeting, besides Rev. James, were a Presbyterian minister and a Methodist minister, the Rev. A.M. Dickie and the Rev. F.J. Hartley, respectively.[31]

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31. Asserted by Brian Fitzpatrick in letter to the Editor, *The Bulletin*, 7 July, 1962. Mr. Fitzpatrick was replying to an article by Peter Kelly in the June 23rd issue, which had inferred that he (Fitzpatrick) had attended the initial meeting. Mr. Fitzpatrick's information was obtained after a check with Rev. James.

These three men, subsequently to be dubbed the 'three peace parsons', announced a list of twenty-four 'original or foundation members'[32] of the Australian Peace Council (APC), together with a six man national executive elected therefrom.[33] Rev. Dickie was listed as Chairman and Hon. Treasurer, and Rev. James and Rev. Hartley as Joint Hon. Secretaries.

In October, 1949, a N.S.W. Branch of the APC was formed with Lady Jessie Street appointed as Chairman, and Miss Nell Simpson of the ALP as Hon. Secretary. Similar type branches were set up in Queensland and South Australia, and eventually in Western Australia. The national executive was expanded to ten,[34] and included Ian Turner of the CPA, who became the first national organising secretary.[35]

The APC's initial project, the sponsorship of a 'peace ballot', generated considerable interest; in fact, proved so successful that it aroused the antipathy of the nation's press, non-Labor parties, and the

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32. See Appendix C for the names of these members and their identifying organisations and occupations.

33. In addition to the 'three peace parsons', the national executive consisted of Miss Heather Wakefield (Student Christian Movement), Mr. J. Rogers (CPA and Director of Australia-Soviet House), and Mr. J.F. Cairns (then a University lecturer).

34. The four additional members were Canon W.G. Thomas (Church of England), Mr. Alec Robertson (Communist journalist), Mr. Ian Turner (CPA and Australian Student Labor Federation), and Rev. Gwyn Miller (Presbyterian).

35. His successor, Alec Robertson, was also a Communist; and so was Robertson's successor, Stephen Murray-Smith, who in turn was followed by Sam Goldbloom, about whom there have been accusations regarding his Communist Party membership. (See R. Summy, *'A Reply to Fred Wells'*, Forward & Reece, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-212.

right wing of the ALP. The N.S.W. and Victorian Executives of the ALP queried the APC's genuine concern for peace, and on February and March respectively of 1950 declared it a proscribed organisation. This was followed by the Federal Executive's Australia-wide ban on the grounds that the APC "is a subsidiary organisation to the Communist Party".[36]

Condemnation of the APC was not confined to the right wing 'grouper' element in the ALP, the press and non-Labor parties. Many of the pacifists and non-class dissenting pacificists, with long memories of what happened to the IPC in the 1930's after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, expressed doubts about the sincerity of the new peace group and hesitated to join in its activities.[37] The APC suffered a further set-back in June 1950, when three of its more prominent members, J.F. Cairns, Rev. G. Miller and Leonard Mann, announced their resignations, ostensibly because they objected to the way the APC persisted in blaming the origins of the Korean War *solely* on the Americans and South Koreans.

Nevertheless, despite these problems and the general anti-communist climate of the period, the APC managed to survive and even achieve a modicum of success. Its activities consisted mainly of organising congresses in Australia, sending delegations to the various international gatherings, and circulating numerous peace petitions - *inter alia*, the

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36. Federal ALP Executive, *Official Report of Proceedings*, Clause 9, delivered at Federal Conference, March 1951.

37. For details of the debate within the pacifist ranks, see *The Peacemaker* issues: June 1950, p. 3; September 1950, pp. 1 & 2; October 1950, p. 4; September 1951, p. 2; and June 1953, p. 4.

famous Stockholm Peace Petition. During the decade preceding the mammoth 1959 Congress, three national congresses were held: the first in Melbourne from April 16-19, 1950, with the Dean of Canterbury, Dr. Hewlett Johnson as principal guest and speaker; the second in Sydney from September 26-30, 1953, which was entitled the National Convention of Peace and War,[38] and was jointly initiated by a group of clergymen and some pacifists as well as the various branches of the APC (still, the N.S.W. State Executive of the ALP saw fit to ban the Convention to its members); and a third congress in Sydney in September 1956, called the Australian Assembly for Peace which was planned and co-ordinated by members of the Peace Convention and the APC. A feature of the 1956 congress was that it received the backing of one hundred and fifty members of the Labor Party.[39] The split in the ALP, which occurred in 1955 and 1956, had opened up a new avenue of support for the pacificist wing of the peace movement. While the ALP's Federal Conference at Hobart in March 1955 had passed a resolution condemning the use of the communist 'peace tactic', it had not named any particular Australian bodies. Moreover, the ALP Conference had promulgated foreign policies - *e.g.*, withdrawal of Australian troops from Malaya and recognition of the Peoples Republic of China - which coincided with those of the peace movement.

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38. For details of this Convention by an 'insider', see Rev. J.E. Owen, *The Road to Peace*, Melbourne, 1954. For the anti-communist point of view, see some of the sources referred to in fn. 4.

39. *Tribune*, 19 September, 1956, cited in Forrester, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

After each of the peace congresses the network of pacificist organisations proliferated. The line-up of major groups existing on the eve of the 1959 Melbourne Congress (besides the various sponsoring committees of that Congress) was as follows:

N.S.W.	-	N.S.W. Peace Council N.S.W. Australian Assembly for Peace
Queensland	-	Qld. Australian Assembly for Peace
South Australia	-	S.A. Peace Convention
Tasmania	-	Local representatives of APC and Australian Assembly for Peace
Victoria	-	Australian Peace Council Victorian Peace Council Peace Quest Forum[40]
Western Australia	-	W.A. Peace Council

Gradually, during the 1950's, the absolute pacifists had come to support the conventions and petitions conducted by the pacificists. The change in attitude can be attributed partly to the fact that more ministers, even though they were pacificists, were participating in the 'other movement'. Another factor, no doubt, was the change in editorial staff and policy of *The Peacemaker*, which after 1954 came under the control of two successive editors highly sympathetic to the work of the pacificists. The first of these editors, W.J. Latona (July 1955 to September 1957), was active in the N.S.W. Branch of the Peace

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40. The Peace Quest Forum was begun in April 1951 by a group of Melbourne ministers interested in fomenting public discussion on issues of war and peace. It is still in existence today, playing a small, but active rôle.

Convention, and later in the 1960's became a prominent figure in the N.S.W. Peace Committee and the Association for International Control and Disarmament (AICD). His successor (also a pacifist, of course), Rev. E.E. Collocott (October 1957 to October 1960), attended the 1952 Peking Conference and became Chairman of the N.S.W. Peace Council. However, it took an event, the Hungarian Revolution, and the reaction of the majority of pacificists to this sensitive issue, to dispel the scepticism of most pacifists. The Australian Assembly for Peace had expressed outright disapproval of the Soviet Union's intervention;[41] and the APC's Chairman, Rev. Dickie, after having stated his scepticism about the probity of Western reporting and been critical of the false hopes given the Hungarians by Radio Free Europe, had gone on record as being opposed to the use of force in Hungary.[42] Finally, the execution of Nagy in 1958 had brought forth an indignant public outcry from some of the pacificists' leaders.[43]

At the time of the '59 Melbourne Congress, the small pacifist wing of the peace movement was composed of the following main groups:

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41. See *Tribune*, 7 November, 1956.

42. Statement of APC in *Age*, Melbourne, 9 November, 1956. For an expression of the wide range of opinions within the World Peace Council regarding Hungary, see *Tribune*, 5 December, 1956.

43. Letters in *Age*, 10 July, 1958, and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 July, 1958.

N.S.W.	-	Peace Pledge Union (PPU) Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)[44] Quaker Peace Committee (QPC)
Queensland	-	FOR WILPF QPC
South Australia	-	PPU QPC
Tasmania	-	QPC
Victoria	-	FOR WILPF Pacifist Movement of Victoria (PMV)[45]
Western Australia	-	QPC FOR WILPF

The *de facto* co-ordinator for these groups was the Federal Pacifist Council (FPC), which provided a common forum through its monthly journal *The Peacemaker*. The FPC has traditionally rotated its headquarters triennially between Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide; and every year, usually in January, the pacifists have assembled for a National Pacifist Conference. On the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima (August 6th) they commemorate World Peace Day with small services throughout Australia.

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44. Not all members are absolute pacifists.

45. The PMV was formed out of a merger between the Christian Pacifist Movement and the War Resisters League in January, 1952.

Hovering on the periphery of the peace movement in 1959 was a small band of political intellectuals, who can be credited with causing the first stirrings of an Australian New Left.[46] Assuming the rôle of peace movement critics rather than activists, they confined their activities to publishing intellectual magazines and forming discussion groups, but when their ideas (or the spirit of their ideas) took root on the campuses in the middle of the sixties, this element became an important force in determining the peace movement's policies, issues and tactics.

However, at the beginning of the decade the main thrust of the movement clearly came from the class dissenters and to a lesser degree the religious dissenters. And the Melbourne Congress of 1959, *sans doute*, was their congress.

The 1959 Melbourne Congress

In some respects the opponents of the peace movement are correct when they claim that the '59 Congress was just another in a long line of periodic national conferences held approximately every three years. The 'peace tactic' - as the practice is derogatorily termed - had been well established as a means of communicating the movement's generalised beliefs and mobilising the support of additional activists, when Rev. Dickie, Sam Goldbloom and the APC convened a meeting in Melbourne, late 1958, of various peace group representatives to determine whether

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46. See Alan Barcan, *The Socialist Left in Australia, 1949-1959*, Occasional Monograph No. 2, APSA, Sydney, 1960; also Rowan Cahill, *Notes on the New Left in Australia*, Australian Marxist Research Foundation, Sydney, 1969.

support existed for the holding of a mammoth peace congress the following year. Receiving a favourable response, they proceeded to set up the organisational machinery for the fourth national conference since the resuscitation of the pacificist wing in 1949.

Despite the regularity of these conferences, the '59 Congress was different from its predecessors, and represented a milestone in the development of the post-war peace movement, primarily because it was successful in achieving its two main objectives: *i.e.*, firstly, propagandising its pacific views (in large measure through an attack on the illiberality of the opposition's anti-communism); and, secondly, mobilising new supporters and reactivating old ones, thus laying the organisational foundations for a viable mass movement when the precipitating factor of the Vietnam War arose five years later.

A confluence of factors contributed to the Congress' success: (1) the tremendous controversy and publicity that surrounded the Congress; (2) the skill, dedication and industry of the organising committees, particularly that of the Congress Chairman, Rev. Alf Dickie, and the national organising Secretary, Sam Goldbloom; (3) the participation of a group of dissident, critical intellectuals, who vigorously upheld the "right to hold independent political views and insist[ed] that this right shall be accorded to all participants";[47] and (4) the status, calibre and influence of the overseas guests as well as that of some of the local individual and organisational sponsors.

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47. *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 5, Sydney, October 1959.

Considering the array of sponsors and guests that the organisers were able to assemble, it was not too surprising that the Congress soon became controversial and captured national headlines. The 'early' list of sponsors included a large number of outstanding Australians.[48] The ACTU and its affiliated Labor Councils voted to sponsor the Congress, as did the Executive of the Victorian ALP. The State Executive of the N.S.W. ALP decided to send an official delegate-observer, A.G. Platt, a Senior Vice-President of the State Executive,[49] whom the Congress' organisers then accorded a position on the Congress' Planning Committee. And under the prodding of the Victorian delegates and Frank Chamberlain, the Federal Executive of the ALP at least granted the Congress an

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48. Among them were Sir Marcus Oliphant, Research School of Physical Sciences, ANU; Dr. J.H. Green, radiation expert from the Univ. of N.S.W.; Rev. Rex Mathias, Director of the Methodist Department of Christian Education; Prof. A.K. Stout, Professor of Moral and Political Philosophy, Sydney Univ.; Judith Wright, poetess; Arthur Boyd, artist; Lady Jessie Street, an Australian delegate to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in 1945, and wife of a Chief Justice of the N.S.W. Supreme Court; Dr. Barton Babbage, Anglican Dean of Melbourne; Prof. Walter Murdoch, publicist; Dame Mary Gilmore, writer; Percy Cerutty, Olympic coach; Shirley Strickland, athletics star; Frank Chamberlain, President of the Federal ALP; J.D. Kenny, Senior Vice-President of the ACTU and an MLC; and the following MHR's: Clyde Cameron, J.F. Cairns, T. Uren, L. Haylen, E.J. Ward, Frank Crean, and Gordon Bryant.

49. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 November, 1959. For a full report of Mr. Platt's findings, which were adopted by the N.S.W. Executive, see *'A Report to the President and Members of the N.S.W. State Executive of the ALP on the ANZ Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament, held in Melbourne - 7th to 14th November, 1959'*, dated 22 January, 1960, which appeared in *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Sydney, March 1964. In his Report, Mr. Platt said he attempted to investigate the 'bona-fides' of the Congress. The conclusions he reached were all favourable.

equivocal endorsement.[50] The Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, Church of Christ, Society of Friends, Salvation Army and Baptist churches enhanced the Congress' prestige by deciding to send delegates. Among the list of international guests were the names of British authors, J.B. Priestley and his wife Jacquetta Hawkes; Dr. Mulk Raj Anand, an Indian writer and editor of *Marg*; Dr. Linus Pauling of U.S.A., a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry and a subsequent winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1963; Dr. Joseph Rotblat, an associate Vice-President of the British Association of Atomic Scientists; Mrs. Indrani Rathman, a reportedly celebrated Indian dancer, and her troupe of associate artists; and Dean C.W. Chandler, the Anglican Dean-Emeritus of Hamilton, N.Z., and leader of the New Zealand delegation to the Congress.

In addition, the National Secretary, Mr. Goldbloom, announced: "We have had messages from Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt and the Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, expressing their good wishes for the Congress."[51] An unadvertised but appreciated visitor was Dr. G.S. Melkote, an Indian M.P. and member of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Delegation; and an

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50. The Federal ALP Executive announcement which was handed to the press by President Frank Chamberlain read as follows: "The Federal Executive has noted the controversy associated with the forthcoming Melbourne peace conference but the Labor Party believes that under the terms of its Federal Conference decisions any genuine peace movement must be supported. We are aware that members of the ALP and trade unions are attending and will hear with interest their impressions of this conference." (Sydney *Telegraph*, 29 October, 1959.)

51. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 October, 1959. Also pre-Congress leaflet authorised by S. Goldbloom.

unannounced but not unanimously appreciated visitor was Mme. Isabella Blume, a Communist official from Belgium, who addressed the Citizens' Conference within the Congress on the subject of "an armed camp in Western Europe and tyranny in South Vietnam".[52]

The announcement of plans to hold the Australian-New Zealand peace congress, together with the periodic press releases about guests and sponsors, elicited immediate, truculent and not altogether unexpected criticisms from the Congress' many opponents. The main line of attack centred on the issue of covert communist initiation and control. In the words of Sir Garfield Barwick, the Attorney-General and Acting Minister for External Affairs, "this Congress is Communist inspired, Communist organised and devoted to Communist propaganda....This Congress is truly a Communist front...[and] is not intended to be a vehicle for any impartial discussion of international disarmament and peace".[53] A month later, Sir Garfield marshalled his evidence in a lengthy statement before Parliament.[54] His sentiments were echoed by Prime Minister Menzies, who

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52. *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1959. The unscheduled appearance of Mme. Blume on the platform and the accompanying fervent emotionalism that it engendered were seized upon by the critics of the Congress as a prime example of communist manoeuvring from 'behind the scenes'. See Harold Crouch *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 7 & 8; and James Jupp, *'What Really Happened at the Peace Conference'*, *Observer*, 26 December, 1959. Mme. Blume's unexpected presence was also deplored by some persons generally more sympathetic to the peace movement - *e.g.*, see editor's comment, *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1959; and W. Macmahon Ball, *'I Was No Match for Madame'*, *Nation*, 21 November, 1959.

53. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 6 October, 1959, p. 1750.

54. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 10 November, 1959, pp. 2524-28.

proclaimed that "it is perfectly clear that this conference has been made the main 1959 activity of the Communist Party of Australia".[55]

The Anglican Primate of Australia, Dr. H.R. Gough, joined the chorus, expressing his unequivocal disapproval of the Congress, and hoping that "none of our clergy or Church people will have anything to do with it".[56] Almost a fortnight earlier Australia's Anglican archbishops and bishops at their House of Bishops annual meeting had issued a statement, declaring that the ANZ Congress "is being largely planned and directed by a partisan group whose purpose seems to be the dominance of Communism rather than peace based on freedom, truth and justice".[57] Instead of attending the Congress, the bishops "called on members of the Church of England in Australia to intensify their prayers and work for the peace of the world".[58]

On the eve of the Congress a group of ten prominent Victorian church leaders, including the Anglican Archbishop of Melbourne Dr. Woods, issued a press statement, endorsing the stated objectives of the Congress, but explaining why they were not supporting this particular Congress.[59] And at the opening meeting the following day, five members

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55. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, p. 2346.
56. Melbourne *Herald*, 6 November, 1959.
57. *The Courier-Mail*, Brisbane, 26 October, 1959.
58. Sydney *Telegraph*, 26 October, 1959.
59. *The Courier-Mail*, 9 November, 1959, and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 November, 1959.

of the University of Melbourne staff,[60] who insisted they were not 'professional anti-Communists', circulated a pamphlet to fellow Congress delegates, warning against the tactics employed by communists at gatherings like this. Throughout the week this group of academics sustained their criticism, 'caucusing' with other dissidents and receiving a large share of press coverage despite their tiny numbers.

The so-called 'professional anti-Communists' who entered the fray came from as far away as the United States. The Chairman of the International Assembly of Captive European Nations, Mr. S. Korbonski, wrote to the *Sydney Morning Herald* from New York City, charging that the Congress organisers had spent large sums from "the treasury of international Communism to launch one of the least original contemporary political circuses".[61] Mr. Korbonski's organisation shipped to Melbourne an exhibition of forty large panels depicting Russian 'imperialism and terror', which was opened to public viewing by the Victorian State Minister for Housing, Mr. Petty. Among the Australian sponsors of the exhibition were Senator Hannan (Lib., Vic.), Senator McManus (DLP, Vic.), Senator Cole (DLP, Tas.), Mr. Wentworth (Lib. MHR, N.S.W.), and Mr. Wight (Lib. MHR, Qld.).[62]

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60. The five staff members were: Rev. Colin W. Williams, Prof. of Systematic Theology, Queen's College; Rev. George Yule, Prof. of Church History, Ormond College; Mr. Peter Fensham, Lecturer in Chemistry; Mr. Phillip M. Knight, Tutor in Political Science; and Mr. A. Sinclair, Lecturer in Economic History.

61. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 November, 1959.

62. Melbourne *Herald*, 4 November, 1959.

The anti-communists made their presence felt throughout the week of the Congress. Approximately two hundred 'New Australians' marched outside the opening session of the Congress,[63] and smaller numbers continued to protest during the week, distributing leaflets and occasionally interjecting at public meetings. A rival 'Freedom Rally', sponsored by such groups as the Committee of Nationals from Countries Behind the Iron Curtain, the Australia Free China Association, and the Asian People's Anti-Communist League, was staged on the opening day of the Congress. Its featured speakers included the Navy Minister Senator Gorton, Senator Cole, Mr. Wight, and Mr. Ku Cheng Kang, a former Nationalist China Cabinet Minister. A ballet depicting the Hungarian uprising was presented by one of the anti-communist migrant societies.[64] Finally, the week's activities by the Congress' 'hard core' opponents ended in a comic fiasco, when some of their number attempted to burn down a tree around which the delegates were preparing to hold a farewell picnic.

All of these incidents were highly publicised by the popular press, as was a circular distributed by the R.S.L., which declared, "The executive is satisfied that the Peace Congress is designed primarily to advance the Communist cause...".[65] A highlight of the Catholic right wing's contribution to the opposition campaign consisted of the release

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63. Melbourne *Sun*, 9 November, 1959.

64. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 November, 1959.

65. *Ibid.*

of a pamphlet entitled *The Peace Game*, sponsored by the National Civic Council and written by Mr. B.A. Santamaria.[66] However, criticism of the Congress also emanated from the Catholic left, represented by such journals as the *Catholic Worker* and *Prospect*. For example, writing in the latter, Vincent Buckley argued that the Peace Congress "builds up Cold War tensions by the very fact that pressure is brought on only one side in the dispute, and that side is our own". The present peace movement, he averred, "contains elements of hysteria, paranoi and excessive self-righteousness".[67] Some of the non-Santamaria Catholics carried the battle directly into the heart of the Congress, distributing at the opening rally copies of *Prospect* which contained two highly critical articles. They were joined in the distribution of unauthorised literature by another group of young intellectuals, most of whom belonged to the moderate-right of the ALP,[68] who were issuing their leaflet called the *Peace Gazette*.[69]

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66. B.A. Santamaria, *The Peace Game*, National Civic Council, Fitzroy, Vic., November 1959.

67. *Prospect*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1959.

68. For a definition of the term 'moderate-right' in the ALP, see Tom Truman, *Ideological Groups in the Australian Labor Party and Their Attitudes*, Univ. of Qld. Press, St. Lucia, 1965. Some of the intellectuals referred to are James Jupp, Phillip Knight, and Barry Jones.

69. This four-page leaflet drew attention to 'Red China's record of military aggression', but urged her admission into the United Nations - providing safeguards of some sort could be arranged for the Formosans. It also stated that freedom and democracy were the best guarantees of peace, and in this regard supported the Priestley-Bertrand Russell protests over the gaoling of the Hungarian writers.

Since Sam Goldbloom announced from the platform that *Peace Gazette* was not an official publication of the Congress, while another unauthorised leaflet - this one distributed by the Seamen's Union - was not similarly disowned by the organising committee, the opponents of the Congress seized upon this incident to substantiate their arguments that the organising committee possessed a pro-communist bias.[70]

Paradoxically, the controversy and clamour surrounding the countless pro-communist charges, by adding greatly to the publicity of the Congress, helped to ensure its success. Not only did the publicity provoke public sentiments of hostility but it also elicited interest *for* the Congress and even served as a means for 'permeating', to a small degree, the society with the generalised beliefs of the Congress. Many opponents, like the ten Victorian ministers (*supra*), when they did express their disapproval felt compelled to affirm their agreement with the Congress' general aims, if not its methods. However, the main context, in which the public debate was conducted, centred on a series of withdrawals of some of the early sponsors, and the outcome of this debate proved to be primarily a diversion from the issues of peace to matters of the Congress' credibility and the Government's infringement of civil liberties.

The first sponsor to resign was Dr. Barton Babbage, Anglican Dean of Melbourne, who gave as his reasons that "some of those who are acting

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70. See Crouch *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 10; and Richard Krygier, *'The Soft Sell'*, *Observer*, 14 November, 1959.

as organising secretaries in various states are active members of the Communist Party".[71] Professor Stout, after a visit from Brig. General Spry of A.S.I.O.,[72] also declined to participate; and Professor Oliphant, apparently believing that the Congress could not now "present in its conclusions an Australian point of view",[73] withdrew his endorsement. Two days before the Congress was to begin the Victorian Baptist Union's Executive Council "decided to withdraw...following representations about its origins, basis and motives".[74] Also withdrawing at the last moment was the Presbyterian Fellowship of Australia, because "the original intention of the Youth Conference committee that the Conference would be attended almost entirely by delegates elected by youth organisations has not been followed. A large number of youth organisations", insisted the Fellowship, "have failed to support the Conference, thus making it impossible for it to be representative of Australian youth".[75]

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71. Melbourne *Sun*, 4 September, 1959. In point of fact only one known Communist was listed among any of the state secretaries, chairmen, vice-chairmen or treasurers of the organising committees. He was Dr. S. Lovibond, a Senior Lecturer in Psychology at Adelaide University, who had assumed the secretaryship of the small South Australian Committee (only 43 delegates attended the Congress from S.A.). However, some of the other officials were reputed by the Congress' critics to be Communists, notably Mr. Goldbloom (see R. Summy, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-212).

72. See *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, pp. 2279-80 & pp. 2347-52.

73. Melbourne *Herald*, 27 October, 1959.

74. Melbourne *Sun*, 6 November, 1959.

75. *The Courier-Mail*, 9 November, 1959.

Another withdrawal casualty was Councillor K. McD. Farrall of Moorabbin Municipal Council, who announced on October 30th that he would not attend as a delegate from his council.[76] A few days later the Moorabbin Council itself withdrew official endorsement and declined to send any delegates.[77]

Congress officials and their sympathisers immediately launched a trenchant counter-attack. Planning Committee Chairman Rev. Alf Dickie reiterated the Congress' principle of "exclusion of none, domination by none", to be implemented through the so-called 'Methodist Plan', whereby each of the sectional conferences within the Congress "would be permitted to determine its own procedures and basis of participation and whose findings could not be interfered with by any other grouping within the Congress or by the Congress as a whole".[78] As was constantly explained in the various Congress brochures inviting participation, the structure of the Congress called for the setting up of eight 'autonomous' sectional conferences: Trade Union, Citizens, Youth, Artists and Writers, Municipal, Education, Christian Churchmen, and Scientists. Each of the sectional conferences would form its own agenda and report its findings, if any, to plenary sessions of the Congress, but the latter had no power

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76. Melbourne *Herald*, 31 October, 1959.

77. Melbourne *Herald*, 4 November, 1959.

78. Rev. Alan Brand, *Statement Issued to Sydney Press*, 4 March, 1964, reprinted in *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 2, March 1964. Rev. Brand was countering charges of 'manipulation' at the Melbourne Congress that were raised in conjunction with the proposal to hold a congress in Sydney in 1964.

to alter these decisions. Two elected representatives from each conference, together with the National Planning Committee Chairman (Rev. Dickie) and the Secretary (Mr. Goldbloom), were to form a drafting committee that would present a joint statement to the closing session of the Congress (which became the Charter of Hope). If any of the sectional conferences rejected the final statement, none would be issued by the Congress.

According to Mr. Goldbloom, it was Rev. Hartley who insisted on the complete unanimity of acceptance of the Congress' final statement by every sectional conference. "Although", explained Mr. Goldbloom, "this meant any one conference could veto, we accepted this, and we then had official participation of the churches at the conference level."[79]

Reassurances regarding the Congress' planned operational procedures merely constituted the first gambit in the counter-attack against all the critics. The 'leftish' journals took up the theme of the importance to create a public awareness of the gravity of nuclear warfare and the need for a peace movement to rally "humanists who refuse to be implicated in mutual genocide".[80] Argued Oliver Paul in the *Nation*: "The fact that so many varied groups - the Trotskyists, the anti-Santamaria Catholic left, the Revolutionists (who know full well the communist technique at peace congresses), the Labor Party, the more intelligent section of the Congress of Cultural Freedom, to say nothing of plain, ordinary,

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79. In interview with writer, 23 August, 1966.

80. *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 5, October 1959.

uncomplicated people - have interested themselves in the Congress proves at least one thing: that there is a need for a movement which will concern itself with the problem posed by Einstein and Russell - will mankind abolish war, or will mankind perish?"[81]

Many of the sponsors and overseas guests publicly entered the fray against their detractors. When queried about his political affiliations, Prof. Murdoch is reported to have snapped: "No, I'm not Red, but I see red!"[82] Prof. Pauling, upon his arrival in Australia, parried a reporter's question about communist influence at the Congress with an acerbic criticism of the Government. "The Australian Government", he pointed out, "has adopted this irrational moral attitude towards the Melbourne Congress because it has not an alternative positive solution to help overcome the destruction of the world by nuclear weapons. But", he went on, "I would say their attitude towards the Congress is politically rational. Australia was going through the period of McCarthyism similar to that experienced by U.S."[83]

For his pronouncement on Australian McCarthyism, Dr. Pauling was taken to task by the *Sydney Morning Herald*. In a feature editorial headed *'Through the Looking Glass'*, the newspaper criticised his lack of "careful scientific inquiry" in the political sphere which opened the way to "those skilful fishers of men, the Communists".[84]

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81. *Nation*, 7 November, 1959.
82. Melbourne *Herald*, 31 October, 1959.
83. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 November, 1959.
84. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 November, 1959.

Another visitor whose remarks were prominently featured in the press was Dean Chandler of New Zealand. 'The Dean' frontally attacked the attitude of Dr. Gough to the Congress, saying: "I think the Primate of Australia who appealed to the church to boycott this Congress was speaking in a very un-Christian fashion."[85] On another occasion Dean Chandler levelled his criticism at the clergy and laity of the Anglican church in Australia, with the observation that "Those who are the slaves of fear and mistrust are the slaves, to my mind, of the devil himself".[86]

Criticism of the Church of England also came from Australian churchmen. *The Anglican* newspaper criticised the bishops and Dr. Gough for their 'negative attitude', and the editor of *The Peacemaker*, Dr. Collocott, stated that he found his 'personal impressions and opinions' at variance with the condemnatory views expressed by the Bishop of Rockhampton, Qld. The Bishop had contended that, "We (the bishops of the Church of England) could not back the Peace Congress because of the people who had organised it, and because we knew it was so organised into subcommittees that no resolution could be passed that did not meet with the approval of the organisers".[87]

J.B. Priestley's curt and definitive reply to this persistent charge of communist manipulation was: "Some people see Communists under their beds."[88]

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85. *The Courier-Mail*, 9 November, 1959.
86. Melbourne *Age*, 10 November, 1959.
87. *Church Gazette*, Diocese of Rockhampton, Qld., December 1959, cited in *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 22, Nos 1 & 2, January-February 1960.
88. Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, 6 November, 1959.

While these kinds of retorts made excellent 'copy' and helped to feed the publicity and controversy surrounding the Congress, the most effective counter-attack was launched by the ALP in Parliament.[89] Led by MP's Cairns, Crean, Haylen, and Ward, the Opposition concentrated on the twin issues of the activities of the Security Service and the civil rights of Australian citizens.

Although the debate had begun with the Government attacking the ALP for its association with the Congress, the Opposition managed to "cut the ground from under the Government's feet",[90] following an admission by Sir Garfield Barwick (under persistent questioning) that he had sent the chief of A.S.I.O. to interview Prof. Stout prior to the Professor's decision to resign as a sponsor of the Congress. The sensational aspects of this revelation were then magnified when it was disclosed that Liberal backbencher, Mr. W.C. Wentworth, had acted as the liaison between Prof. Stout and Sir Garfield. According to Mr. Haylen, it was Mr. Wentworth who had been leading A.S.I.O. officers, telling them to check certain individuals and give information to others - in effect, "subverting the security service to his own ends".[91] Mr. Haylen produced the information that a constituent in Mr. Wentworth's electorate, Mr. W.J. Latona,[92] who

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89. This point is even made by the highly critical writer of *'Canberra Commentary'* column in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 November, 1959.

90. *Ibid.*

91. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, p. 2347.

92. Mr. Latona was a former editor of *The Peacemaker*, a long time Methodist pacifist, who was active in the FOR and the N.S.W. PPU, and a conscientious objector during World War II.

was the joint secretary of the N.S.W. organising committee, had even been approached by Mr. Wentworth and advised that a security officer could be sent around to see him.

Although Mr. Wentworth did not expressly deny all these charges, he interpreted them quite differently. He stated that in the case of Prof. Stout he had mentioned to the Attorney-General that the Professor had reservations about the Congress and was seeking conclusive proof about communist domination. The Attorney-General, in turn, had then asked him to make sure that this was what Prof. Stout wanted, "so that the person who saw Prof. Stout would do so with the Professor's concurrence and full permission".[93] Only then was Brig. General Spry sent to see Prof. Stout, and with the explicit instructions that he was not to attempt to alter the Professor's decision.

Mr. Wentworth admitted to the conversation with Mr. Latona and the fact that he had said he would get some one to provide him with information about the Congress. However, "At that stage", explained the member for Mackellar, "I did not necessarily have in mind a member of the security service".[94]

Before this heated colloquy between Mr. Wentworth and Mr. Haylen, some other 'sensational' incidents involving security procedures had emerged. Answering a question of Mr. Crean's, Sir Garfield informed the House that Prof. Stout was not the only one to have requested and been

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93. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, p. 2349.

94. *Ibid.*

provided with information about the Congress. He mentioned the Archbishop of Sydney and a Methodist clergyman as seeking information.[95] Later, in the same day, Mr. Crean produced a letter written to Sir Mark Oliphant in which the Acting Secretary of External Affairs asserted that the Communist Party had developed a series of plans around the Congress. Mr. Crean also disclosed that Sir Mark had received an earlier letter from the External Affairs Department, this one written two months before and signed by the Minister, Mr. Casey, which actually discouraged his sponsorship and attendance.[96] Subsequently, Sir Garfield conceded, albeit obliquely, "Letters were written to some other persons, who, it was thought, might find this information useful".[97]

Dr. Cairns deduced the Opposition's conclusions from all this evidence. Mr. Wentworth has admitted, he stated, that "it is possible for a private member of Parliament to make arrangements for the chief of the Australian security service to interview a professor at a university and to make statements about other people which may be harmful, libellous, and damaging, those people having no chance of knowing what was said or of answering what was said".[98] Dr. Cairns maintained that undue pressure had been exerted on Prof. Oliphant - as in the case of Prof. Stout - to induce him to withdraw. Although Prof. Oliphant had received the second

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95. *Ibid.*, p. 2280.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 2344.
97. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 10 November, 1959, p. 2531.
98. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, p. 2350.

letter from the Department of External Affairs in August, a couple of months later he was still prepared to stand by the Congress. For, on October 26th Prof. Oliphant was quoted in the press as having said: "...whatever truth there may be in these statements, the natural reaction of all decent-minded citizens should be to flock to the conference and ensure that whatever resolutions are passed and whatever conclusions are reached, represent a true majority view of the public as a whole".[99] Yet less than forty-eight hours later, as Dr. Cairns pointed out, Prof. Oliphant withdrew, giving as one of his reasons the fact that the Congress "involves so many people that no effective discussion can take place".[100]

The apparent contradiction between these two statements has never been completely resolved, even to this day, though Sir Mark does make it explicitly clear that it was because of the organisers' intention to pass resolutions, rather than the security issue, that induced him to resign as a sponsor.[101] In the end, he did decide to attend the

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99. *Ibid.*, p. 2351.

100. *Ibid.*

101. In a letter to the writer dated 15 March, 1967, Prof. Oliphant gave the following explanation for his withdrawal: "The proposal for the Melbourne Conference interested me, and I attended meetings which formulated how it would operate. I was utterly opposed to the passing of resolutions, believing that, following discussion, a report giving the consensus of opinion on the questions raised should be issued. Also, the Congress grew to such proportions that I felt that the limited time given to each problem was far too short for effective discussion. Resolutions were framed beforehand, and discussion was likely to be limited to these, rather than to the issues themselves. It was for these reasons that I withdrew as a sponsor, and not because of any pressure exerted on me by security officers." See also the statement of Sir Mark in Crouch *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 6 & 7, where he avers that "I will have no part in any future Congress which does not specifically ban the passing of resolutions".

sectional conference of scientists within the Congress, as a mere delegate.

Meanwhile, Dr. Cairns' speech in Parliament had shifted the debating ground. In his words, this debate "covers not only the nature of the Congress, but also the right of people to meet and associate for lawful purposes, and the question whether the security service should be used as an instrument of party-political policy".[102] For many weeks the Opposition continued to harass the Government on the security issue and the alleged infringement of civil liberties. Mr. E. Ward, as a sponsor of the Congress, asked if he, too, might have access to security information, but the Prime Minister refused to make it available in his case.[103] When the Government did reply to the allegations raised against it by the Labor Party, it confined its answer to a detailed denunciation of the alleged communist influence behind the organisation of the Congress.[104] In due course the Government refused to answer any more questions concerning the Congress, and the topic faded from parliamentary limelight.

However, the debate - particularly, over the issue of freedom of dissent - continued elsewhere. The Australian Council for Civil Liberties, through its spokesman, Mr. Brian Fitzpatrick, announced that it was "disturbed by some features of Government's policy on Peace

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102. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 27 October, 1959, p. 2351.

103. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 29 October, 1959, p. 2453.

104. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 10 November, 1959, pp. 2524-28.

Congress".[105] The *Nation*, which was cautiously reserving its judgment on the Congress, had no hesitation in condemning the rôle of ASIO. Exclaimed one of its columnists: "Professor Stout is not the only person to whom the security service has shown confidential data on the political activities of his fellow citizens. Where will all this stop?"[106] In addition, a statement issued by Prof. S.E. Wright and Mr. Latona, the joint Secretaries of the N.S.W. organising committee, received wide press coverage. They declared that the information Brig. General Spry gave Prof. Stout should be made public, and concluded on the note that "we believe that the very concept of the Gestapo, with its attendant phone-tapping, innuendo and the inability of the accused to defend himself, sends a chill through most Australians".[107]

While the Government's action might not have sent "a chill through most Australians", the *exposé* of the rôle of the Security Service certainly 'took the heat off' the ALP. As noted in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, "It will now be very difficult, short of some new explosion, to use the Congress issue effectively for party political purposes. The Labor Party has cause to thank Sir Barwick...".[108] The article was referring specifically to the vulnerability of the Party because of the rift within its own ranks over the Congress issue. The battle lines

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105. Melbourne *Herald*, 7 November, 1959.
106. Oliver Paul, *Nation*, 7 November, 1959.
107. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 October, 1959.
108. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 November, 1959.

were most sharply drawn between the Federal President Mr. F. Chamberlain and the Federal Secretary Mr. J. Schmella, as well as between the Victorian branch and the Queensland branch. At a Federal Executive meeting on October 27th, the Victorian delegates submitted a motion for straight-out support of the Congress; Queensland countered by claiming it was impossible to be sure that the Congress was free from Communist domination. The result of this controversy was a compromise, which left either faction free to interpret the statement as it chose.[109] In an ensuing press conference the differences in interpretation readily came to light. According to one newspaper account, "Mr. Schmella made quite clear at the Press Conference today that he wanted known that the ALP was not supporting the Congress....[He] asked the Federal ALP President to point out that the ALP Federal Executive had not endorsed the Congress....Mr. Chamberlain did not back him up, and Mr. Schmella walked out of the room".[110]

The sensitivity of the ALP to the Congress issue was illustrated again when the Labor Premier of N.S.W., Mr. Heffron, declined to answer a question on the Congress that had been raised in the Legislative Assembly.[111]

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109. For the contents of the brief statement, see fn. 50.

110. Sydney *Telegraph*, 29 October, 1959.

111. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 November, 1959.

These incidents are typical of the division that has constantly plagued the ALP in its attitude towards the peace movement. Although the 1963 Federal Conference at Perth received a detailed report on the continuing committees of the Congress and other peace bodies, and declared that the continuing committees were 'bona-fide' peace bodies in which Labor Party members could feel free to participate, the attitude within the ALP has never, at any time, been *solidly* behind the peace movement. This disunity (which has deep ideological roots) has made it difficult for the Party to meet the attacks of its opponents when pressed for clarification regarding its relationship to the movement - whether it be at the 1959 Congress, the 1964 Sydney Congress, the 1966 Federal election, the demonstrations against Premier Ky in early 1967, or the Vietnam moratorium campaigns in 1970.

In 1959, the ALP was singularly fortunate that any adverse effects it might have suffered from intra-party strife were more than offset by the Government's own penchant for blundering. Moreover, so much publicity attended the fast-moving events of the Congress that specific incidents tended to become lost in a kind of episodic blur. At one time, during a fortnight that included the actual week of the Congress, the Australian press featured the Congress, in terms of quantitative coverage, as the second major news story. The first concerned a gaol escapee.

Throughout the main week of Congress activities, the mass media concentrated almost solely on the overseas visitors and some explosive incidents that occurred within four of the sectional conferences (the

Artists' and Writers' Conference, the Youth Conference, the Citizens' Conference, and the Education Conference). The three plenary sessions, though well attended by the 1064 credentialled delegates,[112] and the varied programmes staged by the Festival of Arts (which were held in conjunction with the Congress) were virtually ignored by the media.

Mr. Priestley considered the best feature of the Congress to be some of the rallies held in the suburban town halls.[113] He left behind him a trail of 'quotable quotes': for example, "It's better to come to the conference table naked than to come radioactive.", or "I would not give West Germany a pop gun."[114] He appeared on 'Meet the Press' in Melbourne. His major contention about disarmament was that the nature of nuclear weapons precipitated the need for disarmament in this area first, before proceeding on to general disarmament. The point was contested by the Indian writer, Dr. Anand, and Mr. Kenny (the Senior Vice-President of the ACTU), who claimed that total disarmament - and not nuclear disarmament as a first step towards total disarmament - should be the aim of the Congress.[115] Mr. Priestley elicited some less friendly criticism from a visiting Chinese Nationalist official, Mr. Ku.

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112. See A.G. Platt, *op.cit.* On the other hand, the Melbourne *Sun* gave an unofficial figure of 1244, excluding the guests. This figure was broken down by states as follows: Victoria - 940; N.S.W. - 176; Qld. - 59; S.A. - 43; New Zealand - 15; W.A. - 6; Tas. - 5. (*Sun*, 14 November, 1959.)

113. See Oliver Paul, *'Priestley Preferred the Suburbs'*, *Nation*, 21 November, 1959.

114. Melbourne *Age*, 11 November, 1959.

115. Melbourne *Age*, 10 November, 1959.

Upon hearing Mr. Priestley comment that, "I have found no one who will say anything in favour of Chiang Kai-Shek's Government", Mr. Ku suggested that "he [Priestley] must be blind", and "should have stuck to fiction writing, at which he is an expert, and not dabble in facts in Asia, of which he has only very sketchy second-hand knowledge".[116]

Dr. Pauling who sparkled in repartee with his detractors at the public meetings also clashed head-on with officialdom or semi-officialdom.[117] According to newspaper accounts he seems to have fared much better than Mr. Priestley whose 'Meet the Press' interview was not favourably reported. In one of Dr. Pauling's first public utterances he claimed that 150,000 people would die because of fall-out from all the nuclear tests up to that time. When Senator Hannan (Lib., Vic.) noted that this figure was at variance with the estimate of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Pauling repeated his claim, explaining that new scientific evidence suggested that the figure might even be higher.[118] He was supported in this assertion by the scientists attending the Scientists' Conference at the Congress,[119] who believed that Dr. Pauling's estimates of the effects of Carbon-14 were even on the conservative side.[120]

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116. *Ibid.*

117. Mr. Ku was an official guest of the Government, and while in Australia received interviews with Prime Minister Menzies and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Melbourne *Herald*, 11 November, 1959.)

118. Melbourne *Herald*, 11 November, 1959.

119. Included among the approximately fifty invited scientists at the Conference were Prof. (Max) Rudolf Lemberg, Prof. Oliphant, and Dr. Walter Boas.

120. *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, Sydney, December 1959.

While the status and personalities of the overseas visitors helped to elevate the quality of the Congress and ensure the publicity needed to create public awareness of the movement's generalised pacific beliefs, the most effective stimulant for the immediate growth of the peace movement appears to have occurred within the Congress itself. For it was at the three plenary sessions and particularly within the separate conferences or subdivisions of the Congress that the participants either recharged their old determination or generated new zeal for the mobilising of public opinion and action against norms and policies in the society they considered to be war-oriented.

The record of the Congress was primarily written in the eight sectional conferences.[121] The record reveals considerable controversy and a fair share of platitudinous statements. Yet the 'net effect' of

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121. For a record of the speeches and many resolutions of the Congress, see *Documents of the Australian and New Zealand Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament*, Challenge Press Pty. Ltd., Coburg, Vic., *c.* 1960. Interpretative accounts of the proceedings can be found in the following: A.G. Platt, *A Report to the President and Members of the N.S.W. State Executive of the ALP on the ANZ Congress for International Cooperation and Disarmament, held in Melbourne - 7th to 14th November, 1959*, 22 January, 1960; Frank Knopfelmacher, *'More Than A Stunt'*, *Observer*, 28 November, 1959; *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1959; Harold Crouch *et al.*, *op.cit.*; *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 21, No. 12, December 1959, and Vol. 22, Nos. 1 & 2, January-February 1960; W. Macmahon Ball, *'I Was No Match for Madame'*, *Nation*, 21 November, 1959; Vincent Buckley, James Jupp, Barry Jones, & Phillip Knight, *'What Really Happened at the Peace Conference'*, *Observer*, 26 December, 1959; *Prospect*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Melbourne, 1960; Rev. Alan Brand, *'Statement Issued to Sydney Press, March 4, 1964'*, reprinted in *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Sydney, March 1964; Richard Krygier, *'The Soft Sell'*, *Observer*, 14 November, 1959; and the daily press throughout Australia, as well as the communist papers *Tribune* and *Guardian* (Vic. & Qld.).

the controversy, reported the independent socialist journal *Outlook*, "has been to make impossible any more of the bad old Congresses. Wider sections of the electorate are moving".[122] Moreover, in connection with the platitudes, they perhaps manifested an ability on the part of the delegates to compromise at critical points rather than force permanent divisions. Neither were all the conference findings non-constructive or meaningless, nor the occupational and age groupings without significance in the development of future peace groups outside the movement's main stream - *e.g.*, the Youth Conference in the formation of the Victorian CND, and the Scientists' Conference in helping to instigate the Australian Pugwash group.

The standard of the scheduled talks was generally agreed by critics and supporters alike to be of high quality - though the discussions which followed often drifted into the prosaic and cliché-ridden (as might be expected at a forum of public participation).

From the standpoint of the hypercritical Australian press, the high-water mark of the week of Congress activities occurred during the middle of the week when a small minority of delegates, together with some persons not attending the Congress, called a special meeting to review the proceedings of the Congress. The meeting was chaired by the Anglican Dean of Melbourne, Dr. Barton Babbage, who (as noted *supra*) had previously withdrawn as a sponsor. After hearing reports from Mr.

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122. *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1959.

Vincent Buckley (on Artists' and Writers' Conference), Mr. James Jupp (Citizens'), Mr. Barry Jones (Education), and Mr. Phillip Knight (Youth), the meeting resolved that "the aim of the Congress was to set up a new permanent Australian peace organisation under the control of the Communist Party and the Communist front World Peace Council".[123] Some of the Congress delegates attending the protest meeting indicated they were going to dissociate themselves from any decisions handed down by the drafting committees of the sectional conferences. They claimed the resolutions were "deliberately vague" and passed under conditions which gagged free discussion.[124]

However, this particular point of view, which was directed mainly at the four above mentioned sectional conferences, was certainly not shared by the overwhelming majority of Congress delegates. Their enthusiasm and sense of achievement - after a week of discussion, debate, resolution drafting, controversy (sometimes personally abusive), frustration and triumph - was vividly captured by one of their number, Mrs. Joy Guyatt of Queensland,[125] in the following description of the final plenary gathering:

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123. Melbourne *Sun*, 13 November, 1959.

124. *The Courier-Mail*, 13 November, 1959.

125. An active member of the ALP, Mrs. Guyatt contested the Federal seat of Ryan in the 1961 election. Later she became a member of the Qld. Central Executive of the Labor Party, a position she holds today.

> *"The Chairman of the Congress, Rev. Alf Dickie, put the Declaration of Hope*[126] *to the meeting for acceptance or rejection. A loud shout of 'Aye' arose from over 1000 throats. Rev. Dickie spoke again - 'Those against?'. The contrasting silence, unbroken by a single dissentient, was most dramatic.*
>
> *"When it was clear that we had achieved our goal, the issue of a unanimous statement, the delegates expressed their joy in the manner of all enthusiastic gatherings - by cheers, hand-clapping, stamping and whistling."*[127]

The *Declaration of Hope* refers to the Congress statement drafted by the representatives from the eight 'autonomous' conferences together with the Chairman and Secretary of the Congress. Although it was couched in generalities and promulgated broad principles rather than policies, it served its intended purpose of becoming a creed for the peace movement during the 'Sixties' - especially for the pacificists.

In the sense that the Congress helped to lay the groundwork for the future expansion of the pacificist wing, it must be adjudged a success. Yet, at the time, the criterion for success or failure was almost solely related to the communist issue. This was the issue that had initiated the great public debate, and it represented the standard by which the Congress in the end must also be evaluated.[128] Unfortunately, the

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126. See Appendix A for a copy of the *Declaration of Hope*.

127. *New Age*, Brisbane, 3 December, 1959.

128. The debate had been touched off with a press statement in June by the External Affairs Minister, Mr. R.G. Casey. Although he was touring abroad when the Congress concluded, he reiterated his claim that it was a "straight Communist-front meeting". (BBC TV interview reported in the Melbourne *Age*, 11 November, 1959.)

verdicts were as inclusive and varied as the predisposed attitudes of the commentators. Thus from one critical delegate, who had condemned the Congress from the beginning, came the verdict: "...now that it [the Congress] is dead, one can see why....[There was] Communist control of the preliminary organisation, Communists monopolising the 'office', Communist Secretaries running several of the sectional conferences."[129]

Another delegate, also an intellectual but with an entirely different predisposition towards the Congress, tartly observed: "If the Party led the Congress, they did it like the Duke of Plaza Toro, from behind; so far behind as to be almost invisible; and also to singularly little purpose as the conference findings and the final Congress Charter of Hope show."[130]

Few persons (the CPA included) would deny the Party was engaged in a "united front from below" strategy, "attracting aggressive support in pre-revolutionary politics" whenever and wherever possible.[131] But an evaluation of the Party's success in implementing this strategy defied any general agreement, mainly because different criteria were selected and different measuring techniques adopted - an almost inevitable outcome in the ideological context of the Cold War.

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129. *Prospect*, No. 1, 1960, presumed to have been written by the editor, Vincent Buckley.

130. Myra Roper, *'Letter to the Editor'*, *Nation*, 5 December, 1959.

131. J.D. Playford, *op.cit.*, p. 402. For accounts of the united front policy of the Communists, see his Chaps. 5 & 8.

CHAPTER III

WEST AUSTRALIAN MOVEMENT

Following the Melbourne Congress the pacificist wing gradually began to show signs of becoming a viably structured, enduring and expanding movement. Over the years it evolved the movement requisites enumerated by Blumer of "organisation and form, a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring division of labor, social rules and social values - in short, a culture, a social organisation, and a new scheme of life".[1]

In contradistinction, the pacifist section failed to expand beyond its coterie of small, self-contained groups, and its influence as an independent political force remained negligible, despite the contributions some of its members made to the development of the overall movement.

In this and the next chapter the specific organisations, activities and personnel associated with both sections of the peace movement will be examined closely in the states of Western Australia and Queensland. These two states have been selected as prototypes of the movement operating in the two most active states, New South Wales and Victoria.

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1. H. Blumer, *'Collective Behaviour'*, in A.M. Lee (ed.), *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, Barnes & Noble, N.Y., 1951, p. 199.

W.A.'s diversified structure tended to resemble that of Victoria, whereas Qld's highly centralised structure mirrored the organisational framework of N.S.W.

However, before undertaking this detailed description *cum* analysis for Western Australia and Queensland, it is proposed to look broadly at the organisation and *modus operandi* of the movement on an Australia-wide basis.

Organisational Structure of Australian Peace Movement

Almost without exception, the larger and more enduring peace groups are organised formally on a state-wide basis. The names of the organisations contain the names of the states or capital cities, and the supporters undoubtedly perceive their organisations in federal terms.

While some of the state groups may belong to national bodies, the latter do not exercise coercive powers over policy or provide the impetus for activities. The national bodies merely serve as communicative and co-ordinative links - the 'talking shops' which help to cement what the pacificists fondly refer to as their 'fraternal ties'. Occasionally, large national conferences are held to propagandise publicly the views of the peace movement - *e.g.*, the 1959 Melbourne Congress and the 1964 Sydney Congress - and, in the wake of critical world and national events, meetings on a movement-wide basis are convened for the most active participants to assess these events and to discuss future goals and methods - *e.g.*, the Sydney inter-organisational meeting

of January 1967 in the aftermath of the resounding election defeat. More frequently, however, usually on an annual or semi-annual basis, the individual groupings within the movement such as SOS, the Continuing Committees of the Melbourne Congress, WILPF, *etc.* meet nationally to discuss their particular problems and co-ordinate their strategies and tactics. An aura of 'renewing the faith' for the committed tends to prevail at these meetings; certainly the independence of the state body is not jeopardised.

Thus, while one can allude to an Australian peace movement, a nationally *organised* movement is largely illusory. The organisational aspect is confined to the exchanging of correspondence, the planning of national tours by foreign visitors, the clarification of broadly conceived policies and strategies, and the co-ordination of activities whenever feasible. The mainstay of the movement is clearly built around the state groups, with a few groups recently oriented around the universities.

Some of the state groups have established branches in the suburbs and in the towns. These sub-units usually operate autonomously, maintaining their formal links with the state groups through an overlap of leadership, similarity of name, and consensus of broadly defined goals. The structural atomisation of the peace groups, with their emphasis on individual participation, can be traced, in part, to the movement's general attitude towards their government's foreign policy formation process. "Traditional diplomacy with its confidentiality, its

detailed negotiations over small issues, its reputation for old world deviousness, its monopoly by the upper classes, its lack of personal force and color"[2] is denounced in the context of anti-democracy. The aim of the peace supporters is to construct their organisations in accordance with the peace norms they are advocating. However, as the individual groups have developed, they have tended to become dominated by their executive committees or one or two personalities. The ideal of rank and file participation and control is soon sacrificed to the pragmatism of institutional survival and efficacy, and perhaps personal power accretion.

To summarise:- Centralised control tends to exist within the groups, while pluralism prevails between the groups. Graphically, *the* movement resembles not a pyramidal hierarchy, but a system of layers, with the top, national layer, moreover, formless and powerless. The second layer at the state level is the dynamic element of the movement; the third, fourth and descending layers, though organisationally independent, derive their strength from the state bodies. In addition, among the state bodies (particularly in N.S.W. and Qld.), one state group tends to stand out as the 'core body' or 'amalgamating force' around which the other groups develop various degrees of affinity, based upon such factors as overlapping membership, common historical roots, use of the dominant group's equipment and facilities, joint undertaking of activities, and the similarity of aims and objectives. Since the 'core body' is apt to

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2. Edward Shils, *The Torment of Secrecy*, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1956, p. 128.

be greater in size, as well as in many other resources, its gravitational pull can prove irresistible and in some cases destructive. This is not to say that the smaller bodies lack autonomy or take orders from the 'core body'. The relationship is more one of subtle influence than of overt domination. For example, rarely, can one of the non-'core bodies' (irrespective of its structural layer) undertake successfully a major project without the assistance or at least the tacit approval of the 'core body'.

In effect, the peace movement mobilised for action *qua* a movement through the 'core bodies'. They amalgamated what would otherwise have been a hopelessly disparate and fractionalised collection of peace groups. When the multifarious smaller groups formulated polar attitudes - gradualism *vs* radicalism, moderation *vs* militancy, constitutionalism *vs* anarchism, and power manipulation *vs* power renunciation - the 'core bodies' attempted to mollify the differences. Since they achieved a modicum of success in this rôle, they came to speak for the broadest section of the movement. Certainly, to the press and hence to a large section of the public, they conveyed the impression of being *the* movement.

The 'core bodies', at least until after the 1966 Federal elections, were the Continuing Committees of the Melbourne Congress or their direct successors. This can be attributed to a number of reasons: (1) they deliberately propounded the movement's lowest common denominator regarding issues and policies (in the process exposing themselves to charges of promulgating peace banalities); (2) they made special efforts

to initiate community-wide projects that would involve the other groups; (3) within their own organisations they attempted to encompass support from all the types of dissenters or potential dissenters (in this they were not always too successful); (4) their aims and objectives were usually less sectarian, being amendable to compromise; and (5) most importantly, they possessed the advantage of a fairly reliable and constant financial and numerical base of support, so that they were not subject to the sudden and sharp reversals that affected those groups appealing to transient and impecunious supporters and dependent on the charisma of one or two leaders. From their left wing trade union base of support the Continuing Committees or their equivalents were able to set up permanent headquarters managed by experienced and often salaried officials and staff,[3] whose professionalism could bring direction to a movement, which, by its nature, tends to attract political dilettantes.

The three major centres of peace activity existed along the Eastern seaboard, in Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne. Of the three cities, the movement was least integrated in Melbourne. The ANZ Congress competed against a multiplicity of groups and encountered a host of rankling problems endemic to the Melbourne scene: *inter alia*, the deep divisions that exist in the Victorian trade union movement and within the State branch of the ALP, the schism between the intellectual

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3. The best staffed peace group existed in Sydney. The AICD, in fiscal 1966-67, employed on a full-time or part-time basis seven officers and staff members, earning a pay-roll of $13,146.51. (G.R. Anderson, *Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting of A.I.C.D.*, 19 June, 1967.)

dissenters and the class dissenters that first erupted at the Melbourne Congress, and the inability of the 'old guard' peace leadership to adapt to the demands and styles of the new and potential recruits. The failure of the ANZ Congress to maintain its position of 'core body' affected not only its local influence but its national prominence as well.

Neither, for different reasons, did any one group dominate the small movements in Western Australia, South Australia, or Tasmania. In Western Australia, the W.A. Peace Council or WPC (roughly the equivalent of the Continuing Committees in the other states) shared control with a small coterie of pacifists and their organisations.

Western Australia

The W.A. peace movement was limited in both effort and effect. Its 'hard core' participants never numbered in the years between 1960 and 1966 more than twenty-five, and its impression upon the general public in a State more interested in the politics of places and projects than issues and ideas was negligible. Its penetration and success in the trade unions was limited, primarily because "traditionally the industrial movement in Western Australia has been weaker, less militant, and more State-centred than that in the eastern States".[4] Moreover, the potential support of the more militant unions was dissipated in the long struggle between these unions and the AWU over the issue of the establishment of a separate Trades and Labor Council. The peace movement did achieve some

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4. Louise Overacker, *Australian Parties in a Changing Society 1945-67*, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, p. 81.

success in the co-operative links it managed to forge with the extra-parliamentary wing of the State Labor Party. But these links, for the most part, constituted the personal ties of men like the Rev. Keith Dowding[5] and Mr. Lawrence D. (Laurie) Wilkinson,[6] and were not the result of the movement's organisational talents in acting as a 'ginger group' within the ALP or in mobilising outside pressure on the Party. Even the tacit endorsement of most peace movement policies by Mr. Frank E. Chamberlain, the powerful ALP State Secretary (since 1949) and ALP Federal President and then Federal Secretary (between 1956 and 1963) did not bolster the W.A. movement *qua* a movement, since his time was engrossed mainly in intra-Party factional struggles at both the Federal and State levels.

W.A.'s embryonic movement consisted of two main groupings: first, the W.A. Section of the Australian Peace Council (WPC) which derived its chief support from the left wing and communist dominated trade unions (the class dissenters) and was associated with the national body in Melbourne; and second, the grouping of pacifist organisations that included the Quaker Peace Committee (QPC), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and the Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee (COAC). Closely related to the first grouping were the Hiroshima Commemoration

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5. Rev. Dowding was ALP State Vice-President, but resigned in the early 1960's from the ALP when he was given the choice of either renouncing his membership in the Immigration Reform Group or leaving the ALP. The former body had been proscribed by the ALP because it advocated the abolition of the so-called 'White Australia Policy'.

6. See pp. 101-102 for description of his activities.

Committee and the State Sponsoring Committee of the 1964 Sydney Congress, whilst the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's (WILPF) membership overlapped with that of the pacifist groups.[7]

As well as co-operating with each other on many projects - *e.g.*, marches, meetings, circularising petitions, *etc.* - the two major groupings formed the nucleus of the State's two largest issue-oriented peace bodies, the Western Australia CND (unilateral renunciation of the procurement of nuclear weapons) and the Church and Community Committee on Vietnam (anti-Vietnam policy). What little public support was mobilised for peace dissent was mainly achieved through these two organisations.[8] Attempts to organise groups like SOS,[9] VAC, and YCAC never gained the support enjoyed by their counterparts in the Eastern States.

By 1966, the Peace Council, in the words of its Secretary, was "nearly non-existent, the reason being that we felt that the Peace Movement has now become so large that our best work would be to encourage peace moves from any direction".[10] The group's decline can also be

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7. Although the W.A. Branch of WILPF managed to publish fairly regularly a local journal called *Peace and Freedom*, it was involved in few other peace activities during the 1960's.

8. Occasionally, *ad hoc* peace groups were formed such as the one which confronted Prime Minister Holt during the 1966 election campaign and forced him to flee in a hastily commandeered taxi. (See *The Australian*, 16 November, 1966.)

9. A few months before the 1966 Federal elections the tiny SOS Branch momentarily captured national attention when one of its members threw a shoe at Prime Minister Holt.

10. H.G. Clements, letter to the writer, 18 February, 1966.

attributed to some factors outside its control. From the time of its inception shortly after the founding of the parent body in Melbourne on July 1, 1949, the Perth branch had constantly been subjected to public criticism for its allegedly partisan Moscow views and double standards of peace.[11] Although Secretary H.G. Clements[12] considered these charges to be unjust smears, in correspondence with the author, he has merely confined his defence to the simple observation: "We have never been a pacifist organisation and will support any struggle for freedom and justice with force if necessary."[13]

In the early years of the organisation, it only managed to stay alive, according to Mr. Clements, due "to the devotion of Katharine Susannah Prichard, doyen of the Australian literary world...".[14] An octogenarian in 1963, the late Miss Prichard[15] understandably became less and less active in Peace Council affairs, though her continued interest in the peace movement was reflected in the theme of her last book, *Subtle Flame* (1967).

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11. See Chapter II, p. 52, for an account of some of the opposition that the Australian Peace Council encountered.

12. Mr. H.G. Clements became Secretary in 1954, a post he held throughout the years of this study. Professionally, he is known as John Clements, the reader of Australian verse and short stories ("the best...we have", according to the Sydney *Sun Herald*, quoted on a blurb of Grand Specialities, the name of Clement's recording business).

13. H.G. Clements, letter to the writer, 8 March, 1966.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Miss Prichard died 3 October, 1969.

The declining fortunes of the Peace Council can probably best be explained by the nature of its power base. The Council had always depended chiefly on the narrow and weak base of support it received from the 'old guard' class dissenters in the trade unions. When new types of dissenters began coming into the national movement, first appearing in the CND groups and then inundating the movement over the Vietnam issue, the Council failed to adopt new policies and attitudes to attract them. The same sort of problem of being 'locked-in' to its power base curbed the growth of the ANZ Congress in Victoria. Yet the Victorian group at least enjoyed the minimum backing of some very powerful unions, whereas the Council's support came from small unions, and, in its general relations with the trade union movement, it constantly met serious rebuffs. For example, its applications to participate in the annual Perth Labor Day Parades with a float and contingent of its own were never favourably received.[16]

Despite all these difficulties, the Peace Council came as close as any peace group in Western Australia to assuming the rôle of 'core body'. It led the protests over the Government's decision to build a radio base

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16. Application were rejected in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964, and not submitted thereafter. Usually permission was denied without explanation, but the 1964 request was turned down on the grounds that, "As the Trade Unions and the ALP are known to be in full support of the abolition of war, for the settlement of international disputes, quite obviously, your Peace one [float] would be a duplication of something that we ourselves are telling the public." (G. Piesley, Hon. Organiser, Labor Day Committee, letter to the Secretary, Peace Council, 26 February, 1964.)

for the Polaris submarines at Exmouth Gulf on the Northwest Coast - co-ordinating a national petition in W.A. on this issue in 1961, publishing a pamphlet entitled *'Early Warning'* which was widely distributed in the trade union movement, and leading a deputation to the U.S. Vice Consul in Perth.[17] Initially, the Council erroneously maintained (despite press reports to the contrary)[18] that the intention was to build "a U.S. Polaris submarine base on our N.W. Coast similar to those established in Scotland"[19] rather than the construction of a very powerful low frequency radio base for the United States. The Council warned that "once the U.S. gets a base, it asserts the right to hold on to it even to the extent of armed attack on any government which tries to remove the base", and cited "U.S. threats to Cuba over the Guantanamo base, which is on Cuban soil,...[as] warnings to Australia. Remember", continued the Council, "no Australian will be allowed in the area without U.S. permission".[20] The comparison with Cuba was probably most unfortunate, and it is not too surprising that protests over the base never made appreciable headway. According to public opinion polls,

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17. See *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1961, p. 11; and *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 5, June 1961, p. 11. Members of the deputation, besides Mr. Clements, included A. Mitchell of the Seamen's Union, K. Day of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, E. Erles of the Fremantle Young Labor League and eight women representing the Union of Australian Women and women's committees of industrial unions.

18. See Melbourne *Herald*, 27 January, 1961; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 February, 1961; and Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, 27 March, 1961.

19. Pamphlet *Early Warning*, issued by Secretary, Australian Peace Council, W.A. Division, *n.d.*

20. *Ibid.*

an overwhelming majority of Australians favoured a U.S. presence on Australian soil as a kind of insurance policy.[21]

During the first part of the 'Sixties' the Council was also actively engaged in propagandising the rise of neo-Nazism and irredentism in West Germany. The so-called 'German Problem', in fact, constituted a major preoccupation throughout Australia of the Continuing Committees of the Melbourne Congress in the years preceding the Vietnam issue.[22] Outside screenings of the film *Mein Kampf*, Peace Council supporters distributed a pamphlet entitled *Never Again*, which pointed out that "some of the

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21. In reply to the Roy Morgan (Gallup) Poll question, "Do you favour or oppose letting America build that radio station in Australia?", eighty percent of the respondents said they supported the station. Only eleven percent were opposed. Comments from those polled reportedly took the following sort of line: "Australia is not strong enough alone"; "America is our main hope for defence"; "they saved us before". That poll was conducted in April 1963. As early as 1960, another Morgan Poll had reported that sixty-two percent of the Australian people said that the U.S. should be permitted to set up bases in Northern Australia similar to those in England, if she wanted to. Only twenty-three percent had said 'no'.

22. Mr. Sam Goldbloom, a Jew and Secretary of the ANZ Congress, was particularly vocal on the topic of growing militarism in the Federal Republic of West Germany, and authored a widely circulated article called *German Re-armament - The Great Betrayal*, as well as a pamphlet entitled *Peace and the German Problem*. A film called the *German Story Today* was distributed among the various peace groups, and the national peace literature abounded with articles such as *'The Eichmann Trial and His Accomplices Today'* (*Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 1, February 1961). In the period immediately following the Melbourne Congress, the Australian Peace Council, including its W.A. section, responded to an appeal from the WPC that support be organised in defence of seven German peace workers accused by the West German Federal Republic of undermining "the constitutional basis of the Federal Republic". The support from the Australian sections took the form of cables and letters to the Special Criminal Court in Dusseldorf and messages sent to the solicitors of the accused.

people you saw in *Mein Kampf* are [again] in top positions...[and] operating policies which prevent a peaceful solution to the German problem which is the greatest threat to the whole world".[23]

Other activities of the Council included the sponsoring of peace poster exhibitions,[24] the circularising of national peace petitions,[25] and the selling of various publications including an article on the Crimes Act and the APC's journal *Pax*. In addition, the Council collected signatures for a protest letter to the South African High Commissioner in Canberra, denouncing the Sharpesville massacre and the policy of apartheid.[26] The Council sold Lumumba post cards,[27] as well as the less controversial UNESCO Christmas cards. Occasionally, it organised a march or demonstration, and was instrumental in forming the Hiroshima Commemoration Committee which held a meeting *cum* march once a year on the anniversary of the dropping of the A-bomb on Japan. And finally, the Council was the chief body promoting the W.A. Sponsoring Committee of the 1964 Sydney Congress.

The other main grouping in the W.A. movement - the pacifist bodies - was composed primarily of members of the Society of Friends, who had

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23. *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 6, July 1961, p. 11.
24. *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 7, August-September 1964, p. 10.
25. For a description of these national petitions, see Chap. 5, pp. 164-165.
26. Letter from W.A. Peace Council to South African High Commissioner dated 24 March, 1960.
27. Cited in letter from Victorian Peace Council to all States and New Zealand dated 23 March, 1961.

been dedicated to the cause of pacifism for many years. Operating through the Quaker Peace Committee (QPC), the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee (COAC), they confined most of their activities to meetings and discussions, yet some of their members played prominent rôles in the issue-oriented and *ad hoc* pacificist groups - *viz.*, the W.A. CND and the Church and Community Committee for Vietnam.

One of the most ubiquitous activists among the Perth pacifists was Lawrence D. (Laurie) Wilkinson, the Quaker elected on the ALP ticket in 1966 to fill a casual vacancy in the Australian Senate. Senator Wilkinson was subsequently re-elected for a full term in the 1967 Senate elections. As a Senator, he has not been particularly outspoken in his criticism of Australia's involvement in Vietnam (perhaps because pacifism is not a part of Labor Party policy), but acting as a Quaker, he has continued to voice strongly his opposition to the War. Attending the Fourth World Conference of the Religious Society of Friends at Greensboro, North Carolina in August 1967, he was appointed a member of the Conference's six-man delegation that delivered a statement to the U.S. Departments of State and Defense, demanding the withdrawal of "all support, active and tacit, from this war".[28] For a long time, a special interest of Senator Wilkinson has been the application of a 'scientific method' to the study of peace through the establishment of peace research institutes. He supported such an idea at the time of the 1964 Sydney

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28. *Pacific*, Vol. 2, No. 3, Sydney, September-October 1967, p. 20.

Congress,[29] and in his maiden Senate speech proposed that a peace research institute be financed by the Government at the Australian National University along lines similar to those of the International Peace and Conflict Research Institute operating in Sweden.[30]

Before his election to the Senate, Senator Wilkinson helped the W.A. pacifists set up a local branch of the COAC. The purpose of this body, which also had branches in the other states and the A.C.T., was to offer counsel to young men about to be conscripted who expressed reservations about being forced to take or assist in the taking of human life - either in all wars or in a particular war. COAC's official position was to offer whatever philosophical assistance it could, and channel legal matters, when necessary, to members of the law profession.

Although it only numbered about twenty members and met irregularly, FOR was the most active of the W.A. pacifists groups between 1960 and 1966. This group - which never officially affiliated with the national pacifist body, the Federal Pacifist Council - assisted prominently in creating and activating groups like the Church and Community Committee and the COAC. It also joined the Peace Council in numerous undertakings - *e.g.*, the Hiroshima Commemoration Day Services - and staunchly supported many of the CND projects. On August 7th, 1966, it helped to organise a march and rally of about 500 anti-conscriptionists, during which two

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29. For an exposition of his views on peace research, see *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 27, Nos. 6 & 7, July-August 1965.

30. *CPD, S.*, Vol. 33, 1 March, 1967, pp. 221-222.

youths burned their draft cards. However, its own activities - due to its size - were limited to more modest undertakings like the leafleting of handbills, organising of public study groups, and the scheduling of meetings to be addressed by outside speakers.[31]

The pacifists, as well as the Peace Council, were much more effective in gaining public recognition through the issue-oriented organisations. In early 1962 a CND group, inspired by the success of the British model, was created in W.A. Almost from its inception until its quiescent demise in mid-1965, the CND'ers dominated Perth peace activity. Their objectives and language were similar to those of the British CND, in that they wanted to alert the public to the dangers of nuclear weapons and prevent a 'nuclear armageddon', but unlike their British counterparts who were proposing unilateral nuclear disarmament for Britain, the W.A. CND'ers and their colleagues in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane sought to prevent the introduction of nuclear weapons into Australia. Specifically, they supported the Leader of the Opposition's call for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere, which they believed demanded two initiatives from the Australian Government: "a) Non-acceptance of nuclear weapons; b) Refusal of military bases, such as the North-West Cape Radio Station."[32] The Government's decision to grant a site to the U.S. for the communications base at Learmonth was bitterly denounced by CND, and at its constant round of public meetings and demonstrations

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31. For an account of some of the major activities of FOR, see *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 1965.

32. *W.A. CND Monthly Newsletter*, February 1963.

formed the principal issue of protest. These protests were frequently attended by officials of the W.A. Branch of the ALP, and by parliamentarians like Senator-elect John Wheeldon.

W.A. CND went to elaborate lengths to try to make the peace issue relevant and immediate to their fellow West Australians. To demonstrate graphically the realities of nuclear warfare, the Committee prepared a pamphlet, with map, depicting an assimilated attack on the city of Perth. Entitled *An Assumed Thermonuclear Attack*, the pamphlet applied to Perth the findings of a study of an assimilated attack on Boston, Massachusetts.[33] In the Perth situation - contended W.A. CND - if only blast and firestorm (not radiation) effects were considered, a mere 6% of the population would escape uninjured from a 6 megaton bomb. 425,000 persons would be killed, and there would be 45,000 injured to be attended to by 20 surviving doctors.[34] Another pamphlet, widely distributed by W.A. CND, was an article that had appeared in *Nation* stressing the fact that the U.S. radio base, "in the event of an outbreak of nuclear hostilities between world powers,...would be a logical target for immediate destruction by intercontinental ballistic missiles; the very difficulty of knocking out submarines would, of course, make it the more imperative to cut off their communication".[35]

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33. Reported in *New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 266, Boston, 31 May, 1962, pp. 1126-55.

34. *Peace Action*, Vol. 4, No. 2, March 1963.

35. *Nation*, 23 March, 1963.

Still - despite the zeal of CND members, whose activities also included leading the local version of the world-wide Easter Aldermaston marches[36] and participating actively in the annual Hiroshima Day commemorations[37] - the political goals of most West Australians continued to be geared to the 'bread and butter' issues.

With the Australian Government's policies confirmed at the general elections of 1963 and the Senate elections the following year, and construction of the radio base well underway, the enthusiasm of the CND supporters gradually began to wane. Moreover, some of CND's demands were met in the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of July 1963. An attempt to organise a federal CND had never succeeded beyond the holding of a single

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36. The largest of these annual treks in W.A. occurred on Easter Sunday, 1963, when over 450 people were reported to have participated in a twelve mile march from Fremantle to Perth. Although the lead banner was carried by CND, representation came from all the main peace groups. The rally at Perth Esplanade was chaired by CND's Chairman, Kenneth McNaughton, and addressed by Mr. Peter Collingwood and Rev. Keith Dowding (the Presbyterian minister who had been forced to resign his Vice-Presidency of the W.A. Branch of the Labor Party). Also in the march, which was composed mainly of class dissenters but included some religious dissenters, were Mr. Bert Vickers (author), Rev. Ralph Sutton (Methodist and a President of the W.A. FOR), Rev. Peter Hodge (Anglican and a President of the W.A. Section of APC), and Miss Katharine Susannah Prichard (who walked the last half mile) - *Peace Action*, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1963. The final Aldermaston rally was conducted in 1965, on Good Friday. The meeting was addressed by Rev. Sutton, Senator-elect John Wheeldon, and the Most Rev. George Appleton (the Anglican Archbishop of Perth) - *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 27, No. 4, May 1965.

37. Typical of these commemorations was a cherry tree planting ceremony arranged by CND at St. Andrews Presbyterian Church, after a march had been held from the Perth railway station. (*Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 7, August-September, 1964.)

national meeting in Sydney in December 1963,[38] so that when Vietnam replaced nuclear disarmament as *the* critical peace issue by 1965, the CND groups throughout Australia dissolved into the anti-Vietnam movement.[39] In W.A., many of the CND'ers moved into an anti-Vietnam coalition called the Church and Community Committee on Vietnam.

This group had been set up by the traditional pacifists and the 'old guard' supporters of the Peace Council in an attempt to unite all Vietnam opposition under one umbrella. Its position was deliberately vague and moderate in order to embrace all shades of dissent. It offered no specific solutions, confining itself to the raising of issues and the generating of moral concern in the community. In some respects, it achieved a modicum of success, since it managed to coalesce the dissent of occupational leaders from such diverse groupings as clergymen,[40] trade

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38. The projected meeting for a second national conference the following year in Melbourne never eventuated for the reasons cited in the text, but, in addition, many of the CND'ers rejected the idea of a second conference since they preferred to concentrate on the peace movement's major project in 1964, the organising of the national Congress in Sydney.

39. In Melbourne the VCND virtually became the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) - see R. Summy, *op.cit.*, pp. 204-209. And in Sydney the SCND under the direction of Mr. Robert Gould, in effect, turned into the beginnings of the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), also under the convenorship of Mr. Gould.

40. The most outspoken of these clergymen were Rev. Sutton, Bishop Appleton, Rev. Dowding, and Rev. Hodge.

unionists,[41] academics,[42] and ALP politicians,[43] helping to pave the way for the national dissent that began to emerge after the 'Tet offensive' of early 1968. But in terms of immediate effects, the quality of anti-Vietnam protest - as well as that of almost all forms of peace activity in W.A. - manifested the characteristics of 'expressive politics'.[44] In the entire course of W.A. peace politics between 1960 and 1966, this researcher could discover only one case of the protesters achieving a tangible victory; and that, on a very minor scale, was achieved by the Union of Australia Women, a group which formally does not even come within the definition of the peace movement. Its success consisted of getting a Perth shop to withdraw a window display of 'jungle war' toys, an incident which led one newspaper to declare "organised and argued protest can still achieve wonders".[45]

After reviewing the record of W.A. peace activity, one peace movement leader at least did not share this optimistic viewpoint. His verdict: "Reasoned argument is very difficult in a nation of many kinds of sheep."[46]

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41. Trade union support was confined to those unions such as the Seamen's Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, and Painters and Decorators Union, which consistently had lent their backing to the Peace Council.
42. Included among the academic supporters were three professors: Prof. E.K. Braybrooke, Prof. F. Callaway, and Emeritus Prof. H. Roberts.
43. Among the more prominent ALP politicians who endorsed statements of the Committee were Senator J.M. Wheeldon, Mr. F.E. Chamberlain, and State Opposition Leader, Mr. A.R.G. Hawke.
44. For the meaning of this term, see Chap. I, p. 18.
45. Editorial, *'Protest Upheld'*, *Canberra Times*, 29 June, 1965.
46. H.G. Clements, letter to the writer, 18 February, 1966.

Conclusion

There were two features of the W.A. movement which were paralleled in some of the other states. The first of these features, the absence of a 'core body', has already been mentioned. The dispersal of power in the W.A. movement was similar to the fragmented organisation that existed in Victoria (though, of course, the volatility of Melbourne's peace politics was unmatched in the Perth-Fremantle area, even on a per capita basis). The structural framework of the W.A. movement was also paralleled in South Australia, where the Continuing Committee of the Melbourne Congress, *i.e.*, the S.A. Peace Committee, was unable to assume the dominant position. The movement there, as in W.A., was divided into the same two major sections of pacifists and pacificists, except that the husband and wife team of G.E. and Edna Hutchesson, who virtually 'ran' the pacificist, trade union based Peace Committee, were also members of the Society of Friends. Although Mr. Hutchesson admitted relations between the Peace Committee's followers and the pacifists were slightly strained in the first years of the decade,[47] the two sections - for a variety of reasons - were much closer in subsequent years.[48]

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47. Letter from G.E. Hutchesson, Chairman, S.A. Committee for I.C.D. (formerly S.A. Peace Committee) to the writer, 16 November, 1967.

48. A close alliance between pacifists and pacificists formed around the conscription and Vietnam issues. The first anti-Vietnam group, the Vietnam Protest Committee, received the strong backing of both sections of the peace movement, and so did the more viable group, the Campaign for Peace in Vietnam, which was set up after the 1966 Federal elections. Composed primarily of middle class and middle aged moderates (*i.e.*, in the context of peace politics), this latter group's Chairman was the Professor of Philosophy at Flinders University, Brian Medlin, and its membership included the Premier of South Australia, Mr. Don Dunstan. After 1969, though, a new kind of factionalism between 'radical' and 'reformist' pacificists splintered the S.A. movement.

Finally, in the case of Tasmania, it is difficult to draw organisational analogies with the W.A. situation because of the extremely low level of peace activity in the island state.

The second feature the W.A. movement shared with some of the other states - notably, S.A. and Tasmania - was a failure to transform small group and individual protestations into anything approaching the insistent and unified demands of a mass movement. There are numerous explanations to account for this. In S.A., Tas. and to a slightly lesser extent in Qld., the movements were circumscribed by social factors similar to those existing in W.A. The politics of their residents did not remotely revolve around the issues of foreign affairs and defence.[49] Not even were there between 1960 and 1966 the semblance of any local *cum* peace movement issues such as arose in W.A. over the radio base, or in S.A., itself, in 1947-48 over the Woomera Rocket Range and in the 1950's over its uranium deposits.

Mobilising difficulties were also encountered in the three smallest states, because the peace dissenters were unable to secure substantial socio-economic bases of support from which large numbers of potential fellow dissenters could be recruited, and from which recognised leadership for the movement could be obtained. The leadership that did exist was

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49. See *Current Affairs Bulletin*, Vol. 40, No. 8, 11 September, 1967, entitled *'Politics at State Level - South Australia'*; *CAB*, Vol. 41, No. 6, 12 February, 1968, entitled *'Politics at State Level - Queensland'*; and *CAB*, Vol. 43, No. 11, 21 April, 1969, entitled *'Politics at State Level - Western Australia'*.

composed, in the main, of unattached artists, intellectuals, and clerics[50] - a feature not uncommon among middle class radicals[51] - but it is exactly this type of individual who exerts little influence in parochially oriented communities, and who carries with his personal commitment no wider interest group backing.

On the other hand, the situation was somewhat different on the Eastern seaboard. The unattached and often unknown artists and intellectuals found a more receptive audience in the cosmopolitan cities of Sydney and Melbourne. And after the 1966 elections, even Brisbane, through the influence of the Society for Democratic Action (SDA) and then the Radical Socialist Alliance (RSA), began to develop an experimental and radical sub-culture. However, the main advantage enjoyed by the peace movement in the East was the fact that it was built upon a solid base of left wing trade union support, and was able to expand during the 'Sixties' into other socio-economic groupings. Cognizance of the importance of building bases of power, no doubt, is what led the planners of the 1959 Melbourne Congress and the 1964 Sydney Congress to organise those conferences along occupational and sociological lines rather than on the basis of topics or lectures to large gatherings of atomised individuals. The effect of cultivating socio-economic bases of support

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50. N.B., the principals H.G. Clements, Katharine Susannah Prichard, Bert Vickers (writer), and Rev. P. Hodge in Western Australia; and the Hutchessons (publishing) and Dr. S. Lovibond (Univ. of Adelaide lecturer) in South Australia. None of these peace activists possessed an independent power base outside the peace movement.

51. See Chap. I, p. 14; and Frank Parkin, *op.cit.*, pp. 97*ff*.

has introduced into the peace movement, in some instances, a new type of leadership. It has meant that some peace leaders owe their influence, not to powers developed in the peace movement *per se*, but to position and prestige earned in areas outside the movement - *i.e.*, in the bases of power.

If the movements in W.A., S.A. and Tasmania had been successful in attracting as their leaders the type of people who exerted influence over important socio-economic groupings, then perhaps these movements could have duplicated - at least in proportion to their state populations - the achievements of the movements along the East Coast.

CHAPTER IV

QUEENSLAND MOVEMENT

By almost any standard other than formal structure, the Queensland peace movement between 1960 and 1966 can be equated with the Queensland Peace Committee for International Cooperation and Disarmament, hereinafter shortened to Peace Committee or QPCICD. Its position as the commanding or 'core body' was never successfully challenged until the University based Students for Democratic Action (SDA),[1] formed in mid 1966, managed to establish an independent base of support during 1967. This is not to say that the two groups were directly and consciously competing against each other for the allegiance of supporters, for at first there actually existed a close liaison between the two organisations. But after 1966 the QPCICD no longer dominated or set the tone for that section of the movement which aimed at propagandising a message, and eventually the two groups even became rivals. In other words, the movement of the post 1966 Federal elections, as a consequence of SDA's rise, was a qualitatively different movement in Queensland than the one operating in the first part of the decade.

This theme, applied to the national movement, is pursued in Chapter VII. However, in this chapter, the purpose is to examine the activities

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1. In order to accommodate non-university support, this group by mid 1967 changed its name to the *Society* for Democratic Action; then in 1969 it disbanded and its leaders formed the Revolutionary Socialist Alliance (RSA), with a student branch (RSSA) on the University of Queensland campus.

and supporters of the various Queensland groups that existed between 1960 and 1966, and to indicate broadly their relationship to the hegemony of the Peace Committee. This situation - where a 'core body' dominated the movement - was paralleled in N.S.W. where the rôle also was assumed by a Continuing Committee of the Melbourne Congress, the N.S.W. Peace Committee, and then its direct successor, the Association for International Cooperation and Disarmament (AICD).

When the Qld. Peace Committee was formed out of the State's preparatory committee for the 1959 Melbourne Congress, it absorbed most of the personnel and equipment of the old Qld. Assembly for Peace group, and assumed all of its functions. The reason for creating the new group, which constituted little more than a change in name, was to forge publicly identifiable links with the Victorian and N.S.W. groups that had been set up after the Congress. The ultimate objective, of course, was to encompass some of the new forces that had been attracted to peace politics by the Congress.

Although this scion of the Melbourne Congress received more broadly based support than its predecessor, its success continued to depend heavily upon the backing of a few trade union officials at the Trades and Labor Council of Queensland[2] and the loyalty of a minority of the

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2. Among the more prominent and consistent trade union supporters were the late A. Macdonald, the Secretary of the Qld. Trades and Labor Council; Mr. F. Whitby, Secretary of Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union, and successor to Mr. Macdonald's position upon his death in 1969; Mr. L. Townsend, Secretary of Vehicle Builders Union of Qld.; Mr. J. Sherrington, State Management Committee of B.W.I.U.; Mr. P. O'Brien, Snr. Vice-President Waterside Workers Federation of Qld.; Mr. T. Chard, B.W.I.U. Organiser; and Mr. N. Kane, Secretary of Electrical Trades Union.

rank and file from the more 'politically left' unions.[3] Without the endorsement of these class dissenters - whose support was competently mobilised by the QPCICD's perennial Secretary, Mrs. Norma Chalmers[4] - the Committee would soon have ceased to function in any viable sense.

Despite this trade union base, the Peace Committee's Executive was not numerically dominated by trade unionists. The majority of its members were clergymen, academics, housewives, businessmen, students, *etc.* Yet for most of them their interpretation of society and events was premised upon the dichotomic conflict between economic classes. They accepted the working class as the chief force around which to mobilise peace dissent. Their presence on the Executive Committee did not mean an upsurge in *non* trade union influence upon the QPCICD, though, conversely, their association extended the Committee's ties - if not influence - into their particular occupational and socio-economic areas.

This tendency of the influence to be one-directional is partly explained by the fact that the *non*-union Executive members did not come to the Peace Committee with established, independent bases of power.

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3. These unions included the Waterside Workers Federation, the Seamen's Union, the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Building Workers Industrial Union - and to a lesser degree - the Australian Meat Industry Employees Union, the Operative Painters and Decorators Union, the Amalgamated Foodstuffs Union, the Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union, and the Boilermakers and Blacksmiths Society.

4. Mrs. Chalmers was an active member of the ALP. Her husband, Hec Chalmers, a businessman who shared his wife's interest in Peace Committee work, was a member of the State Executive of the Qld. Branch of the ALP - *i.e.*, the QCE.

Other than a few extra-parliamentary officials of the ALP, who owed their positions in the ALP to the trade union faction within the Labor Party,[5] the members of non-union organisations were not influential figures capable of involving large groups or institutions in the politics of peace dissent. Some of the members, it is true, provided useful contacts with cliques and individuals within large groups, but these forces, in return, were not powerful enough to noticeably affect Peace Committee decisions. Although the Peace Committee claimed it welcomed suggestions from friendly sources (and it certainly adjusted its strategy and tactics to 'feedback' from the society), its aims, policies and assumptions remained uninfluenced by sources other than a section of the trade unions. The primary flow of power travelled one way: from a section of the trade unions (which obviously held some ties with the Communist Party) through the Peace Committee to any part of the society that could be reached. The only interaction affecting basic decisions occurred between the trade union political left and the Peace Committee, but the latter was little more than an appendage of the unions, so that its influence was merely based on the expertise it had gained in running peace campaigns. Graphically, the system operated something like the following:

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5. Four officers and Executive Committee members of the Peace Committee sat on the ALP State Executive. They were trade union officials F. Whitby, T. Chard and L. Townsend (see fn. 2), and businessman H. Chalmers (see fn. 4). The three trade unionists were also members of the important seven man Inner Executive of the ALP. In addition, Mr. Whitby was one of Qld's six delegates to the ALP's Federal Conference, and one of its two delegates on the ALP Federal Executive.

DIAGRAM I



Basal power flow.

Interaction re decisions.

Feedback or politico-social control.

At the beginning of this chapter it was averred that the Peace Committee, in effect, equalled the Qld. peace movement. Thus the centre box in Diagram I can be exchanged for the entire peace movement, without basically altering any of the other elements of the operational system.

The evidence for equating the Peace Committee with the peace movement rests on the relationship between the Peace Committee and the other Qld. peace groups. Whenever any smaller or emergent group attempted to influence the course of the mass movement, it inevitably found itself requiring Peace Committee assistance, thus eventually becoming dependent on it. Since any mass protest depended on trade union support, and the Peace Committee enjoyed special trade union ties, the Peace Committee automatically was thrust into an ascendant and controlling position. It had to be consulted and listened to; otherwise, there were no supporters *en masse* - only the moral witnesses of a few individuals. Moreover, Peace Committee dominance arose not only from its accessibility to the trade unions, but because it possessed certain advantages in the way of experience and material resources that were needed to undertake large scale projects.

Given the core position of the Peace Committee, there were three possible courses of action the smaller, independently initiated group with limited resources and connections could adopt:

(1) It could refrain from engaging in activities that involved wide scale propagandising and the mobilising of mass forces. It could retreat within itself.

(2) It could decide to break out of such a restrictive circle. If it did this, two options were open: it could recognise the superior resources of the Peace Committee, and reconcile itself to the QPCICD's dominant position, accepting the status of being little more than a mere adjunct; or it could persist in its independent rôle and end up destroying itself.

(3) It could isolate itself from the Peace Committee with the intention of developing its own power base, and - if successful - then choose to co-operate with the QPCICD on an equal footing.

In effect, there was still a fourth category defining the relationship that the small peace group may have held with the Peace Committee. It may have started under the aegis of the Peace Committee: *i.e.*, it may have been one of the *ad hoc* 'front' organisations instigated by the Committee, or one of its branches operating in a town or suburb. These types of groups - *e.g.*, the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), the Rockhampton Peace Committee, the Norman Park Peace Committee, *etc.* - are discussed, together with the Peace Committee, at the end of the chapter, but first it is proposed to look at the groups that can be classified under the first three headings: the self-contained small groups; the small groups aiming at mass support; and the single case of a group building an independent base.

Self-Contained Small Groups

Queensland's three pacifist groups - the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Quaker Peace Committee, and the Conscientious Objectors Advisory

Committee - all come under the category of being small and self-contained.[6] None of these groups was as large or as active as its counterpart in South Australia, Western Australia, N.S.W., or Victoria. FOR was Queensland's affiliate with the Federal Pacifist Council (FPC), but its membership only averaged about eight and it generally only held about one meeting every two months. Its association with the national FPC was tenuous,[7] which partly explains why the biennial rotation of the FPC Executive was confined to the three southern states of Victoria, N.S.W., and South Australia.

Since most of FOR's members were Quakers and met as well in the Quaker Peace Committee,[8] the pacifist section of the Qld. peace movement tended to be a well-defined, narrow clique. Both groups usually held their meetings at the Friends Meeting House, approached topics in the same manner, and rarely ventured into activities of a public nature. On this last score, however, a couple of individual members participated regularly in the activities of the pacificist groups, and it was chiefly FOR and QPC that set up the Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee.

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6. Another group closely associated with the pacifists, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, was formed in 1966, but this local chapter of an overseas body made relatively little mark in Qld.

7. A fact freely admitted in FPC's journal. See *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 1965.

8. For an account of the pacifism of the Qld. Quakers, see Brian Laver, B.A. thesis, *History of the Queensland Quakers*, Univ. of Qld., 1967.

However, much of the subsequent work in assisting prospective CO's was performed by Queensland's Save Our Sons (SOS) group, which, besides offering advice of a theoretical and practical nature, became engaged in the task of creating a legal aid fund.

SOS did not conform ideally to the prototype of the inward looking, self-contained group. Nevertheless, it came closest to this classification. For despite its involvement in some projects of high public visibility and its occasional liaison with the Peace Committee, its relations with the other peace bodies were generally restrained, its projects modest and limited in scope, and its public encounters tended to be of a personal, testimonial nature.

Formed at a public meeting held at the Friends Meeting House on September 1st, 1965,[9] SOS derived its inspiration from the sister SOS groups created in N.S.W. and Victoria in May 1965 and August 1965 respectively. The sole aim of SOS was to "oppose conscription of youth into the armed services to serve in overseas wars".[10] This meant the group's major attack was levelled at the National Service Act as amended in May 1965, which authorised the Government to send National Servicemen to the Vietnam War. As far as SOS was concerned, a member could base her objection to conscription for service in overseas wars on any ideological

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9. This meeting was addressed by Father Illtyd (Anglican), Rev. R. Smith (Methodist), Mrs. Audrey Buchanan (Convenor), Mr. Fred Harris and Mr. Laurie Brown (the last two being active members of FOR and the Society of Friends). See *The Peacemaker*, Vol. 27, No. 10, November-December 1965.

10. SOS pamphlet, *Statement of Aims of SOS*, Brisbane, *c.* September 1965.

grounds whatsoever. However, in point of fact, the women who started the Qld. branch were deeply influenced by pacifist views.

This underlying approach never changed in the course of the next two years, but the group's political style became slightly more militant. Under the secretaryship of Mrs. Vilma Ward, an active member of her local ALP branch, as well as the Qld. Council for Civil Liberties and the Norman Park Peace Committee, SOS began to engage in some militant, even party political, activities. One of its most publicised encounters occurred at a stormy reception given to Prime Minister Holt when he appeared in Brisbane for his first open election meeting of the 1966 campaign. The meeting was described by the local press as "one of the rowdiest ever held in Brisbane".[11] *The Courier-Mail* singled out the flamboyant actions of some SOS members for special mention.

> *"He* [Mr. Holt] *was forced to stop several times when demonstrators shouted anti-Vietnam slogans, waved a big 'Save Our Sons' banner, and held aloft about 20 anti-conscription placards....As the wild scenes developed, the solid core of up to 100 'Save Our Sons' hecklers, seated at the rear of the hall, were assisted by isolated pockets of interjectors scattered through the audience.... One large woman persistently jumped to her feet and led a 'choir' of interjectors in chanted slogans. Mr. Holt was forced to stop speaking during these sessions of 'Holt Holt - no conscription'. 'One, two, three, four, We don't want war', and 'Save Our Sons'. The woman and several of her followers were warned by police to remain in their seats...."*[12]

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11. *The Courier-Mail*, 10 November, 1966.

12. *Ibid.*

Presumably, the reference - "one large woman" - pertained to Mrs. Ward. Outside the meeting hall she again led a protest. This time the police linked arms to disperse "the Save Our Sons members gathered in small groups",[13] and the Prime Minister sped away in his car.

The above incident was atypical. Most of the time SOS engaged in more restrained protest, or worked behind the scenes with potential conscientious objectors. Every Friday afternoon for almost two years a small band of women wearing SOS sashes stood in Anzac Square in silent protest against the sending of conscripts to Vietnam. Their vigils received little publicity and provoked only desultory comments from passers-by. The purpose of the vigils seems to have been aimed at rendering a 'witness for peace' in the manner of the Quaker appeal to 'the light within' every individual.

Towards the middle of 1967 the vigils ceased, and the organisation itself lapsed into inactivity. Some members continued to be active in the peace movement, their main efforts being directed towards helping young men with conscientious beliefs avoid national service. They were especially pleased with the total exemption they helped to obtain for Roland Hovey, since his case was won on political grounds and objection to a particular war.

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13. *Ibid.* The Brisbane *Sunday Truth* gave a similar account of the episode, different only in that it spoke more chivalrously of the SOS women, referring to them as "the stalwart ladies of the 'Save Our Sons' movement." (13 November, 1966).

During its brief existence SOS was not in competition with Qld's only other women's peace organisation, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), for the two groups were different in many ways. In the first place, WILPF was much more inhibited in its activities. Only a couple of its members belonged to Brisbane's tiny core of habitual demonstrators. And as an organisation, WILPF seldom, if ever, partook in any provocative public project - not even a silent vigil. Most of its members came from middle to upper-middle class homes (SOS had more of a working class tone), and they preferred to confine their dissent to the persuading of uncommitted friends rather than submit to the indignities associated with public politics. Their projects stressed self education and quiet spreading of 'the message'. Seminars were arranged around such topics as esperanto, communism,[14] conscription, world federalism, and sources of social conflict. Some of the women were very active in producing *'Puppet Plays for World Friendship'*. Other projects included the sale of the group's special peace stationery, the

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14. This was a very sensitive issue for the WILPF women. Constantly, they were discussing what the relationship of their group should be towards the Communists. Perhaps the closest they ever came to formulating a definitive policy was contained in a statement by the editor of the group's newsletter, who pointed out: "W.I.L.P.F. membership is open to women of all political beliefs providing they sincerely seek to promote world peace. At present our branch has no Communist members. Like Bishop Moyes, we repudiate Communism, but do not fear it. Nevertheless, we find the 'Communist smear' a very real obstacle to progress. Many women who would like to join in our work for peace are deterred by fears that our organisation may be of service to Communist interests in some way. We want to bring this question right into the open...." (*WILPF Newsletter*, Qld., October 1966).

sending of telegrams to world leaders,[15] and the constant writing of letters to the local newspaper - many of which were directed against the popularisation of violence and war toys on television and in the stores.[16] Probably, the problem that most interested the members was investigating ways in which non-violent attitudes could be inculcated in children.[17]

From the foregoing, it becomes obvious that the objectives of WILPF extended over a much wider range than those of SOS. Its multifarious aims were premised on a call to strengthen the United Nations.[18] It supported "all steps leading to general and complete disarmament under

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15. These messages were usually highly moral in tone, yet conciliatory in attitude. For example, the following telegram was sent to President Johnson on the occasion of his visit to Brisbane: "Peaceloving Australian women wholeheartedly wish you every success in achieving worthwhile peace plans at Manila /stop/ however we deplore United States and Australian participation in the Vietnam Civil War and urge you in the name of humanity to cease all bombing immediately /stop/ napalm and white phosphorous especially horrify us /stop/ we trust Mr. Malik's hints of peace overtures from Hanoi will be thoroughly explored /stop/ reports of American rejection of similar overtures in 1965 deeply disturbed us all /stop/ may America's great traditions be once more upheld. (Signed Qld. Members of W.I.L.P.F.)" Printed in *WILPF Newsletter*, Qld., November 1966.

16. Two WILPF members opened up a commercially successful children's store of 'creative toys' in the Brisbane suburb of Taringa.

17. Some of the subjects listed for discussion included: *'Constructive Toys', 'Child Psychology', 'Popularization of Non-Violence', 'Ways of Combatting Irrational Fears' etc.* Lecturers from the University were sometimes secured for addresses on these subjects, but usually the women listened to talks from their own members. One member, Mrs. Margaret Henry, co-authored a book entitled *Parents and Children*, and the group also had as members (though rather inactive ones) the two well-known Qld. poetesses Judith Wright and Kath Walker.

18. WILPF's international body enjoys consultative status B with the UN, UNESCO, FAO, ECOSOC and ILO.

law with United Nations inspection and control, (including) the permanent abolition of nuclear testing as an immediate and basic step".[19] It advocated "greatly expanded UN programmes for economic aid and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries...establishment of Peace Corps under the United Nations",[20] the setting up of programmes for population control, "effective action to eliminate discrimination based on race, sex, religion, politics, economic status, or national origins",[21] and programmes that would "develop in children and adults attitudes and behaviour which will enable them to build a peaceful world".[22] In order to achieve these aims, which were endorsed by all the state branches in Australia, WILPF declared its belief in the basic rights of freedom of thought, speech and assembly.

WILPF's Qld. branch had been moribund for many years until revived in 1963, mainly through the efforts of an American woman, Mrs. Betty Ruth Kay. The wife of a history lecturer at the University, who also became very active in the Qld. peace movement, Mrs. Kay built up the Qld. chapter around a nucleus of women associated in one form or another with the University. When she and her husband returned to the U.S. in 1966, WILPF's membership numbered about thirty. Her departure did not immediately signal the decline of the organisation, as she was replaced by an equally

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19. Circular, *50th Anniversary, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Australian Section*, Sydney, *c.* 1965.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*

energetic woman, Mrs. Eena Job, the mother-in-law of Queensland's leading student radical, Brian Laver. For almost two years the membership was sustained at the same level - most of the members continuing to come from Brisbane's more 'fashionable' Western suburbs - and the same round of activities were engaged in. Then, when Mrs. Job left on a trip to England, the group reverted to its pre-1963 state.

Small Groups Aiming at Mass Support

Among those groups attempting to venture into mass politics but which lacked any strong and cohesive socio-economic base were the Qld. branches of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC), the Brisbane Professionals for Peace, and in its initial stages the Students for Democratic Action (SDA). When these groups failed to mobilise any degree of mass support, they were presented, in effect, with four choices. They could submerge their identity with the 'core body', *i.e.*, the Peace Committee. They could disband completely. They could change the nature of their activities, reducing them to the scale of the small, self-contained group. Or they could retreat within themselves, undertaking the task of solidifying their own independent base of support before seeking to mobilise community wide support.

At various stages of its existence Qld. CND adopted all the above courses of action except the last one. Formed in 1962 with objectives similar to the CND groups in Melbourne, Sydney, and Perth, it nominally survived for about three years before its members finally acknowledged

their inability to develop a sizeable and cohesive body of supporters and let the group become defunct. Almost all attempts to engage in wide scale direct action projects seemingly were circumscribed by the Peace Committee. In vain, CND sought to retain control of its major march and demonstration, the traditional Easter Aldermaston march. Yet when left to its own devices the response to the march was negligible. For instance, the first Aldermaston march in Brisbane on April 14th, 1963 - a combination two mile march and subsequent rally - which was organised and conducted solely by CND, attracted a mere one hundred participants, most of them young people.[23] The following year around Aldermaston season a 'Consultative Committee', composed of twenty committees, was set up upon the initiative of the Peace Committee to plan a two-day relay walk from Ipswich to Brisbane. And this time, with the support of the trade unionists, approximately one thousand persons were involved in the march and rally.[24]

Although CND constituted one of the twenty committees serving on the 'Consultative Committee' and it could not reasonably be claimed that the spirit of the march diverged from CND's aims, many CND'ers objected truculently to the manner in which both the march and concluding rally

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23. *The Courier-Mail*, 15 April, 1963; also *Peace Action*, Vol. 4, No. 4, May 1963.

24. *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 3, April 1964. *The Courier-Mail*, 5 April, 1964, estimated an attendance of 750 at the rally. Thus at least 250 marched, an impressive figure when it is considered that the march permit obtained from the police specified that no more than 50 persons could walk at any one time and these 50 had to be separated into groups of 6 people walking at two minute intervals.

were taken out of their control and no longer identified as a CND enterprise. Moreover, as advocates of unilateral disarmament for those countries already possessing nuclear weapons, they were not in full accord with the 'Consultative Committee's' assertion that "organisations and individuals participating or associating with the demonstration will be co-operating in the general spirit of the walk while retaining their own particular approach to the [disarmament] question...".[25] Since the Peace Committee's "particular approach" meant multilateralism under a system of "adequate controls and inspection", in contradistinction to the traditional unilateralism of Aldermaston, some CND'ers felt the statement gravely compromised their position.

Another incident provoking friction between the two groups was the appearance in June 1963 on the Brisbane streets of the sensational pamphlet, *Spies for Peace*, which had been circulated at the 1963 British Aldermaston March.[26] The Brisbane reprint of this pamphlet contained a foreword in which Australians were called upon to reveal any secret information they might have regarding their Government's plans for the running of the country after a nuclear attack. "Can we be sure", the

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25. *Peace Action*, Vol. 6, No. 2, March 1964. According to the Peace Committee the themes of the march were: "support for the partial test ban treaty and its extensions to cover underground tests; opposition to the proposed French tests in the Pacific; support for nuclear free zones and the goal of general, total and controlled disarmament." (*Ibid.*). This last theme, of course, was not a CND goal.

26. This was the pamphlet concerning the Regional Seats of Government in Britain which allegedly would take over the governmental operation of the country after it had been subjected to a nuclear attack.

pamphlet asked rhetorically, "that our Australian Government, too, has not quietly accepted the certainty of nuclear war?...If you know any official secret then, for your children's sake, publish it. For only in this manner can we really learn what our Government has done."[27]

The foreword was signed by an organisation calling itself "Spies for Peace, Australia, Inc.", but CND was immediately suspected of having authored the "treasonable document inviting people to commit espionage".[28] The CND Executive was interrogated by Commonwealth police, and samples of their typewriters were taken for laboratory analysis. As press publicity and public antipathy mounted, the Executive felt constrained to issue a public disclaimer, affirming that "Brisbane CND is an organisation which seeks to achieve its aims through lawful means...[and] we do not countenance their [the Spies for Peace] advocacy of espionage activities in this country".[29]

Although the Brisbane "Spies for Peace" were never unmasked, CND suspicions were directed at a short-lived group known as the Qld. Youth Campaign for Peace, a group which met in the Peace Committee's office, and which was granted the use of Peace Committee office equipment. Once again, the Peace Committee (though possibly blameless) had incurred the disfavour of the CND.

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27. Spies for Peace, Australia, Inc., *Foreword*, Brisbane, *c.* June 1963.

28. Brisbane *Sunday Truth*, 23 June, 1963.

29. Press statement of Brisbane CND, printed in *Sanity*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Brisbane, *c.* July 1963.

The preceding incidents were probably just as much the product of the strained relations between the two groups as their cause. It was almost inevitable that relations should be tense, when CND persisted in retaining its independence in the field of mass politics, and yet was unable to organise a solid, independent base of support to operate from. In such a situation, the centripetal pull of the stronger body was irresistible. As much as the 'core body' might have genuinely wanted to encourage and co-operate with CND, its dominant position would appear to have ensured the eventual demise of the smaller body. Of course, factors other than CND's relationship with the Peace Committee helped to contribute to its downfall - *e.g.*, the collapse of British CND, the signing of the partial test ban treaty, and the emergence of the Vietnam issue. Yet this last factor did not mean the end of the CND groups in Sydney or Melbourne, which, in effect, merely changed their names to the Vietnam Action Committee and the Vietnam Day Committee respectively.

By the time of the 1965 Aldermaston march (also routed from Ipswich to Brisbane), Brisbane CND was in the process of winding up its affairs. Remnants of the group joined an *ad hoc* body called the Aldermaston Relay Walk Committee - whose President and Secretary both came from the Peace Committee's Executive - and were allotted, together with "youth, students, miscellaneous", one section of the relay for "suggested walkers".[30] Soon afterwards, all identifiable traces of the Brisbane CND disappeared.

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30. Aldermaston Relay Walk Committee, Letter of Instruction from N. Chalmers, Secretary, *c.* March 1965.

YCAC of Qld. and the Brisbane Professionals for Peace differed from CND in that they were seeking to rally mass protest from clearly defined bases of support: in the first case from young Australians of both sexes, and in the second from persons of professional training. Since neither group proved capable of consolidating a strong base, yet continued to seek the mobilised support of the public, it was not long before they, too, found themselves drawn into the Peace Committee orbit. Confronted with the prospects of becoming mere appendages of the Peace Committee, both groups decided to change the direction of their appeals and reduce the level of their activities to those of the self-contained group along the lines of the pacifists and WILPF.

YCAC of Qld., which was modelled after similar type groups in Sydney and Melbourne, was founded towards the end of 1965, with the aim of enlisting public "opposition to part or all of the National Service Acts 1964".[31] By "not get[ting] involved in the rights and wrongs of the war [Vietnam]", insisted its President, "we appeal to the widest possible section of the community".[32] Despite this disclaimer about debating the Vietnam issue, most of YCAC's supporters did direct their protests against the Vietnam War, including the same official who made the above assertion. Slogans like 'Why Die for Ky' and 'Stop Viet War' tended to set the theme of YCAC demonstrations. YCAC's small band of activists appeared prominently at Brisbane anti-Vietnam 'demos'. Members were arrested on

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31. *Constitution of YCAC of Queensland.*

32. Jim Beatson, President YCAC, *Marbles* (Newsletter of YCAC of Qld.), Vol. 1, No. 5, May 1966.

protest deputations to the U.S. Consulate, and on the visits of President Johnson and Air Vice Marshall Ky to Brisbane. In fact, two of Brisbane's most frequently arrested anti-Vietnam demonstrators were officers of YCAC.

Although the group remained small and isolated, unable to mobilise a significant popular following (its 'hard core' was confined to about twenty activists), for a very brief period it captured sensational headlines in the local press. In March 1966, when the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC) staged what was billed as "A Week of Vietnam Protest", YCAC joined the protest with a spectacular draft card burning 'demo'[33] at one of the city's busiest intersections at 5 o'clock on a Thursday afternoon. As it turned out, very few draft cards (or their facsimiles) got set alight. Instead, the police chased the demonstrators from corner to corner in an attempt to prevent them from congregating, and those that lingered or uttered 'improper' comments were efficiently and unceremoniously dispatched into one of the waiting police vans. The entire episode was filmed 'live' on all three of Brisbane's television news channels, and highlighted numerous incidents of rough handling by the police. In addition, the Brisbane *Telegraph* produced a special feature of dramatic photographs, depicting so-called 'police brutality'.

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33. Since the Government does not issue draft cards, the correct term is really registration certificate. In this particular demonstration most of the protesters were not even subject to the call-up, so that they were probably only setting fire to ordinary pieces of paper. Moreover, assuming the protesters were burning their registration certificates, it is unlikely this act, in itself, would constitute draft-dodging, since it would not affect the status of the registration.

Thus the original purpose of the demonstration was soon forgotten in a series of charges over 'police brutality' which emanated from diverse, even unexpected, quarters. Among those tendering criticisms were *The Courier-Mail* and the Labor MHR for Oxley, William Hayden. *The Courier-Mail*, while making it clear that it did not condone the demonstration, felt that the police had greatly overreacted.[34] Mr. Hayden raised the matter in Federal Parliament, seeking a special public enquiry to investigate the way in which the demonstration was handled by the police, and calling for a screening in the House of the television film on the demonstration. After making "a fairly exhaustive survey", explained Mr. Hayden, "it seems to me that a number of the police panicked...and were unfairly and unnecessarily rough with the people who were involved. I understand that in one case six policemen - I do not know whether that number is exact, but certainly there were more than two - lifted bodily a young lad who had a broken arm which was in plaster. One of them... twisted the lad's broken arm up his back and flung him into a paddy wagon. This is not the way to handle a civil disorder".[35]

To heighten the embarrassment of the police, almost a third of the twenty-seven persons arrested were not directly connected with the protest. They had been bystanders, trundled off to the City Watch House for voicing criticisms of the police action, or for not moving out of the way quickly enough. The episode can be said to mark the beginning of the

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34. *The Courier-Mail*, 25 March, 1966.

35. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 50, 31 March, 1966, p. 812.

concerted campaign in Queensland to alter some sections of the Traffic Regulations - culminating in the march of September 8th, 1967, when nearly four thousand students and staff of the University of Queensland, supported by the Qld. Trades and Labor Council, committed civil disobedience in defiance of the Government's refusal to meet their principal demands.

YCAC's sensational public debut was never sustained.[36] After one of its principal founders, a university student, moved to Sydney in April 1966, the group was unable to gain a strong foothold on the University campus. And without an independent base, it began drifting towards the Peace Committee or its adjunct, VAC. To avoid complete absorption into the QPCICD, it withdrew by mid 1966 into the cocoon of the self-contained group - restricting its activities mainly to silent vigils, seminars and self-educational programmes. By the end of 1967 its demise was complete.

Almost unique in composition among Australian peace groups was the Brisbane Professionals for Peace.[37] Its membership was "limited to professionals",[38] although this term was never precisely defined. Almost the entire membership, which reached about thirty-five at its peak, was

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36. The presence of its members was vociferously felt at a couple of important public meetings: *viz.*, the two addressed by Prime Minister Holt. The first occurred in Ipswich in April 1966; the other in Brisbane in November 1966 at the meeting referred to in connection with SOS (see pp. 121 & 122).

37. It came closest to resembling the Australian Pugwash group and the Vietnam Study Group at the University of N.S.W.

38. *Constitution, Brisbane Professionals for Peace, c.* late 1963.

drawn from the staff at the University of Queensland. Initiated by an American, university lecturer Dr. Michael Kay,[39] its general aim was to "unite professional men and women in order to promote world peace".[40] Its activities were directed along three lines: the dissemination of information about the dangers of war in the nuclear age among its own members and interested colleagues, the education of the community on this subject by all practical means,[41] and the participation of its members in direct action projects.[42]

The first of these functions - self-education - took the form of reviewing current literature on the subject and listening to specialists at meetings held once every three weeks. To implement the second and third functions, the Professionals depended heavily on the co-operation and assistance of the Peace Committee.

The greater part of 1964 was spent working with the Peace Committee on gaining support for the nation-wide Peace Congress in Sydney from October 25th-30th of that year. Dr. Kay was elected Chairman of the Qld. Sponsoring Committee of the Sydney Congress, half of whose sponsors came

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39. See p. 125.

40. *Constitution, op.cit.*

41. These means, according to the Constitution, consisted of "talks by members before other organisations and over radio and television, compilation of bibliographies and sources of information, sponsorship of public meetings, submission of letters and articles for publication in the press and journals, and distribution of copies of relevant articles." (*Ibid.*). Although most of these things were done, it was on a very limited scale.

42. Brisbane Professionals for Peace, *Circular*, March 1965.

from the Brisbane Professionals. Nevertheless, while the 'Professionals' provided many of the prestigous names, almost all of the administrative tasks were performed in the Peace Committee's office under the supervision of its Secretary, Mrs. N. Chalmers. Likewise, the Peace Committee supervised most of the post Congress activities, such as the visit of Dr. Linus Pauling and his wife to Brisbane, and the distribution of the papers read at the Congress.

The 'Professionals' relied upon the Peace Committee for assistance on a range of public projects, including some abortive attempts at staging direct action protests outside the U.S. Consulate. Inevitably, on these occasions, the overwhelming majority of demonstrators were mustered from the trade unions by the Peace Committee, and only as many as two or three 'professionals' could be counted among the truly committed. As well, anti-war pamphlets, though written by the 'Professionals', were usually distributed through Peace Committee channels; and the public meetings that were always jointly sponsored came under the organisational control of the Peace Committee. About the only project that penetrated beyond the circle of 'Professional' membership and which was handled independently of the Peace Committee was a study and report in 1965 on the political and scientific aspects of the proposed nuclear tests on Mururoa atoll - a report specially prepared for Mr. James B. Keeffe (now Senator), the President of the Federal ALP, and then Secretary of the Qld. Branch of the Labor Party.

When Dr. Kay returned to the U.S.A. in 1966, the organisation was already in a state of fast decline. Attendance at meetings, though now bolstered by some students, rarely exceeded ten. With the base of staff support disintegrating, it only took the results of the 1966 elections to apply the *coup de grace*. And, in 1967, no enthusiasm remained to resurrect the body.

Parity With the Peace Committee

A group evolving partly out of the 'Professionals' demise was the university based Students for Democratic Action (SDA); its other progenitor was the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), a short-lived, militant body initiated by the Peace Committee in the early part of 1966. Although many of SDA's founders had been active in both VAC and the 'Professionals' - representing for most of the young dissenters their political baptism - they decided to form a new group which would be less restrictive in vision and would attempt to interrelate a host of contemporary social and political problems.[43] The inspiration for its formation was derived from

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43. SDA characterised itself as an organisation whose supporters could be recognised by their "concern for the future of humanity because of the danger of nuclear war, [their] axiomatic acceptance of the sanctity of human life, revulsion at the ready use of force as an instrument of international policy, concern for the degrading poverty of two out of every three people in a world of potential plenty, and [their] belief that the individual should be free from the unwarranted interference of the state". It was, continued its founders, "an association of *individuals* united by a belief that democratic freedom is something that must be fought for, and once having been achieved, it must be protected if it is to survive...the password is ACTION". (*SDA Circular*, *c.* April 1967 - emphasis in the original.) In his daily 'forum' addresses SDA leader, Brian Laver, would incantate the message of reordering society's values ("human values before material values") and of restructuring its institutions ("participation in decision-making instead of the imposing of hierarchical orders").

the U.S. group called The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) - in particular from that group's manifesto issued from Port Huron, Michigan in 1962.[44]

Despite the aggressive proselytising of SDA's message by a handful of dedicated students and junior staff members, its radicalism was poorly received by the traditionally conservative students of Queensland University. It was not until SDA's leader, Brian Laver, undertook a vigorous campaign for the presidency of the Student Union and was mercilessly reviled in the local press that the students became curious enough to want to hear what was 'corrupting' them. And in the process, many were converted to the 'new radicalism'. Unwittingly, the mass media were probably largely responsible for Laver's surprisingly good showing in the election, enabling him to capture about one third of the student vote. At the same time (mid 1967) the SDA bandwagon gained momentum from a campaign the group instigated for civil liberties. This campaign originated half in frustration; half in shrewd, strategical calculation. While the SDA'ers may have genuinely felt thwarted in their attempts to exercise their rights of peaceable assembly and freedom of expression,[45]

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44. For a copy of document, see Paul Jacobs & Saul Landau (eds.), *The New Radicals*, Vintage Books, N.Y., 1966, pp. 154-167.

45. SDA grievances mounted against the Qld. State Government after a series of arrests and felt harrassments. In 1966 members were arrested at a demonstration on July 4th in front of the U.S. Consulate, on a march from the University on October 5th (26 students were locked in the city watchhouse), and on October 22nd when President Johnson visited Brisbane. The feud between students and police continued in 1967. In January, Brian Laver served five

[*Footnote 45 continued on next page*]

they also turned from Vietnam protest to the issue of civil liberties, because they saw this as a most effective way of beginning the task of mobilising a wide base of radical student dissent.[46] In terms of this last objective, they were rewarded far beyond any reasonable expectations. Abetted by an inept Government and some blunders on the part of their student opponents, the SDA'ers steered a campaign which reached a climax in the illegal march of nearly 4000 students and staff, and in the arrest of over one hundred persons.[47]

The SDA triumph rested, first, on the fact that a fair measure of tolerance for radical dissent and direct action tactics had been gained on the campus. A new rôle - incorporating political involvement - had been defined for the student. The march had also been a success on another level. In SDA jargon, the march had 'radicalised' large numbers of students, most of whom came from middle class, conservative homes.

[*Footnote 45 continued from previous page*]

days in gaol rather than pay a fine, and his sympathisers were prohibited from carrying protest signs outside the prison walls. Later that same month, many protesters were arrested in a demonstration against the Brisbane visit of Air Vice Marshall Ky, and in April a march from Brisbane to Ipswich was banned by the police until some members of the University staff privately intervened on behalf of the marchers. Finally, SDA members constantly complained of being harrassed by police whenever they attempted to hand out leaflets or carry signs.

46. From discussions with Brian Laver, *c.* April 1967; also with other members of the Civil Liberties Co-ordinating Committee (SDA's 'front group').

47. For one of the more balanced and non-emotive accounts of the march and its origins, (though the author was instrumental in drafting the Student Union's demands to the Premier), see Colin Hughes, *'Marching Rule in Brisbane'*, *Quadrant*, No. 50, November-December, 1967.

Having once "committed themselves against the power structure", these students began questioning authority along a broad front of ideas and issues. SDA had created an indeterminate base of power, but given the propitious circumstances and if properly mobilised, it contained the potential to erupt into a viable political force.

Thus, by the end of 1967, there existed a group in Qld. concerned with peace issues that rivalled, if it did not surpass, the influence of the Peace Committee. In terms of tangible, organisational assets, SDA employed three full-time organisers, owned an offset printing press, and turned over funds in excess of $10,000.[48] The Peace Committee, on the other hand, employed one and a half full-time workers, had no printing press, and averaged only about $7,000 in annual revenue. Yet the QPCICD usually had access to resources in the hands of Trades Hall officials.

The narrative of how the rise of SDA and groups like it redirected the course of the Australian peace movement immediately following the 1966 general elections is pursued more fully in the last two chapters.

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48. While it is difficult to unearth orthodox bookkeeping records from SDA, this figure represents what the writer considers a fairly accurate estimate on the basis of statements made to him by various SDA leaders, a survey of cheque account records, and on the general volume of SDA activity, especially its vast number of publications. On the other hand, the Peace Committee's receipts for 1967 were formally audited at $7,471.37 and its expenditures at $7281.34. (*Treasurer's Report*, Annual General Meeting, 5th and 6th April, 1968.) The 1968 receipts and expenditures were slightly less than $7,000. (*Treasurer's Report*, Annual General Meeting, 25th and 26th April, 1969.)

QPCICD or Peace Committee - Its Base, Its Activities, Its Policies

Until SDA's successful emergence as an independent group, the Peace Committee, together with its 'fronts' and 'autonomous fraternal' branches, clearly dominated Qld. peace politics. Moreover, in SDA's formative stages, it also greatly influenced that body. It often provided SDA with the use of its office equipment and vitally needed materials; it opened up to SDA its trade union contacts; and it maintained formal organisational links with SDA through an interlocking of top leadership (two of SDA's founders were also members of the QPCICD Executive).[49]

(1) Base of Support

Throughout the years of this study the Peace Committee's Executive formally reflected a diversity of community representation, a factor which made it easier for the Peace Committee to extend its influence into some of the other peace groups. However, as has already been strongly emphasised, the directing and chief influence in the Peace Committee emanated from a section of the trade union movement - the *sine qua non* of its existence. This close relationship was symbolically confirmed when the Peace Committee, in 1962, was granted permission to march in Brisbane's traditional Labor Day Parade, an honour never before accorded a nominally

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49. Although these two SDA leaders continued to serve on the QPCICD Executive during 1967 and 1968, they assumed an increasingly less active rôle, concentrating almost solely on SDA affairs.

non-labour organisation.[50] The practice has been continued in the ensuing years.

The Building Workers Industrial Union (BWIU) constituted the largest and most consistent financial supporter of the Peace Committee. The union imposed a voluntary peace levy of 25¢ payable once yearly by the members at the time of their September half yearly union dues. From the revenue collected in this manner the Union officials made disbursements throughout the year to the Peace Committee as well as, on special occasions, to the other peace groups.[51] The system of voluntary peace levies was also practised in the Seamen, Miners and Boilermakers unions. Another fairly reliable source of finance and manpower came from the

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50. The granting of this privilege initially aroused considerable controversy in some of the unions. Not only did QPCICD participation represent a formidable intrusion into traditional labour exclusiveness, and was therefore opposed for setting a "dangerous precedent", but there were political objections as well, coming from the right wing and moderate unions. For example, the Federated Clerks Union's W.J. Barry announced that he would not be marching in the same parade as the Peace Committee - a decision ratified by his Union Executive. The Federated Ironworkers Association State Secretary, H. Peebles, indicated he was "not happy about it". However, his union still marched, though under protest. The AWU was reported to have received the news with "cold disgust" - according to Peace Committee critic John Higgins ('*Peace Fronts on May Day*', *The Bulletin*, 12 May, 1962).

51. Thus over the five month period from May to September 1966, which saw a proliferation of peace groups, the BWIU donated a total of $540 to the following groups: Qld. Peace Committee - $300; Southeast Asia and Australia Conference - $100 (this was a Peace Committee undertaking); Trades and Labor Council to assist the above conference - $50; YCAC - $30; SOS - $30; and VAC - $30 (a group under Peace Committee control). (Qld. Peace Committee, '*Dry Season Approaching*', *Circular*, 18 November, 1966.)

Waterside Workers Federation through its special peace body, the Waterfront Peace Committee.[52]

Between March 1961 and June 1966 the Peace Committee's offices were located about fifty yards away from the Trades and Labor Hall. It was a relatively simple matter for the Peace Committee's Secretary Norma Chalmers to keep in daily contact with trade union officials, attach notices to the bulletin board, and above all maintain close liaison with the late Alex Macdonald, the Secretary of the Trades and Labor Council of Qld., and the key figure in the Peace Committee-trade union nexus.

From the time of the Peace Committee's formation after the Melbourne Congress until his death in 1969, Mr. Macdonald, a member of the Australian Communist Party, held the position of vice-president in the Peace Committee. In his triple rôle of Peace Committee official, Communist, and trade union leader, he channelled peace affairs through the maze of union hierarchies, and promoted QPCICD policies at the numerous conferences he attended in his various capacities. Among the many international peace conferences he attended during the first half of the decade were: the World Congress for Disarmament and Peace in Moscow in 1960; the Japanese Conference Against A & H Bombs, also in 1960; the International Conference for Solidarity with the People of Vietnam against U.S. Imperialist Aggression and for the Defence of Peace in North Vietnam in 1964; and the World Council of Peace meeting in Europe in 1966.

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52. The Secretary of this Committee, Mr. P. O'Brien, was also the President of the Peace Committee, an office he held from September 9th, 1965 until April 26th, 1969.

Some of his outspoken remarks at the 1964 North Vietnam Conference for Peace Defence were reported back in Australia and aroused a virulent response in the Central Executive of the N.S.W. Branch of the ALP. At the North Vietnam Conference Mr. Macdonald and his co-delegate, Mr. Reginald Rickard,[53] announced that an Australian body called the Committee for Peace in Vietnam and sponsored by twenty-eight trade unions "has organised mass demonstrations...against U.S. aggressions in South Vietnam ...[and] distributed thousands of leaflets all over Australia".[54] When news of this assertion and the general composition of the anti-Vietnam group reached the moderate Executive of the N.S.W. Branch, it took immediate steps to proscribe the group to its Labor Party members.[55] As a result of this proscription, the Committee for Peace in Vietnam quickly collapsed, but its loss was not particularly detrimental to the overall anti-Vietnam campaign, since its functions were simply assumed by two existing peace groups, the AICD and Sydney's CND.[56]

Mr. Macdonald also actively promoted - whenever feasible - the peace movement's interests at trade union conferences. For instance, at the

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53. Secretary of the Milk and Ice Carters Union of N.S.W.

54. Cited in P.R. Findlay, *Protest Politics and Psychological Warfare*, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1968, p. 6.

55. *Minutes of the Central Executive of the N.S.W. Branch of the ALP*, 29 January, 1965.

56. AICD was also proscribed by the N.S.W. Central Executive - on March 10th, 1967. In this case, though, an appeal to the Federal Executive was lodged, and the ban was eventually lifted (see pp. 209-210 & fn. 14). The Sydney CND was transformed into Sydney Vietnam Action Committee (VAC).

ACTU sponsored South Pacific Trade Union Conference in December 1965,[57] he campaigned for strong union action against the forthcoming French nuclear tests in the Pacific. His position was akin to that of the Amalgamated Engineering Union, which attempted in mid 1966 to get the ACTU to impose a ban on all French shipping and a ten minute protest stoppage on the day of the nuclear test.[58] Although this proposal failed, both within the ACTU and the South Pacific Conference, the two bodies adopted milder resolutions, recommending that "the Trade Union movement ...consider sanctions or appropriate steps to prevent such tests, including the refusal to handle any goods or equipment or material of any kind used in the erection of the Nuclear Testing site".[59] In Qld., this resolution was never implemented in any form by the unions affiliated with the Trades and Labor Council despite the efforts of Mr. Macdonald.[60] However, he and his associates, with the aid of the Peace Committee, did manage to have the substance of the resolution propagated through many of the union newsletters.

It was under Mr. Macdonald's urgings that the Qld. T.L.C. and some of its affiliated unions usually sent representatives to the interstate 'working sessions' organised by the various State Continuing Committees

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57. This conference, which was organised by the ACTU and the N.Z. Federation of Labor, was attended by representatives from thirteen Pacific area nations, including Singapore, Malaysia and Noumea.

58. *The Australian*, 15 June, 1966.

59. Declaration of South Pacific Trade Union Conference, *c.* December 1965. Later the ACTU endorsed the resolution as its official position on the French tests. (*The Australian*, 1 July, 1966.)

60. Interview with Alex Macdonald, 8 January, 1966.

of the Melbourne Congress. The purpose of these meetings was to co-ordinate local campaigns and clarify policy positions. While Mr. Macdonald was seldom present himself, undoubtedly his views were known and carefully weighed by the Queensland contingent.

As long as the QPCICD maintained an intimate association with union leaders of Alex Macdonald's prominence, it enjoyed an assured base of support. Nevertheless, from the mid 1960's onward, a constant lament of the Executive members concerned the relative decline in trade union support for peace politics in comparison to the rising interest shown by other sections of the community. While Vietnam and related issues precipitated the mobilisation of thousands of youth, intellectuals and clergymen from the middle class, these new issues revealed deep fissures in the "solidarity of the working class" and complicated the task of propagandising peace policies in the unions - not only in Qld. but throughout Australia. The ACTU's four page pamphlet supporting the ALP's 1966 election policy never once mentioned Vietnam or conscription,[61] although the ALP's parliamentary leader had declared them to be the leading issues. Some unions, notably the 61,000 member Ironworkers Association, the 60,000 member Federated Clerks Union and the 17,500 Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, actually endorsed the Government's decision to send troops to Vietnam.[62] Evidence of the depth of division among working class rank and file was confirmed by the outcome of the 1966 elections.

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61. *The Australian*, 14 November, 1966.

62. *Ibid.*

The theme of the *relative* decline in the support of the class dissenters is examined again and in much greater detail in the final three chapters.

(2) Peace Committee Activities

Toward mid decade one of the QPCICD's chief activities was co-ordinating the activities engaged in by other groups. This, as a matter of fact, was put forth as one of the reasons for the decline of the Committee's own rank and file support.[63] It certainly was true that when the old Assembly for Peace group merged into the Peace Committee in 1960, there were no pacificist groups whose activities required co-ordinating. All efforts could be (and were) directed towards changing the attitudes of individual workers and householders. Operating through trade union channels, the organisers were able to devote all their energies to such activities as lunch hour meetings on the work site, job leafleting, and preparing peace articles for the union newsletters and journals.

The tactic used to change attitudes and arouse constituent support stressed personal commitment, but this commitment came primarily through involvement in specific projects rather than through any understanding of detailed and subtle argument. The types of projects which fostered individual participation included the circularising of national

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63. Norma Chalmers, Secretary, Qld. Peace Committee, *Draft of 1968 Annual Report*, c. March 1968.

petitions,[64] joining of cavalcades to Canberra,[65] protesting of war films and war toys, organising of Peace Committee dances and barbecues, arranging for the entertainment of overseas visitors, raising of funds for the sending of Qld. delegates to overseas conferences, taking part in the annual Aldermaston[66] and Hiroshima Day[67] marches *own* rallies, attending classes in oration and speech, helping to promote the 1964 Sydney Congress,[68] petitioning of local members of Federal Parliament, and countless lesser projects. But the principal projects, around which the Peace Committee engaged the commitment of its supporters, consisted of the holding of large scale regional conferences and the sending of numerous protest deputations to the local French and U.S. Consuls.

The regional conferences, which functioned like microcosms of the Melbourne Congress, were held approximately every two years. During the 1960's the first of these conferences was conducted in Rockhampton from April 7th to 9th, 1961. Called the "Congress for Peace and Freedom", it discussed such topics as *'Effects of Modern Warfare and Failure of Civil Defense'*, *'Disarmament, General, Total and Controlled'*, *'What Can We Here*

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64. National petitions, emanating from the South, were circulated in 1961, 1962, 1963 and 1964. See pp. 164-165.

65. The cavalcades were annual projects, also organised in the South, and took place in 1961, 1962 and 1963.

66. See pp. 127, 128 & 130.

67. The commemoration of Hiroshima Day became an annual event after 1961, when a meeting sponsored by the Peace Committee decided to set up an Hiroshima Day Committee. Subsequently, every year, the Peace Committee resurrected the group.

68. "The 1964 Congress was the most important activity" of that year, according to the Peace Committee Secretary (*Minutes of Secretary, 1965 Annual Meeting*, 9 September, 1965).

Present Do to Help Peace and Freedom', and *'Benefits of Peace'*. The emphasis, as at all these conferences, was placed on individual participation rather than depth of analysis. The chief organiser and chairman of the Rockhampton conference was Dr. D. Everingham, later to become an MHR for the seat of Capricornia. One of the most popular conferences from the standpoint of union support was held in Brisbane on the weekend of March 15th to 17th, 1963. The general theme of this conference - disarmament - led to an enthusiastic endorsement of the ALP's policy for a nuclear-free Southern Hemisphere. In 1966 a Brisbane conference, held one month before the November general elections, attempted to propagandise radical foreign policies for "Australia and Southeast Asia". Its principal 'Southern' guests included Anglican Bishop J. Moyes, Mr. Gordon Bryant (MHR), and Mr. Francis James (publisher of the *Anglican*). None of these conferences elicited wide-spread public interest, except over the 'communist influence' issue which was well reported in the local press and which was standard 'ammunition' for the Liberal and Country Party politicians. Typical of these attacks was the statement of Mr. G. Pearce, the Liberal member for Capricornia, at the time of the Rockhampton conference, who announced he was "not attending and hope that my absence will be correctly interpreted as a protest and boycott of this Communist inspired gathering".[69] The 1966 conference, which created a tremendous furore in the Qld. State Legislature, was debated in the context of what

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69. Quoted in *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 4, May 1961.

the Country Party member for Redcliffe, Mr. Houghton, referred to "as the latest shot in the communist peace campaign".[70]

The Peace Committee regularly led protest deputations to the French and U.S. Consulates over the issue of nuclear testing. In addition, the U.S. Consulate was repeatedly singled out for protests over United States escalation of the Vietnam War, and, in 1961, was picketed for U.S. involvement in the 'Bay of Pigs' invasion. In March 1962, the Peace Committee co-ordinated a protest to the U.S. Consulate with the maritime unions over the construction of the W.A. radio base, and the following year a demonstration over the issue of "No Nuclear Bases in Australia" was carried into the Brisbane streets while Federal Parliament was debating the ratification of the W.A. radio base agreement with the U.S. None of these demonstrations provoked acts of civil disobedience until some protesters at a July 4th rally in front of the U.S. Consulate in 1966 sat down on the footpath and had to be removed by the police.

Meanwhile, the QPCICD was constantly engaged in attempts to set up local peace groups with aims similar to its own. Between 1960 and 1967 there existed outside Brisbane 'autonomous' branches of the Peace Committee in Rockhampton, Cairns, Townsville, Maryborough, Toowoomba and Ipswich, but the only group with a record of consistent activity was in Rockhampton under the leadership of Dr. Everingham. To stimulate peace support in the provincial towns, the Peace Committee's Secretary Norma

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70. *The Courier-Mail*, 2 September, 1966.

Chalmers toured Northern and Central Queensland extensively in 1960 and again in 1965. Branch groups were also encouraged in the Brisbane area, where periodically suburban peace committees appeared in Norman Park, the Western Suburbs, the Northern Suburbs, Inala-Darra, West End, and Wynnum. Two of the unions formed groups to operate in conjunction with the QPCICD: the Waterfront Peace Committee and the Seamen's Union Peace Committee.

Another organisational stratagem of the QPCICD consisted of establishing groups for conducting single issue campaigns, and fostering groups that appealed to special sectional interests. Some of the sectional groups promoted by the Peace Committee included the World Youth Forum Preparatory body whose objects were to stimulate discussion of world peace problems among youth and send representatives to the World Youth Forum in Moscow during the week from July 25th to August 3rd, 1961; the youth group formed in June 1963 known as the Youth Campaign for Peace; and the Ex-Services Human Rights Association (ESHRA, Qld. division) organised in early 1967 with Senator James Keeffe as its President. ESHRA was founded primarily through the efforts of Mr. P. O'Brien, the QPCICD's President, who modelled the group after a N.S.W. organisation of the same name which had evolved the previous year out of tensions within the R.S.L.[71]

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71. See Henry S. Albinski, *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia*, Duke Univ. Press, Durham, N.C., 1970, pp. 139-141, for a brief account of the N.S.W. ESHRA and its struggles with the N.S.W. branch of the R.S.L.

The *ad hoc* groups promoted by the Peace Committee ranged from the annual Hiroshima Day Committees and the Aldermaston Consultative Committee to the very brief but mercurial Vietnam Action Committee (VAC). This latter group originated in a decision of the QPCICD Executive, in February 1966, "to act fairly soon due to the rapidly deteriorating position in Vietnam and neighboring states...[and] put forward...a week of diverse activity at the end of March...with similar actions by all interested organisations, culminating in some form of joint activity".[72] The minutes relating to this decision noted that "Executive members supported idea of an ad hoc, informal form of co-ordination being continued around this week of activity".[73] The "form of co-ordination" became in reality VAC, which quickly rallied the support of all the local peace groups. Under the leadership of VAC's elected convenor, Mr. Brian Laver, the week of protest probably generated more interest in the community than any previous Peace Committee undertaking. For Laver, himself, and for some of his friends, the experience of VAC represented their first foray into the politics of dissent. They quickly found VAC's aims and structures too inhibiting, and drifted away to form their own group, SDA, which encompassed much broader aims and which was outside the direct control of the Peace Committee. Their departure from VAC, by the middle of 1966, precipitated its premature demise.

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72. *Minutes of the Executive Meeting of the Queensland Peace Committee*, 3 February, 1966.

73. *Ibid.*

(3) Peace Committee Policies

As has been indicated *supra*, the Peace Committee devoted more time to organising new groups and promoting its multifarious projects than to carefully formulating detailed policies and arguments. Primarily, it was interested in affecting public values and attitudes rather than in bringing about specific changes in policies. This strategy was dictated partly by necessity, since the group lacked the political resources for it to enter directly into the pluralist bargaining arena. In terms of 'interest group' politics its only power leverage existed in the unions, yet even here its power ultimately rested on the degree to which it could convert rank and file members to a pacificist outlook. Very few union officials - no matter how sympathetic to QPCICD goals - were prepared to jeopardise their union positions for the sake of a radical foreign policy.[74]

Thus, the Peace Committee assumed chiefly the rôle of an 'attitude group', attempting to mobilise mass support behind a general position. Such a broad statement of policy had been proclaimed in the Melbourne Congress' 'Declaration of Hope'.[75] Two years later, at an interstate meeting of the Continuing Committees, a series of more specific and provocative proposals were set forth.[76] Taken together, these two

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74. Thus Brian Laver, who became a trades hall research officer, soon found himself out of favour with officialdom when he tried to press action beyond 'economism'.

75. See Appendix A.

76. See Appendix E.

statements formed what came closest to constituting an official position of the Melbourne Continuing Committees. Naturally, ensuing events and crises elicited countless press and newsletter statements, yet these never departed significantly from the earlier proclamations.

The Peace Committee's response to world events generally coincided with the positions adopted by the 'fraternal' bodies in the South. For instance, the QPCICD joined the N.S.W. Peace Committee and the ANZ Congress in Melbourne in proclaiming support for the Statement on Disarmament issued by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference of March 1961;[77] shared in the denunciation of the United States for its "provocative" policy towards Cuba in April 1961;[78] "view[ed] with very grave concern the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union" in September 1961;[79] and added to the chorus of praise to Lord Russell for

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77. The Peace Committee circulated copies of this Statement through its regular distributive channels. The Statement was also endorsed and printed in full in *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 4, May 1961.

78. See *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 4, May 1961.

79. *'Waterfront Peace Committee Declaration'*, printed in *Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia, Branch News*, Brisbane, 14 September, 1961. Some of the other statements from the peace groups were not quite so unequivocal in their denunciation. For example, in *Peace Action* (Vol. 2, No. 8, September 1961) appeared the following: "The announcement by the Soviet Government of the intention to carry out a large series of tests and the commencement of such tests has been received with dismay, because of the known dangers of an increase in the atmospheric burden of radiation." The statement then went on to proclaim: "The most important issue today is a peaceful solution of the dangerous crisis in Germany which threatens nuclear war." In the same issue of *Peace Action* were printed a copy of the Soviet Union's statement at the time of the resumption of tests, and a copy of Prof. J.D. Bernal's WPC statement, which contained the much publicised and contentious observation that, "Lovers of peace throughout the world will deeply regret that the Soviet Government has, however reluctantly, found it necessary to resume testing nuclear weapons".

his rôle in the Cuban missile confrontation of October 1962.[80] Other policies were similarly attuned to the thinking of the Southern groups. The Peace Committee opposed in word and demonstrative action the ratification of the W.A. radio base agreement; it bitterly criticised the French Government for its decision to explode nuclear bombs over the Pacific, calling upon the Australian Government to impose stringent sanctions against the French;[81] it repeatedly appealed to the Chinese and Indian Governments to lay down their arms and negotiate their frontier dispute;[82] it initiated, as early as 1964, a campaign against "the conscription of twenty year old youths for overseas service";[83] and during the 1965 hostilities over Kashmir "urge[d] the Indian and Pakistani authorities to immediately agree to a cease fire, so that negotiations may be commenced forthwith", thus giving "support [to] the initiative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to mediate...".[84]

The explosion of China's first nuclear bomb elicited a blanket "condemn[ation of] the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere [and] ...the failure of the great powers to progress towards a full and complete test ban treaty".[85] The QPCICD's press statement also repeated the demand

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80. See *Peace Action*, Vol. 3, No. 10, November 1962.

81. See *Peacelight* (Bulletin of Qld. Peace Committee), May 1964. The QPCICD endorsed the radical proposals regarding sanctions put forth by the AEU (see p. 145).

82. *Peace Action*, Vol. 3, No. 11, December-January 1962/63, *et seq.*

83. *Peacelight*, October-November 1964.

84. *Peacelight*, September 1965.

85. QPCICD, *Press Release* (not published), 17 May, 1966.

for "the participation of the People's Republic of China as a partner to all talks" on disarmament.[86]

The Peace Committee's Vietnam policy called for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, and a settlement based upon the Geneva Accords of 1954.[87] After the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, the Vietnam War overshadowed all other issues, and it was only until recently, in 1968 and 1969, that the Committee began again broadening its protest - this time to such issues as conscription and the 'ABC' weapons of mass destruction.

Concurrently, with the propagating of its peace policies, the QPCICD joined the struggle in Qld. for increased civil liberties. In 1967, it combined with the Qld. Trades and Labor Council in strongly supporting the student campaign to alter the Traffic Regulations.[88] The instrumental successes achieved in expanding the basic freedom of expression and right to assemble peaceably in Qld. were duly recorded into the Secretary's 1967-68 Report. "It is interesting to recall", noted the Report, "that as recently as 1960 it was not possible to obtain a permit for a march. Since then the Centenary Park forum has been opened, march permits have now become traditional and last year the right to picket, or carry banners was achieved...."[89]

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86. *Ibid.*
87. *Peacelight*, June 1964, *et seq.*
88. See QPCICD, *Newsletter*, August 1967.
89. QPCICD, *Secretary's Report, Annual Meeting, 5/6 April 1968.*

Despite the many campaigns and public stands taken by the Peace Committee, civil liberties proved to be the only area in which any tangible results were achieved - not much 'output reward' from the pluralist system after seven years of hard and consistent 'input effort'. Still, it is perhaps unfair to evaluate the Committee's success in terms of concrete achievements. On the level of 'expressive politics' - an important but non-measurable and quantifiable function of politics - many of the peace participants appeared to have been amply rewarded. Furthermore, since the Peace Committee acted primarily in the rôle of an 'attitude group', it is largely meaningless to attempt to assess the immediate and direct effects of its actions in the formulation of policies.

Comparison With N.S.W. Movement

While the Qld. 'core body' paradigm was duplicated in N.S.W., the circumstances surrounding the relationship there were vastly different. In Qld., before the advent of SDA, the Peace Committee dominated the movement by virtue of the weakness or absence of potential rivals, and because it was linked so closely to powerful figures at the Trades Hall. In N.S.W., on the other hand, the Continuing Committee of the Melbourne Congress' access to the trade union hierarchy was partially blocked, and Sydney's more dynamic political climate produced a series of worthy rivals, beginning as early as 1962 with the formation of Sydney CND. Yet the N.S.W. Peace Committee and particularly its successor, the AICD, proved extremely resilient in adapting to new ideas and in accommodating the new types of peace dissenters, so that its 'core body' position never

was seriously challenged prior to the 1966 election defeat. As major host and organiser of the 1964 Sydney Congress, it gained an effective platform from which to coalesce the diversity of new forces coming into the movement. It adroitly seized the 'opportunities of the moment' and set up the widely based AICD, which almost immediately became the most influential of all the Australian peace groups.

Much of this story will unfold in the remaining chapters.

CHAPTER V

POST 1959 MELBOURNE CONGRESS

The four remaining chapters of the thesis examine the broad developmental pattern of the Australia-wide movement during the years that followed the Melbourne Congress and that ended in the movement's bifurcation after the 1966 General Elections. This time span of approximately eight years is divided into three general and sometimes overlapping periods: (1) the years immediately following the 1959 Congress; (2) the period preceding the 1966 election; and (3) the post-election response to the crushing defeat suffered at the polls. Each of the three periods is set forth in a separate chapter, while a summary analysis of the movement's evolvement and characteristics is contained in the thesis' final chapter.

The movement's tri-demarcation has been devised as a comprehensive way of encompassing and elucidating the many changes that took place in the movement's political techniques, organisation, composition and policy orientation. The most salient of these changes, which pertain to tactics and personnel, have been highlighted against a theoretical perspective of the two prototypes of political behaviour - militant and moderate - outlined in Chapter I.

Since pacificism, rather than pacifism, has proved to be the dominant pacific doctrine of the past decade - by far the more dynamic

component in the Australian social and political context - the ensuing material concentrates almost exclusively on the pacificist section of the movement. That growth and change should be much more pronounced among the pacificists is not too surprising when one considers that generally they seek less inclusive goals than the pacifists and tend to concretise their issues. Thus the problems they raise are more apt to be solved, taken up by 'third parties', or fade away; and their groups are more apt to develop in response to new and specific problems.

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A few years elapsed before the enthusiasm and propaganda generated by the Melbourne Congress were *visibly* transformed into a wider based and more active movement. In 1960, 1961, and during much of 1962, the movement was still confined to a small, solid and dedicated core of ALP dissenters, members of the CPA, an insignificant assortment of political and social non-conformists, and various shadings of pacifists - some Christian oriented and others motivated by non-religious, humanitarian considerations. In terms of the five types of dissenters listed in Chapter I, the movement exemplified, in descending order of importance, the characteristics of the class, religious, humanitarian, intellectual and youth dissenter. Whilst the support of the religious dissenters remained relatively constant, the movement was clearly dominated by the class dissenters. Yet the sum total of movement supporters represented a group of only minor influence, certainly not one that threatened

establishment policies or approached anything like the massive scale of the CND movement in Britain.[1]

During the heyday of British CND and the beginnings of the civil rights and peace movements in the U.S., the Australian peace movement (which meant primarily the various permanent state committees formed out of the Melbourne Congress' state preparatory committees) engaged mainly in unobtrusive and innocuous activities, whose only function seemed to be the reinforcement of the existing membership's views. Apparently the Cold War animus had not abated enough for the movement's leaders, in the early 1960's, to be emboldened to resort to militant tactics. Memories of the bitter trade union defeats in the late 1940's were still too fresh in the minds of many peace dissenters. As well, they remembered the narrowness of their victory to keep the CPA from being banned, the imprisonment of the three Communist leaders under the Crimes Act, and the way in which the Menzies Government was constantly able to make 'political capital' out of the communist issue such as in the case of the Petrov affair in the 1954 election. Their own peace organisations were under the close scrutiny of the security police; and the peace movement generally, as demonstrated by the pressures brought to bear at the time of the Melbourne Congress, came under the virulent attack of

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1. Two major works have been published on the CND movement: Christopher Driver, *The Disarmers, A Study in Protest*, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1964 - a detailed and highly factualised account of CND; and Frank Parkin, *Middle Class Radicalism*, Univ. of Melbourne Press, Melbourne, 1968 - an examination of the social bases of CND.

the press, Liberal Party, and all parties and groups to its right. An unsympathetic press stressed the pro-Soviet bias of the pacificist section of the movement,[2] overlooking the issuance of such press releases as the N.S.W. Peace Committee's protest against the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear testing in 1961.[3]

In the light of all the above circumstances, for the movement to proceed cautiously and adopt moderate tactics is at least explainable (though the New Leftists would insist there were more endemic reasons). Other than the occasional police sanctioned 'open air' meeting or march,[4] the movement's leaders shunned direct action and any direct confrontation with the Government. Instead, they promoted unprovocative projects like state and local discussion groups, interstate organisational committee meetings, public conferences, international peace conference trips, film screenings, 'job meetings', 'job' distributions of literature, raffles, bazaars, and the like. As a means of consolidating the gains of the Melbourne Congress, the leadership devoted its skills and energies to the holding of countless area meetings where the peace issues could be

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2. For example, see comments of Peter Kelly, *'Peace Movements in Australia'*, *The Bulletin*, 23 June, 1962.

3. This oversight on the part of the press prompted a particularly bitter denunciation in one of the peace movement's official journals. See *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 10, November 1961.

4. For instance, in August 1961, an 'Hiroshima Day' march in Sydney attracted between 5,000 and 6,000 marchers (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 August, 1961 and Sydney *Telegraph*, 7 August, 1961); and in Melbourne on the same day about 3,000 persons and 400 decorated cars transformed a march into a parade (Melbourne *Age*, 7 August, 1961).

discussed among the regular supporters of the movement. Typical of these discussion meetings were the Cumberland Zone Conference (21 March, 1961), the N.S.W. state meeting (4 March, 1961), and the Victorian Peace Council meeting (17-19 March, 1961). The leadership of the various Melbourne Congress Continuing Committees attempted to co-ordinate activities by meeting nationally at least once a year. At these meetings arrangements for the circulation of national peace petitions were discussed, the holding of public conferences planned, and the sending of delegates to overseas peace conferences finalised. So many peace activists attended international peace conferences during the first part of the 1960's that one peace official was led to comment wryly: "Join the peace movement and see the world."[5] Australians travelled to peace conferences as far apart as the World Peace Council (WPC) in New Delhi, March 24-28, 1961; the All Christian Peace Assembly in Prague, June 13-18, 1961; the WPC Delegates' Conference in Stockholm, July 16-19, 1961; the World Youth Forum in Moscow, July 25-August 3, 1961; the World Conference Against A & H Bombs in Tokyo, August 6-15, 1961; and the London Peace Conference, September 14-16, 1961. And this particular series of conferences only represented the international itinerary for *one* year! On the local scene, the larger public conferences included those held in Sydney and Melbourne on May 15, 1960, in Sydney on November 19, 1960, in Melbourne and Richmond, Victoria on December 2, 1960, in Rockhampton, Queensland on April 7-9, 1961, Hiroshima Day Conferences on August 6, 1961 in three

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5. Jack Sherrington, Treasurer of Queensland Peace Committee, to the author.

of the capital cities, conferences in Sydney on October 27, 1961, in Sutherland, N.S.W. on October 7, 1961, and in Hurtsville, N.S.W. on October 14, 1961. In addition, an anniversary conference was held in Melbourne a year after the 1959 Congress. However, despite all these attempts at involving the public in a debate of the peace issues, the attendance at these conferences was drawn chiefly from the regular peace movement supporters, and press comment was limited almost exclusively to the issue of covert communist control.

In another attempt to open up public debate and achieve wider support - yet still operating within the channels of accepted political activity - the movement devoted a major portion of its energies in 1961, 1962, and 1963 to the circulation of national peace petitions. The first of these, which was launched from the Australian Peace Council's national headquarters in Melbourne, pertained to the issue of general and universal disarmament, and was designed to coincide with the 1961 Federal election. The petition circulated the next year, by far the most successful in terms of signatures obtained (over 200,000), endorsed the Federal Parliamentary Leader of the ALP's proposal to extend the nuclear-free zone in the Antartic to embrace all the Southern Hemisphere. It also beseeched the Government not to manufacture, test, station, or acquire nuclear weapons or bases in Australia. This petition and the one the following year were initiated by the N.S.W. Peace Committee. The 1963 petition, which differed only slightly in content from the previous years' but which contained fewer signatures, was linked to the 1963 Federal election.

Although the peace movement's big project of 1964 was the organising of the Sydney Congress, two petitions - one emanating from the ANZ Congress on behalf of Mr. Gordon Bryant (Labor, MHR) and the other from the offices of the N.S.W. Peace Committee - were circulated calling for the Government to increase its efforts to prevent the proposed French nuclear tests in the Pacific. Nationwide, mass petitions were abandoned in subsequent years, as the established peace groups switched their tactic to assisting special occupational groupings like academics and clerics to obtain signatures for their statements.

The peace organisations constantly endeavoured to secure the names of distinguished persons as sponsors of their projects and as speakers on their platforms, thus hoping to generate a more 'respectable' public image. For instance, at rallies held concurrently in Sydney and Melbourne on May 15th, 1960, messages of support were read from such diverse personages as Sir Mark Oliphant, Tom Lehrer (American entertainer) and Sir Malcolm Sargent.[6] Likewise, efforts were directed at involving in peace politics Federal ALP parliamentarians like Dr. J.F. Cairns, Mr. Tom Uren, Mr. Leslie Johnson, Mr. Les Haylen, and Senator Douglas McClelland, who were regularly invited and often appeared at pacificist meetings.

Despite the modest success which had been achieved at the Melbourne Congress in widening the socio-economic base of the movement, the bulk of its financial support continued to come from the left-wing trade

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6. *Peace Action*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1960.

unions. Ostensibly, it was among the officials and members of these unions, through personal contacts and by means of lunch hour meetings, notices and articles in the union newsletters, that the peace leaders were exercising their greatest influence. Yet the inroads they were making into these areas were minimal, for most of the time it was a case of preaching to the converted.

In short, the movement's failure to reach a wider public, gain media coverage, and make an impression on the society, can, in some measure, be attributed to the restrictive and unimaginative nature of its activities. If the tactical problem of the dissenting movement is to be provocative without inciting disastrous reprisals and to gain new supporters without sacrificing basic tenets, then the peace movement of the early 1960's was overbalanced on the moderate side of being unprovocative and oriented towards a 'fortress existence'.

However, whilst the movement's *actions* conformed to the moderate paradigm, some of its *rhetoric* occasionally struck a highly militant note. This was particularly true among some of the rank and file class dissenters who aggressively denounced the capitalism and imperialism of the United States as being the root cause of the threat to world peace. And throughout the movement, the printed and electronic media were almost uniformly singled out as 'the enemy' for their allegedly unfair reporting of peace issues and the activities of the peace groups. Regarded as an integral part of the power structure, they were even maligned for deliberately inciting war tensions. Thus one peace supporter's attitudinal

cum ideological philippic against the press took the following extremely militant form:

> *"Daily newspapers of the world are a menace to mankind. They are enemies of the people. They stir up strife in a fashion more cold blooded than any other invasion against the welfare of the human race, creating national enmities and fostering warmongery. Peace is not their vocabulary. There's no money in it...."*[7]

Although such sentiments were more apt to emanate from the movement's rank and file (particularly the trade unionists) than from the leadership, they occasionally slipped into the official oratory and into publications sanctioned by the leadership. Yet whenever it came time to translate the militant rhetoric into militant action, the leadership inevitably balked. The attitude expressed at the trade union sectional conference of the 1959 Melbourne Congress - an attitude which carried over into the first part of the decade - is a good case in point. Some of the delegates at this conference had advocated from the floor strong working class action to effect peace policies. Their calls for industrial militancy included a 'black ban' on nuclear tests and a twenty-four hour stoppage, after President De Gaulle exploded a French nuclear bomb in the Sahara Desert, to commemorate 'Disarmament Day'. One speaker recommended that the workers leave the Congress dedicated to the slogan, "Down Bomb - Down Tools". Another worker rhetorically asked the meeting, "How many of us are lending our muscles to the cause of war? Let us take steps now to progressively withdraw our labour from war plants".[8] A further suggestion

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7. Oscar Walters, *Peace Action*, Vol. 1, No. 6, Sydney, November 1960.
8. Cited in *Outlook*, Vol. 3, No. 6, December 1959.

(although it had been tried unsuccessfully in 1947) was made to declare a 'black ban' on all equipment and weapons for the Woomera Rocket Range.

In replying to these proposals the peace and union officials sounded a typical note of caution and warning. The Secretary of the Waterside Workers Union and a leading communist, J. Healy, for example, had this to say about the call for a twenty-four hour stoppage:

> *"This proposal would be impossible for this conference, not because I am afraid of industrial action, but because there are unions and union leaders who are afraid of such a move. We shouldn't get divided on this question. We want to get the workers talking about this. Such a call would not be binding...."*[9]

The final resolutions of this sectional conference clearly reflected a victory of the leadership's moderate position over the more militant posture adopted by some of the rank and file. After noting that "experience shows that wars arise from conditions created by the profit making system"[10] (militant rhetoric), the trade union conference merely proclaimed itself in favour of 'Summit Diplomacy'; international exchanges of representatives of trade unions, cultural and sporting bodies; Australian recognition of the People's Republic of China and support for her admission into the United Nations; and preparation for the transition from war production to peace production[11] (moderate

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9. *Ibid.*
10. *Documents of The Australian and New Zealand Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament*, Challenge Press Pty. Ltd., Coburg, Vic., p. 4.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

remedies). The conference added a call for "improved social services, full employment, increased wages, shorter hours, longer leave, more homes, schools and hospitals",[12] which - it noted - "will be assisted by the division of resources now devoted to war preparations".[13]

In line with the above emollients and the broad guidelines laid down in the Melbourne Congress' manifesto, the Declaration of Hope,[14] the policies and remedies of the peace committees in the early 'Sixties' were related to distant and/or inclusive issues - *e.g.*, peaceful co-existence, universal disarmament, abolition of all nuclear testing, Cuba, Algeria, Berlin, and the Congo, U-2 flights, and Japanese and German re-armament - issues which must have seemed geographically and politically remote to most Australians, who traditionally have been concerned chiefly with incremental 'bread and butter' politics and have left the grander global problems to the 'Mother Country' or to 'Uncle Sam'. A major preoccupation of the movement in the early 'Sixties' was the rise of neo-Nazism and irredentism in West Germany. Mr. Sam Goldbloom, the Secretary of the ANZ Congress, spoke tirelessly on the subject and authored a widely circulated article called *German Re-armament - The Great Betrayal* and a pamphlet entitled *Peace and the German Problem*. In the months immediately succeeding the 1959 Melbourne Congress, the APC responded to an appeal from the WPC for support of seven German peace workers accused by the

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12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*
14. See Appendix A.

West German Federal Republic of undermining "the constitutional basis of the Federal Republic". The APC organised the sending of a series of cables and letters to the Special Criminal Court in Dusseldorf and messages of support to the solicitors of the accused. Other manifestations of the movement's concern over the so-called 'German Problem' included the holding of a special public meeting in Sydney on October 27, 1961 to "alert the public", the distribution of a film *German Story Today* for showing among the supporters of the various peace groups, the printing of articles such as *The Eichmann Trial and His Accomplices Today* in the regular peace outlets of newsletters and journals, and the handing out of pamphlets declaring *Never Again* outside screenings of the commercial film *Mein Kampf*.

A typically general and remote peace programme was that proclaimed by the N.S.W. Peace Committee, an important voice for the whole movement. Following the collapse of the May 1960 'Summit Meeting' in Paris, the N.S.W. body declared that "essential great-power agreements for disarmament and peaceful coexistence can be reached only through greater popular pressure to 'smother' specific Cold War activities and to create conditions of trust essential for a successful meeting".[15] This broad objective of counter-acting "establishment Cold War propaganda" by fomenting "positive grass-roots pressure" was to be achieved by directing the attention of the Australian people to such matters as "the

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15. *Peace Action*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 1960.

remilitarization of Japan", "the unconcealed acceleration of re-armament in West Germany", "the danger of provocative statements and military activities associated with SEATO", and "the need for a positive stand by the Federal Government for world disarmament and peaceful coexistence and for successful agreement in the negotiations to end nuclear weapons testing and in the East-West disarmament talks".[16] Since all these issues were either abstract or remote - not to mention one-sided in their 'question begging' - it is not too surprising that the pragmatic and insular Australian responded indifferently. Only the small band of ideologues on the Right bothered to reply to the issues and policies raised by the Left.

When the movement did turn to issues closer to home and directly affecting Australia, such as SEATO and the U.S. radio base in Western Australia, it tended to formulate its policies *in toto* - that is, rejecting piecemeal and proximate solutions in favour of distant and inclusive goals. Thus the issue of colonialism demanded "immediate action to encourage the independence movement of the Congolese, Laotian and other peoples, and the emancipation of the New Guinea and Aboriginal peoples of Australia"[17] - *i.e.*, support for insurgency groups. The movement's foreign policy, *inter alia*, stipulated "withdrawal from existing pacts and alliances based on interference, including armed intervention,

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16. *Ibid.*

17. *'Interstate Peace Committee Resolutions'*, 18 February, 1961, published in *Peace Action*, Vol. 2, No. 2, March 1961.

in the domestic affairs of South East Asian peoples"[18] - *i.e.*, the renunciation of SEATO's military sections.

When the movement attempted to graft these sorts of 'advanced' objectives on to the body politic of Australia, not unexpectedly it encountered rejection problems.

Within the movement itself there appeared in the first years of the 'Sixties' the nascent signs of an emerging activist directed New Left. In 1960, a Victorian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (VCND) was formed in Melbourne by a group of young intellectual dissenters inspired by the British 'unilateralists' and condemnatory of the way in which peace politics was conducted in the ANZ Congress. Their central criticism focused on ANZ's operation as a personal machine for a few individuals whose political biases were scarcely disguised, but they also denounced the ANZ Congress for its moderate tactics which they contrasted unfavourably with the acts of confrontation and civil disobedience committed by the expanding CND movement in Britain. Although the Australian CND'ers could not call upon their Government to relinquish nuclear weapons that it did not possess, they joined their British counterparts in stressing the importance of non-alignment for their country in the nuclear age. They wanted Australia to renounce any involvement in nuclear strategy, to pursue a more active rôle in the attainment of a universal test ban treaty, and to undertake never to

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18. *Ibid.*

develop an independent nuclear force.[19] The nucleus of the VCND was located at the University of Melbourne where a campus chapter helped to resuscitate university politics from the doldrums it had slipped into during the late 1950's. A highlight of the University's activities was a long and vitriolic exchange of leaflets with a radical right contingent led by Dr. Frank Knopfelmacher.

At Sydney, a CND with similar aims[20] was founded in March 1962, and - together with the VCND and the CND groups formed in 1962 in Western Australia and Queensland[21] - gave Australia its first preview of the political flamboyance that was to become a trademark of dissenting politics in the latter half of the decade. Drawing its support mainly from humanitarian and intellectual dissenters, with a heavy accent on youth, the CND stressed mass direct action and a politics of personal commitment. Its supporters marched and sang. They developed a special sub-culture of defiance symbolised by the famous emblem of the drooping cross and by an unconventionality in hair and dress styles. Even in the midst of fellow peace dissenters, the CND'ers stood out as a fringe group. In Australia, they always remained outside the main stream of the peace

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19. *VCND circular*, August 1963.

20. The aims of Sydney CND, as expressed in its constitution, were "the adoption by a Federal Government of a foreign policy by which Australia will: (i) Refuse to possess, manufacture or use nuclear weapons, (ii) Refuse Australian-administered territory for use by other nations as nuclear bases, (iii) Refuse, also, the use of Australian-administered territory for nuclear tests and withhold assistance to nuclear tests anywhere".

21. See preceding two chapters.

movement, though they did modify its course and they were the stylistic forerunners of an important peace faction that grew out of the Vietnam and conscription issues. In fact, they also were this faction's organisational forerunners, because in 1965 both the Victorian and Sydney CND's dissolved into major anti-Vietnam bodies - the VCND providing the Vietnam Day Committee with the majority of its executive and channelling most of its energies into that new body, while SCND was doing the same with the Vietnam Action Committee in Sydney.

CHAPTER VI

PRE 1966 FEDERAL ELECTIONS

Movement's Transition to a More Dynamic Rôle

To the casual observer, who saw only the visible part of the iceberg composed of the peace movement's personnel, activities and policies, little impact seemed to have been made by the 1959 Melbourne Congress. Yet beneath the surface some significant transformations were taking place. Foremost amongst these were the integration that followed from the movement's re-organisation, the germination of a policy re-orientation as the movement turned to issues of a more specific and local nature, and the gradual appearance of a greater diversity in types of dissenters and sources of financial support. Concurrently, the movement also began to manifest a greater range and flexibility of tactics, becoming far more militant in the way it expressed its dissent and pressed its demands.

In terms of re-organisation, the most important event was the establishment of the permanent state committees out of the Congress' state preparatory committees. These committees supplanted the various Assembly for Peace groups, the S.A. Peace Convention Bureau, and the remnants of the old APC,[1] and they generally performed the service of mobilising the

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1. In Victoria, the Australian and Victorian Peace Councils continued to exist in a fairly moribund state alongside the newly formed ANZ Congress, and were not formally disbanded until 1967. Also in 1967, the ANZ Congress changed its name to the Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament (CICD), largely as a result of the attempts in N.S.W. of the Labor Party to proscribe AICD.

peace sentiment expressed at the Congress into a potentially effective future outlet. By developing strong *intra* and *inter* state consultative and 'fraternal' ties, the peace bodies laid the quasi-formal and efficient organisational framework that later enabled them to co-ordinate so effectively their state and national activities into a protest movement against the Vietnam War, conscription, and the re-election of the Holt Government. That they undertook these campaigns with some degree of efficiency and became a force of some saliency can be attributed, in no small measure, to the fact that the machinery had largely been erected beforehand.

In the early years of the decade, the national leadership tended to emanate from Victoria's ANZ Congress in the persons of Mr. Sam Goldbloom and the 'peace parsons' - that is, the Rev. Alf Dickie, the Rev. Frank Hartley, the Rev. Victor James, and before he moved to Sydney, the Rev. Norman Anderson. In due course, however, the Victorian group was superseded in the rôle of *de facto* national leader by the N.S.W. Peace Committee. The shift in influence became especially evident after the holding of the 1964 Sydney Congress and the creation of the N.S.W. Peace Committee's successor, the Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament (AICD). The central organisational figure associated with both the Peace Committee and AICD was Mr. Geoff Anderson, a winner of the DFC and twice mentioned in dispatches in the last World War, whose *forte* as a peace leader (as he, himself, once described AICD's achievements) lay in "assisting the promotion of independent and co-

ordinated initiatives by the various components of the movement...without in any way submerging the identity of the component parts".[2] In other words, under his leadership, AICD successfully managed to assume the rôle of 'core group' without giving offence to the other groups - at least not initially.

In addition to strengthening its organisational bonds, the movement, after late 1962, gradually began to discard peace abstractions and distant goals for the tackling of specific, local issues. This shift in policy orientation was probably due not so much to a deliberate, strategical choice on the part of peace officials as to a series of fortuitous, outside events forcing the movement into new areas of concern. The crisis in West Irian, the general worsening of Australia's relations with Indonesia due to the confrontation with Malaysia and the rise in power of the PKI, the Opposition Leader's advocating of a nuclear-free zone in the Southern Hemisphere, the decision of the French Government to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, the palliative effect of the signing of the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty on the general disarmament question - all these events and others compelled the movement to turn its dissent towards more specific issues of a local nature. And from the moment the Australian Government announced, in 1965, that it was sending a small contingent of combat troops to Vietnam, all issues became subordinate to the twin issues of Vietnam and conscription.

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2. G.R. Anderson, *Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting of AICD - May 25, 1966*, p. 7.

Closely related to the concretising and segmenting of issues and goals were some major structural and social changes occurring to the broader movement. A spate of new organisations arose, built primarily around specific issues. The more prominent of these new groups included the Save Our Sons (SOS) and the Youth Campaign Against Conscription (YCAC) which were formed in opposition to conscription for overseas service but generally extended their activities beyond this limited aim; the Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee (COAC) which offered counsel to potential conscripts; the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC), the Vietnam Action Committee (VAC), the Committee for Canberra Vigil, and the Project Vietnam Committee, all four of which were organised to foment legal and illegal agitation against Australia's Vietnam policy; the Ex-Services Human Rights Association (ESHRA), which was designed to counter-balance the militarism of the RSL and oppose the war in Vietnam; and countless ephemeral organisations, notably in the universities, which received their impetus from the Vietnam and conscription issues. Only one new group formed after the 1964 Sydney Congress concentrated on an issue other than one related to Vietnam: the Sydney based Committee Against Atomic Testing (CAAT) set up in December 1964 to counter the French nuclear testing at Mururoa atoll. And its most publicised action proved to be a hoax and something of an embarrassment to the rest of the movement, for on July 2, 1966, when the French exploded their first N-bomb, CAAT falsely reported to the mass media that it had sailed a ketch into the testing area.

The myriad of new groups reflected a change in the socio-economic base of the movement from a dependency on the left-wing trade unions to a greater involvement from the middle class. The movement became much more diverse in a number of areas: in occupational groupings, in the political affiliations of its supporters, in the increased participation of women, and in the upsurge of a volatile younger generation. Thus SOS was composed primarily of middle class,[3] middle aged[4] housewives, professional and business women with an admixture of political and apolitical backgrounds.[5] Acting out of what they construed to be a sense of civic responsibility and believing strongly in the amenability of the political attitudes of Australian women through education, the SOS groups undertook to explain the history of Vietnam,[6] the reasons for Australia's presence, and the great moral issue associated with conscription. The major reason "why...the Menzies-Holt government committed Australian troops", explained a Victorian SOS pamphlet, "[is] because the government

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3. Most of the SOS founders and the initiators of its activities, in both Melbourne and Sydney, came from upper-middle class suburbia, such as Beaumaris in Victoria and Pennant Hills in N.S.W.

4. A survey, conducted by the author, of the ten-woman executive committee of Victoria SOS disclosed that their average age was forty-four, ranging from thirty-two to fifty-six; and the same general age group was observed by the author to be the case when he interviewed the N.S.W. SOS leadership.

5. Survey, *supra*. From the author's own observations and on the basis of information supplied to him by the Victorian executive, only minor differences existed between the leadership and rank and file with regard to occupation, age and political party affiliation. The leadership did tend to come from slightly more affluent sections of the community. (See R. Summy, *'A Reply to Fred Wells'*, in R. Forward & Bob Reece, *op.cit.*, pp. 203-204.

6. For example, printed pamphlet by Jenny Teichmann, *The War in Vietnam*, Victorian SOS, *c.* 1966.

believes that Australia must blindly follow American policies in order to consolidate the Australian-American alliance, which the government regards as necessary to Australian security".[7] The conscription issue contained high moral overtones, and a fairly typical approach was that once expressed by a N.S.W. leader, Mrs. A. Gregory, in answer to a dictum of the Minister for the Army, Dr. Forbes, that the National Service Act should be obeyed because it was the law of the land. She replied, as the SOS women frequently contended, that "the citizen had the duty to oppose the law if it was immoral, and that the arguments of loyalty to the law were used to defend war criminals at Nuremburg, but were not accepted as valid".[8] By conducting a protracted educative campaign along the above lines, the SOS women were hopeful of bringing pressure to bear on the government. An SOS official statement argued: "As individuals we may feel powerless. But a nationwide movement of earnest determined women could force our Government to review its legislation."[9] Whilst such an objective in no way departed from the norms of middle class conventionality, some of the tactics the women were prepared to adopt to achieve this end were not only unorthodox but threatening to the moral authority of the Government.

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7. *The Moral and Political Issues Involved in Vietnam and Conscription*, Victorian SOS, *c.* early 1966.

8. *Press Release*, SOS, N.S.W., 21 May, 1965. It was issued after a delegation of SOS supporters had received an interview with Dr. Forbes at Parliament House.

9. *Statement*, SOS, N.S.W., *c.* late 1965.

YCAC's membership, of course, came from young people (both sexes), many of whom belonged to Young Labor Associations. YCAC branches were established at the Melbourne and Sydney universities, and the aims of YCAC were taken up by many of the other left-wing clubs at the universities - *e.g.*, by the Monash Labor Club in 1966. Strictly speaking, the aims of YCAC were confined to opposing conscription for overseas service, but since the issue of Vietnam could hardly be dissociated from conscription, YCAC officials rarely, if ever, left any doubt where they stood on this issue. Thus a Sydney YCAC circular in enlisting support for a 'demo' at Central Station protested "against conscription and the dirty war in Vietnam".[10] And an advertisement placed in *The Australian* by YCAC and signed by about one hundred and fifty young men liable for military service stated: "We oppose overseas conscription because we believe that we may be sent to fight in Vietnam [and]....This would be a moral wrong and an unjust call upon our lives by the Government of our country."[11] As in the case of SOS, YCAC was dedicated to bringing about change through the parliamentary system, especially by assisting the Labor Party in its 1966 election campaign, but the tactics which it used in pursuing this general strategy were probably the most militant of any of the peace movement groups.

COAC (as was indicated in Chapters III and IV) was instigated by the pacifists whose main efforts from 1965 onward were directed towards

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10. *Circular*, authorised by YCAC, 2nd Flr., 96 Phillip St., Sydney, *c.* September 1965.

11. *The Australian*, 19 June, 1965.

assisting the conscientious objectors and the potential conscientious objectors. The pacifist journal *The Peacemaker*, throughout the second half of the decade, maintained an excellent record of the conscientious objector court cases being conducted in Australia.

Both Sydney VAC and the VDC in Melbourne were co-ordinating bodies of action against the war in Vietnam. Descendants in large part of the CND groups, they drew much of their support from middle class youth, and they were in the forefront of moves to introduce more militant tactics into the movement.

The Committee for Canberra Vigil was strictly a churchmen's organisation. Instigated and led by the Rev. Alan Walker, this group expressed its opposition to the Vietnam war through such activities as the lobbying of parliamentarians, circulating petitions among clergymen, and engaging in protest vigils. The Ex-Services Association of Australia, later renamed the Ex-Services Human Rights Association of Australia (ESHRA), was formed in November 1966, as a servicemen's organisation to promulgate a pacificist position, at the time the N.S.W. branch of the RSL was celebrating its golden jubilee. Six months later, ESHRA gained nation-wide attention, when one of its leaders, Mr. L. Waddington, was expelled from the RSL and another, Mr. A. Pascoe, was suspended for five years, because of their opposition to the Vietnam war and to conscription, which was judged subversive to the objects and policy of the League.[12]

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12. *The Australian*, 2 June, 1967. Also see John Philip Goode, *'Why 500 People Are Ready To Do Battle with the RSL'*, *The Australian*, 15 June, 1967; and H. Albinski, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-141.

Subsequently, they were reinstated, but in November 1968, Mr. Waddington resigned in protest against attitudes expressed at the RSL's 1968 national congress.[13] ESHRA's initiators, besides Mr. Waddington and Mr. Pascoe, included such well-known figures as Mr. Allan Ashbolt of the ABC who became the first president of the N.S.W. branch,[14] Senator James Keeffe who assumed a similar position with the Qld. branch, and Mr. Francis James of *The Anglican*.

As long as the peace movement co-ordinated activities around a single and immediate goal, such as defeating the Government in the 1966 General Elections, differences amongst the proliferating groups were muted and raised no insurmountable problems. It was only afterwards, in the wake of the movement's election rout and when the goals became diffuse, distant, and more sweeping, that some of the differences turned into tensions strong enough to create schisms.

During the pre-election period of the movement's expansion some of the old peace organisations acted as strong unifying forces, co-ordinating peace activities in their respective areas, offering equipment and facilities to the newly formed smaller groups and generally encouraging the proliferation of new groups. On a few occasions they even initiated the formation of *ad hoc* groups themselves - for example, the Hiroshima

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13. Brisbane *Telegraph*, 18 November, 1968.

14. Mr. Ashbolt is currently writing a book on some of the theoretical problems confronting the peace movement. See final chapter of thesis.

Commemoration Committees organised in the various states, the Project Vietnam Committee in Sydney, and the short-lived Vietnam Action Committee in Brisbane.

Of all the established peace organisations the AICD and its predecessor, the N.S.W. Peace Committee, were particularly adept at mobilising wider support, both within their own organisations and in the movement at large. Their leadership seemed quick to recognise the potential of a movement based upon the moral zeal of the middle class and the enthusiasm of youth for its drive, particularly when this was combined with the traditional forces of the Left and Christian pacifism. Thus, as early as mid 1961, when the peace committees in the three eastern mainland states were approached by the British Committee of 100 (Lord Russell's break-away group from CND) for assistance in "a world-wide movement of resistance which will make it impossible for any government, East or West, to have nuclear bombs or bases",[15] the N.S.W. leadership indicated a perception of emerging tactical trends in dissent movements, and the need for the established peace groups to accommodate to them. Wrote the N.S.W. Joint Secretary, at that time, in an interstate letter:

> *"We feel it will be important for us to respond to this appeal, so as to link our movement with the anti-nuclear committees and also to take appropriate steps to accommodate within our movement the type of actions which have characterised the work of the anti-nuclear committees, such as walks and marches against weapons and bases, etc.*

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15. Michael Randle, Secretary of British Committee of 100, *Letter to W. Morrow, Joint Secretary of N.S.W. Peace Committee*, 13 July, 1961.

> *"We feel that unless we take some initiative about this type of activity, it will, before very long, be initiated independently of our movement."*[16]

The upshot of the overseas appeal was that the Australian groups arranged a motorcade *cum* relay march to Canberra where delegates were selected to call on members of Parliament and make the rounds of the embassies - a very tamecat demonstration compared to some of the militant tactics adopted later. However, what was important was the cognisance of the N.S.W. Peace Committee of the emerging militant tactics popularised abroad - as well as by the local variants of the CND - and the necessity for incorporating them into a viable, broadly based Australian movement. As a result, when militant tactics were forced upon the N.S.W. body in late 1965, it utilised rather than perversely resisted the new techniques.

Meanwhile, the 1964 Sydney Congress, which was designed on the model of the Melbourne Congress except that it was divided into sections by topics as well as occupational groupings, proved to be an important watershed in expanding the base of the movement and integrating peace sentiment throughout the nation. In retrospect, the Sydney Congress managed to achieve three major tangible results. It helped to establish indirectly the YCAC; it provided some of the impetus for the formation of VAC in N.S.W.; and, most importantly, it led to the foundation of AICD, an organisation which achieved great success in amalgamating diverse

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16. G.R. Anderson, Joint Secretary N.S.W. Peace Committee, *Letter to N. Chalmers, Secretary Qld. Peace Committee*, 11 August, 1961.

sections of the community through a more representative membership and executive committee.

Bishop J.S. Moyes, the former Anglican Bishop of Armidale, represented the most notable acquisition to the front-line ranks. His association with AICD, as well as that of Mr. Francis James, the Chairman of *The Anglican* newspaper, was related, in part, to a series of events concurrently taking place within the Anglican Church. The much-publicised exchange of letters in 1965 between almost half of the Australian bishops and the Prime Minister was initiated and facilitated, to a large degree, by the AICD staff.[17]

The moderate tactic of enlisting the support of prestigious community leaders was extended into many areas: into the universities, the ALP, other churches, and additional trade unions. The six officers and nineteen executive committee members of AICD came from a cross-section of the community, both occupationally and in terms of party politics.[18] In addition to Bishop Moyes and Mr. James, they included, in 1966, university professors and academics, a dental surgeon, housewives, secondary school teachers, a psychologist,[19] a company representative,

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17. G.R. Anderson, General Secretary of AICD, in interview with author, 18 January, 1966.

18. See Appendix D for a list of the AICD Executive and their identifications.

19. She was Mrs. A. Michaelis. Her son, Robert Michaelis, became a 'cause célèbre' in the hectic month preceding the 1966 general elections, when he preferred to leave Sydney Grammar School rather than remain in the school's compulsory cadet corps. The case

[*Footnote 19 continued on next page*]

students, and trade unionists. In party politics they ran the gamut from a Liberal party branch executive[20] and another Liberal party member[21] to two members of the CPA.[22] Between these two extremes lay eight ALP members, one Liberal Reform member, and a balance of non-party clerical and secular pacifist and pacificists, as well as non-party radical and moderate democratic socialists. The membership, which rose to one thousand by early 1966 also represented a diversity of backgrounds. According to information furnished by the General Secretary, it was composed of: 18% professionals; 17% trade unionists; 16% women (home duties); 15% self-employed (shopkeepers, parliamentarians, farmers,

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[*Footnote 19 continued from previous page*]

gained national headlines, was the subject of an editorial in *The Australian* (1 October, 1966) after the Army Minister, Mr. Fraser, used a Security dossier in Parliament to verify the Government's claim that the boy's mother was a member of a peace organisation regarded as being under Communist influence. *The Australian* condemned this political climate which reduced debate on politics to the "hysterical talk of...crypto-communists, patriots and traitors". (*Ibid.*)

20. Dr. I.V. Newman, Department of Botany, University of Sydney. As an officer of a North Sydney branch of the Liberal Party, he offered to step down because of his compromising position on the executive of an organisation which had been attacked by the Federal Attorney-General as "Communist influenced". However, Dr. Newman's branch refused to accept his resignation and re-elected him to the branch's executive. Dr. Newman was one of the chief initiators of the academics' petition on Vietnam which was sent to Sir Robert Menzies in 1965 with slightly more than 500 signatures.

21. J. Mackay Sim, also from a North Sydney branch.

22. W. Gollan and E. Boatswain. Mr. Gollan was a very important member of the party. According to the communist press, he served on two of the three highest national bodies of the CPA - the Political Committee and the Central Committee (the third body, the top committee, is the Secretariat). Of the fourteen important subcommittees acting directly under the control of the Political Committee, Mr. Gollan headed two: Peace and Friendship, and Education. Mr. Boatswain was an official of the Building Workers' Industrial Union.

miscellaneous); 12% clerical workers; 9% retired; 5% clergy and laymen; 4% academics; and 4% youth and students.[23]

A concomitant of the comprehensive representation was an increased diversification in the sources of financial support, resulting in less dependency upon the traditional left-wing trade union backing. The N.S.W. group - by whatever name it went - had been moving in this direction for a long time, but the formation of AICD brought about a drastic reduction in the *proportional* amount of funds received from trade unions.[24]

Such an assertion is verified by a comparison of the Statements of Receipts and Payments of the N.S.W. body over a period that goes back as far as the pre-Melbourne Congress' Assembly for Peace group and concludes with the second fiscal year of AICD. While it is not always easy to discern trade union donations from those of other sources, the same general accounting form has been retained, so that a trend, if not absolute percentage, can be accurately ascertained. Through the years the N.S.W. body has denoted such items as 'mines', 'ships', 'wharves', 'shop committees', 'trade union collections', *etc.* in its accounts, thus

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23. G.R. Anderson, *Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting of AICD*, 25 May, 1966.

24. In interviews with countless peace officials they constantly deplored the failure of the 'reliable' old trade unions to contribute as magnanimously as they once had. Such remarks were heard not only in N.S.W., but also in Qld. and Victoria. When queried why trade union support was not increasing, despite the Vietnam and conscription issues, these officials usually attributed this to rank and file ignorance and disinterest in international affairs. Rarely, did they seem prepared to follow the matter further by condemning the conservatism of the union leadership which was opposed to union involvement in non-economic affairs.

permitting a uniformly computed percentage of trade union contributions to total revenue to be made. On this basis, the Assembly for Peace between 1 January, 1958 and 30 April, 1959 received *at least* 31.7% of its funds from trade union sources; the N.S.W. Peace Committee during the twelve months ending 30 November, 1962 received *at least* 29.6% of its income from the trade unions; but the AICD during its first year of operation ending 31 March, 1966 recorded *at least* 10.6% of its finances as specifically coming from the unions. This lower AICD percentage was subsequently sustained, though it rose slightly to 11.2% in fiscal year 1966-67.[25]

TABLE 1[26]

N.S.W. Assembly for Peace - 1 January, 1958 to 30 April, 1959:-

Total Receipts	-	$12,000
Union Receipts	-	3,800
Percentage	-	31.7%

N.S.W. Peace Committee - 1 December, 1961 to 30 November, 1962:-

Total Receipts	-	$23,000
Union Receipts	-	6,800
Percentage	-	29.6%

[*continued on next page*]

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25. The higher percentage in 1966-67 resulted from the fact that some of the union contributions in the preceding year were siphoned off to the N.S.W. Peace Committee which did not officially close its books until 31 December, 1965.

26. Pounds have been converted into dollars and numbers rounded off to the nearest $100. Again, note that the percentages represent only known union contributions. Some of the individual donations and the monies collected at meetings and rallies *etc.* would, of course, also come from trade unionists.

[TABLE 1 (Cont.)]

AICD (N.S.W.) - 1 April, 1965 to 31 March, 1966:-

Total Receipts	-	$23,500
Union Receipts	-	2,500
Percentage	-	10.6%

AICD (N.S.W.) - 1 April, 1966 to 31 March, 1967:-

Total Receipts	-	$32,900
Union Receipts	-	3,700
Percentage	-	11.2%

When the breadth of support of AICD, the largest of the state continuing committees or their successors, is coupled with the expanding base of support that resulted from the formation of the multifarious new groups, the full extent of the movement's social transformation becomes apparent.

However, the Qld. Peace Committee (as noted in Chapter IV) did continue to rely heavily on trade union backing, and in Victoria the ANZ Congress failed to expand its base of support due to a host of problems unique to the Melbourne scene. Firstly, it was beset with a great deal of factionalism. Since it received strong but sporadic support from the left-wing Trade Union Defence Committee, it incurred the enmity of the moderate-controlled Melbourne Trades Hall Council under the secretaryship of Mr. M.C. Jordan, and even became a symbol of the latter's opposition to the radicalism of the Trade Union Defence Committee. As well, the Congress became caught in the cross-fire of ALP politics, receiving the endorsement of the State Executive of the ALP but the abuse of many of the branches and their members. Within the peace movement itself, some

of the peace dissenters criticised the Congress for soft-pedalling its condemnation of unpeaceful actions by communist bloc nations and for trumpeting almost exclusively the 'militant imperialism' of the West. Such criticisms were exacerbated by the communist schism between Moscow and Peking wings that was acted out within the Congress' executive committee. A 'Hillite' or pro-China faction represented by Mrs. Betty Little[27] and Rev. Victor James (Unitarian) was practically driven off the executive and forced to set up a parallel group, the moribund Australian Peace Liaison Committee, on May 19, 1964. Finally, among potential peace supporters and the peace activists in the other peace organisations, a strong resentment was expressed against the ANZ Congress not only for its party political in-fighting and ideological warfare, but for the leadership of its Secretary, Mr. Sam Goldbloom, who, many maintained, managed the Congress impervious to the wishes of those with differing views.

For these reasons the task of co-ordinating much of the frenetic peace activity in Victoria during the year preceding the 1966 General Elections fell to the VDC.

The 1966 Election Campaign

Despite an *undercurrent* of divisive forces that existed throughout the expanding peace movement (not only in Victoria), the goal of winning

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27. Although Mrs. Little continued for some time to attend ANZ Executive Committee meetings, one member of the Executive informed this writer that she was treated very "coldly" and "impolitely" by some of the non-clerical members.

the election proved to be a unifying bond. "A slight wisp of hope appeared...", explained one newcomer to the movement. "There seemed at least a possibility that Labor could win...."[28] Thus most differences were submerged in the pursuit of the one, immediate, proximate and tangible goal. While it might be impossible to bargain and reason with the holders of power, there was the distinct possibility of appealing over their heads to the people directly and turning the "bastards" electorally out of office. For the first time in the post-war history of the movement the peace dissenters felt they were spearheading a popular protest where the outcome might be favourable to their side. As AICD Secretary Anderson commented in May 1966: "Without a doubt the Movement has played a major part in bringing the Government into serious difficulties over its Vietnam policies. There is now a real possibility that the Government could be defeated in the Federal election...."[29]

Even the Defence Minister, Mr. A. Fairhall, was prepared to acknowledge the potential efficacy of the protest voices on the Left, as he told a parade of conscript soldiers that, "It would be foolish of me not to be aware of the criticism rife in the land today of national servicemen and the question of service overseas".[30]

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28. Michael Hamel-Green, *'Vietnam: Beyond Pity'*, *Australian Left Review*, No. 24, April-May 1970, p. 55.

29. *Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting of AICD*, 25 May, 1966.

30. *The Australian*, 13 April, 1966.

The buoyant mood that pervaded the peace movement, the militancy of their tactics, and the proliferation of so many new peace groups probably did rekindle fond ALP memories of World War I anti-conscription campaigns and help to pave the way for the ALP to declare Vietnam and conscription the principal issues of the election.[31] In return, the Federal ALP leader, Mr. Arthur Calwell's, call for "protests and demonstrations from one end of the country to the other"[32] did not go unheeded in the peace movement. During the election campaign a cordial and co-operative relationship existed between peace movement activists and ALP left-wing

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31. The Parliamentary Party of the ALP made known as early as May 1966 that conscription would be a major issue of the election (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 May, 1966). Mr. Calwell, in his motion of dissent from the policies outlined by Mr. Holt in his first statement as Prime Minister, cited as the first item "emphatic opposition to the despatch of conscripted youths for service in Vietnam" (*CPD, HR*, Vol. 50, 15 March, 1966, p. 238). Labor's opposition was not confined solely to the conscription issue. A Labor government would insist upon the return of all forces from Vietnam as soon as practicable (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 May, 1966; *The Australian*, 13 May, 1966). Mr. Calwell's election policy speech, delivered six months later, continued in the same vein: proposing that a Labor government would withdraw conscripts first and regulars later from South Vietnam. This challenge was accepted in the Policy Speech of the Prime Minister on 8 November, 1966, when he declared he too wanted to make conscription and foreign policy the key issues. However, for the voters there is some question whether conscription and Vietnam were the principal issues. The Gallup Poll of 1 November, 1966 discovered that health services, education, pensions and prices ranked ahead of conscription and Vietnam (Roy Morgan, Australian Public Opinion Poll). Offsetting the results of this survey is the careful analysis of the voting in the Melbourne area done by Denis[*sic*] P. Altman - which concludes that "in so far as the election was fought on issues, it was foreign policy/defence that was important." ('*Foreign Policy and the Elections*', *Politics*, Vol. II, No. 1, May 1967).

32. *The Australian*, 10 May, 1966.

politicians - the latter being only too willing to appear at the protest meetings of the peace groups, to present anti-Vietnam petitions in Parliament, to fight for the civil liberties of the demonstrators,[33] and to call upon the peace movement to reciprocate by supporting unofficially meetings sponsored by the ALP.

The tactic popularised during the election was the 'demo'. While not all peace activists condoned confrontations that might elicit strong counteractions from the 'Establishment', the demonstration definitely set the tone of the peace movement's campaign. It injected a new verve into peace politics, becoming the chief means for expressing a counter commitment of principle to the Government's commitment to send troops to Vietnam and conscript twenty-year olds for overseas military service. In its most militant form, this counter commitment took the form of street demonstrations during peak hours, rowdy interjections and scuffles at Government sponsored meetings, and deliberate acts of civil disobedience. Many of the women of SOS resorted to the tactic of holding hour-long silent vigils every week; some students went to gaol in preference to paying their fines; a few protesters staged hunger-strikes outside the U.S. Consulates; a twenty-one year old typist, Miss Nadine Jensen, poured a mixture of red pigment and mineral turpentine over her head and clothing and, running between the ranks of the 1st Battalion RAR on parade after a tour of duty in Vietnam, smeared the red liquid on some of the soldiers;

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33. For example, see Wm. Hayden, *CPD, HR*, Vol. 50, 31 March, 1966, pp. 811-813; and Senator J. Keeffe, *CPD, S*, Vol. 32, 12 October, 1966, p. 954.

and throughout the election campaign students, workers, middle-aged housewives booed, jeered and 'cat-called' Government speakers in one of the stormiest elections in Australia's history. The climax came with the visit of U.S. President Johnson one month before the election, when about 20,000 demonstrators registered their protests in the streets.[34]

The beginning to this year of militant tactics dated from a peace demonstration held in Martin Place, Sydney, on October 22nd, 1965. Although AICD very quickly recognised the mobilising potential to be derived from this highly publicised demonstration at which over fifty people were arrested, it was almost solely conceived and organised by the newly formed VAC. Yet the civil disobedience of sitting down in Pitt St., at 5.00 p.m., on a Friday afternoon was something which the organisers claim was never contemplated. "It just happened as an emotional thing", explained VAC's leader, Mr. R. Gould. "People were tired of verbalising their political and moral impulses."[35]

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34. The 20,000 voices of protest were pitted against crowds probably numbering close to one million, who cheered and clutched ecstatically at the hand of the President. Electorally, the President's visit was an unqualified success for the Holt Government, while the publicity accorded the protesters was highly uncomplimentary. The large amount of mass media attention was also disproportionate to the number of protesters, although the impact of the protest was heightened by the fact that the demonstrators could concentrate their forces in one area. All that was necessary was to out-manoeuvre the police. The approximate figure of 20,000 is arrived at by dividing the protest between cities visited by President Johnson in the following manner: Sydney - 11 to 12 thousand; Melbourne - 6 to 7 thousand; Brisbane - 500 to 1 thousand; Canberra - about 500; and Townsville - 0.

35. Interview with Robert Gould, 4 January, 1966.

As this "emotional thing" gripped the peace protesters of Sydney, the AICD, in conjunction with VAC, arranged for a follow-up 'monster rally' at the Sydney Town Hall, to be preceded by another mass street demonstration on the same day. This time the demonstration, though larger, involved no mass civil disobedience. The rally at Town Hall attracted an estimated 3,000 - an unusually large audience for less than a fortnight before Christmas. The rally, which had received the endorsement and support of nine other local pacifist and pacificist groups,[36] besides that of its sponsor, AICD, was reported by some of the participants to be the most enthusiastic in memory. Thus the peace movement had been mobilised to make election year 1966 the *annus mirabilis* - the mood being militant, and morale at its highest since the anti-conscription campaigns of World War I.

The situation in all three state capitals on the East Coast was a movement poised to utilise the election as a platform for broadcasting its views. While the immediate goal had been lowered to the winning of the election, which meant identifying with the election campaign of the Labor Party or with the belated campaign of the Liberal Reform Party, the movement *generally* was not prepared to achieve this end by reducing its set of maximum demands on the two key issues. Thus the strategy of

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36. The supporting organisations were Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Australian Quaker Peace Committee; Kuringai Study Group; SOS; CND; YCAC; Fellowship of Reconciliation; CAAT; and VAC (*AICD Newsletter*, November 1965). These groups, together with AICD and the *ad hoc* organisations in the universities, constituted almost the entire N.S.W. peace movement that engaged in the election campaign.

electioneering in parliamentary democracies, which entails the compromising and modifying of policies for the sake of gaining power and position, played little part in the movement's strategy. This does not mean that the movement renounced completely the more orthodox and socially accepted forms of election campaigning.

Some of the more pragmatic groups like AICD engaged in a wide range of activities that included door-knock and letter-box electioneering in marginal electorates, as well as the better publicised street marches, demonstrations and massive rallies. The series of activities specifically linked with the election campaign began in 1966 with the March 16th 'Mobilisation Project' and concluded on the eve of the election with a spectacular combination demonstration and indoor rally.

The Victorian SOS helped to produce a satirical review of the Vietnam war, which was staged by a professional theatre company, the Emerald Hill Theatre Company. Entitled *A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Front*, the revue, among other things, poked fun at the RSL, showed Lawrence of Arabia as a commercial traveller for bed sheets and depicted a Chinese invasion of Australia. One of the best songs to come out of the revue, later pressed into a record, was *'The Ballad of Bill White'*, which was written and performed by Miss Glen Tomasetti, an executive member of SOS.

Also in the artistic *cum* cultural *milieu*, the peace organisations gave over their limited resources to the publicising of Alan Hopgood's play, *Private Yuk Objects*, and arranged theatre parties to the

performances both in Melbourne and Sydney (in the latter city under the sponsorship of the Elizabethan Theatre Trust at the Phillip Theatre). Taking as its subject Australia's involvement in Vietnam, the play depicted, in the author's words, the theme "that in a country like this, which has never had any serious internal upheaval - such as civil war - there comes a time when there is dissent and argument which may herald a fundamental change in the growth of the national conscience".[37]

To nurture that "national conscience" some of the peace groups, particularly the continuing committees of the Melbourne Congress and their successors, assisted groupings of Australian intellectuals and artists in channelling the expression of their dissent into the mainstream of anti-Vietnam protest. In Melbourne, paintings by some of the country's best known artists (yet falling into Parkin's category of "unattached artists") were displayed in an anti-war protest exhibition at the Princes Hall Gallery - including an oil painting by Clifton Pugh called *'The Body Count in Vietnam'*. Fifty-eight of Australia's leading writers signed a statement which concluded that "it is morally wrong that young Australians should be compelled to fight and perhaps die in Vietnam, and we ask the Government not to continue with the dispatch of conscripts".[38] In addition, the peace groups helped to collect the signatures of academics and professional people for a *'Statement on*

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37. Francis Evers, *'Alan Hopgood Objects...'*, *The Australian*, 15 October, 1966.

38. *The Bulletin*, 2 July, 1966.

Vietnam' that was published in the Melbourne *Herald* and *The Australian*,[39] and enthusiastically lent whatever assistance they could to the promotion of the so-called 'teach-ins' on Vietnam at the universities. Since the 'teach-ins' were often attended by ranking Government members - thus widely reported in the press - they were particularly viewed as an excellent means of evoking public doubts about the sagacity of the Vietnam commitment.

While all of these relatively moderate activities were associated indirectly with the winning of the election, the most direct method consisted of approaching each voter individually. An intensive door-knock and letter-box campaign was undertaken by some of the N.S.W. organisations. Concentrating on the marginal electorates - such as Parkes, Lowe, Evans and Phillip - the peace workers, according to one peace official,[40] distributed over two hundred thousand leaflets of peace literature in these areas. As well as approaching the individual homes, some of the women participated in protest parades at the shopping centres, while their cohorts handed out leaflets to the passers-by.[41]

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39. This statement was an extract from a similar advertisement which appeared in *The New York Times*. It called for the cessation of all bombing, negotiations with the NLF, and consideration of Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam. It was initiated by Dr. M.J. Charlesworth, Bruce Anderson, Rev. Arthur Preston and Max Teichmann in Melbourne, and received the endorsement of approximately two thousand academics and professional people.

40. Interview with Mrs. Phyllis Latona, Vice-President of AICD and also an official of WILPF and Women for Peace, 9 January, 1967.

41. See *AICD Newsletter*, October 1966.

Despite the energies expended on so many moderate type projects, the movement's public image undoubtedly was identified with the extremely militant tactics of the draft card burnings, throwing of paint at President Johnson's car, and the like. Perhaps, too, the public sensed that the moderate projects were only moderate *qua* projects. For the way in which they were carried out often placed them outside the praxis of pluralist democracy. Inevitably, the promulgation of maximum demands at 'grass roots' level tended to predominate over the winning of office. No matter what type of project was being undertaken, the militant's espousal of principle, challenge to authority, and mobilisation of mass consciousness prevailed over the seeking of access to pluralist centres of power or bargaining with policy makers.

The peace activists uniformly conducted their election campaign in the manner of populists rather than politicians. They believed in victory, if only they could get 'the facts' to the people and break through the barrier of institutions separating the people from their government. Thus when the movement went down to its resounding election defeat, the chief explanation given was that the movement was unable to match the government's propaganda machine and reach the people with 'the truth'. The text of a call for the holding of a *post mortem* conference put the case as follows:

> *"A number of reasons for the defeat we suffered are obvious, the most significant being the vicious and hysterical campaign in favour of the Vietnam War conducted, on Government behalf, by every conceivable medium of propaganda, i.e., the Press, Radio, T.V.,*

> *etc. While the forces opposed to the war made a determined and reasonably imaginative effort to explain the issues to the people, the resources in this sphere of the anti war movement proved to be marginal, compared to the enormous impact on popular thinking of the established media."*[42]

Yet during the election campaign the peace activists had some cause to think they were making progress in changing public attitudes. Numerous favourable public opinion polls on the overseas conscription issue (but never on the Vietnam issue), together with the responsiveness of the ALP, kept encouraging the movement. The Roy Morgan polls (Gallup) of December 1965, February 1966, April 1966, and November 1966 indicated fairly strong public opposition to conscription for overseas duty. These findings were confirmed by the Mercantile Public Opinion Poll of April 1966, also by a special poll for the ALP which was conducted in October 1966 by a group of Melbourne advertisers, and by a write-in poll run by the Brisbane *Sunday Truth* in April 1966. However, the public opinion polls convincingly demonstrated that most Australians supported the country's involvement in the Vietnam conflict - *e.g.*, Roy Morgan polls of May 1965, July 1965, October 1965, February 1966, and a special youth survey of February 1966, as well as the findings disclosed in the above special poll for the ALP and in the Mercantile Public Opinion Poll. A Vietnam and conscription referendum supervised by the SRC at Sydney University showed that among 5,547 students "most students (63%) oppose the use of conscripts in Vietnam but agree (68%) with the presence of

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42. R. Gould, Convenor, Sydney VAC, *Call for an Australia-wide Peace Conference of Activists For Early 1967*, *c.* December 1966.

Australian troops there".[43] A poll of students at the Australian National University conducted by their SRC revealed a similar result - *i.e.*, "A majority favours American and Australian involvement" in Vietnam, but "an equally big majority opposed sending National Servicemen" to Vietnam.[44] The results of still another survey, this one taken of 1,337 academics in ten Australian universities, indicated that "Fifty-four per cent of academics oppose the Vietnam War while only thirty per cent support it".[45] Although the Roy Morgan polls consistently revealed during 1966 (February, April, July, September, November 12th and November 19th) a landslide victory for the Liberal-Country Party coalition, the ALP and peace movement activists could take comfort from the fact that the polls had inaccurately predicted that the 1963 general elections would be close. Moreover, on November 19th, a poll conducted under the auspices of Mr. Don Whitington, the editor of *Inside Canberra*, disclosed a swing to Labor of at least 4%, which would have been enough to defeat the Government.[46] Another bit of encouragement came from an earlier poll sponsored by the Liberal Party in the electorate of Yarra (Dr. J.F. Cairns' seat) which showed only 37% of the 1,000 interviewees supporting the Federal Government's decision to send more troops to Vietnam.[47]

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43. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 July, 1966.

44. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 November, 1966.

45. *The Australian*, 10 November, 1966. This survey, which was conducted by four N.S.W. lecturers, was highly criticised by some of their colleagues for being non-professional in its techniques.

46. *The Australian*, 19 November, 1966.

47. *The Australian*, 10 May, 1966.

On the basis of the various poll findings, reinforced by the peace activists' own experiential impressions of the public's concern and sympathy, it did appear that for the first time in fifty years the peace movement no longer expressed the views of an alienated and innocuous minority. While previously peace movement participation had meant largely a very personal act of commitment, self-immolation, psychological purgation or ideological obtuseness, with only the vague hope that something might be done to affect attitudinal changes, the situation, by 1966, seemed to indicate that the movement had finally moved from expressive, protest politics into the arena of popular, power politics.

If such a view proved to be overly sanguine, the movement had certainly traversed a long way from the days of isolated dissent that pervaded the Melbourne Congress.

CHAPTER VII

POST-ELECTION RESPONSE

To recapitulate the concluding point of the last chapter: among its supporters the movement had managed to create a buoyant *milieu* of expectation, each protest having a self-regenerative and augmentative effect that continued right up to the election dénouement. Many of the activists, like the President of the AICD, "believed that a strong body of opinion existed in the Australian community which would show itself, perhaps decisively, at the ballot box" in opposition to the war.[1]

When the converse occurred, and the movement went down to a resounding defeat at the polls - the ALP, which was the main carrier of the peace movement's banner, registering its lowest percentage of the total vote since 1906 - a shocked and dispirited movement was confronted with the prospect of how to remobilise. Its problems seemed endless. Six months after the election an *AICD Newsletter* discouragingly commented: "Seemingly, no matter how much we petition, march or demonstrate our protests make little impact upon our Governments and the war proceeds to escalate regardless."[2]

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1. A.G.H. Lawes, *Report to AICD Committee Meeting*, 14 December, 1966.
2. *AICD Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 5, May 1967. An acknowledgement of the peace movement's low morale was also expressed in the *Secretary's Report, AICD Annual General Meeting*, 9 June, 1967.

The visit to Australia of Air Vice-Marshal Ky in January 1967 temporarily reignited a spark of protest from the movement. Afterwards, though, activity and enthusiasm quickly tapered off. While protests over Vietnam were reaching new heights in the U.S. - an estimated 125,000 marching in New York City and 60,000 in San Francisco on the 15th of April to produce the largest anti-war demonstrations ever held in America - a co-ordinated procession and rally in Sydney drew a meagre 1500 persons.[3] (Press and T.V. estimates of the crowd were even lower.) And in Melbourne no organised march was held.

In Brisbane a sympathy march from the city to Ipswich in support of the U.S. protesters attracted little more than fifty of the young 'hard core' dissenters. The march, planned by SDA, had received the endorsement of the Qld. Peace Committee, but only two of the latter's officers and no members actually took part in the march.[4]

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3. AICD officials explained the poor attendance as being the result of "serious diversion of time and effort arising from the ALP proscription problem which intervened during the critical preparatory period of this operation." (*AICD Newsletter*, Vol. 3, No. 4, May 1967). Despite an element of truth in this explanation, the movement's demoralisation - as expressed in the statements *supra* - probably comes closer to the underlying cause.

4. The Qld. Peace Committee's explanation for only tacitly supporting the Ipswich march was the pressure of another project: *viz.*, the organisation of the peace contingent that would march 15 days later in the Brisbane Labor Day parade. Another stated reason centred on the Qld. Police Department's denial of a permit for the march, though this decision was reversed a couple of days before the event when a deputation of University staff, mainly from the Law Faculty, made a special plea to the Superintendent of Traffic.

Perhaps one of the most emotive yet articulate expressions of the helplessness and paralysis felt by many activists appeared in a public letter by the historian, Dr. Ian Turner. Noting a remark of *The Australian*'s political columnist, Douglas Brass, that it was a sign of "the callousness and deep-down despair of our times" that the recent intensification of the war in Vietnam had created so little impression in Australia, Dr. Turner tartly replied: "Those of us who do protest, what do we get? The back of your hand - What Mr. Brass giveth, he also taketh away."[5]

"One reason", reminded Dr. Turner, "why we lost [the election] Mr. Brass...was that, when it came to the moment of decision, you and *The Australian*, and every other newspaper in this country, told the voter to vote for the Government."[6]

Dr. Turner confessed to his own inactivity over the past six months, explaining:

> *"Quite simply, it's because I don't know what to do... what are we to do? Pray that George Romney takes the Republican nomination and the Republicans take the next presidential election?*
>
> *"Come to think of it, that's probably what we ought to be doing, for there's not much we can do here. We had our chance six months ago and we lost it."*[7]

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5. Ian Turner, *'An Open Letter to Mr. Brass'*, *The Australian*, 9 May, 1967. For Mr. Brass' reply, see his column, *'Looking On'*, *The Australian*, 31 May, 1967.

6. Ian Turner, *ibid.*

7. *Ibid.* Numerous letters were published in *'Letters to the Editor'* sections - expressing the futility that peace dissenters felt in continuing their opposition to the Government's policies - *e.g.*, M. Page, P. McMahon, and D. Smart, *The Australian*, 31 May, 1967.

Not only had the movement's morale been gravely affected by the *election outcome*, but it encountered pressures and defeats from society on countless other fronts as well. The ALP, which had served as an important conduit of protest for the movement, formally modified its Vietnam policy at the Party's Federal Conference in Adelaide on 31st July, 1967. Whereas the parliamentary wing of the Party under Mr. Calwell's leadership had enunciated a policy of first withdrawing the conscripts and then the regulars as soon as it was practicable, the modified position of the Conference stipulated that withdrawal would only take place if Australia's allies failed to meet three conditions: "(a) cease bombing North Vietnam, (b) recognise the National Liberation Front as a principal party to negotiations, (c) transform operations in South Vietnam into holding operations thereby to avoid involvement of civilians in the war, cease the use of napalm and other objectionable materials of war, and provide sanctuary for anyone seeking it."[8] To the growing militant wing of youthful dissenters, such a policy represented a betrayal of principle. Australia's forces should be unconditionally withdrawn, because its Vietnam policy was legally and morally indefensible, or, as argued by some militant class dissenters, counter-revolutionary.

The peace movement's disillusionment with the ALP had commenced immediately after the election debacle when the Party's right-wing

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8. ALP, *Platform, Constitution and Rules*, Adelaide, July 1967, p. 33.

gained ascendancy. Although Mr. Calwell called for demonstrations against the visit of Air Vice-Marshal Ky in January, 1967,[9] only twelve of his Parliamentary colleagues joined him in the protest marches and demonstrations he personally led in Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.[10] Then, on February 8th, Mr. Calwell resigned as Leader of the Opposition (keeping an election promise if defeated at the polls), and the Federal Parliamentary Party elected a new leader, Mr. E.G. Whitlam, who proceeded to lead an Opposition that confined most of its criticising to domestic issues. When foreign policy was discussed such as on ABC Television's *'Four Corners'* programme, Mr. Whitlam refused to say he would withdraw Australian troops from Vietnam, even the National Servicemen. In the House of Representatives he argued the ALP's opposition to Australia's "commitment in the form in which the Government made it" and particularly in "the use of conscription", but he insisted that "Australian troops in the field must be fully supported and aided while they are carrying out" this commitment.[11] (This last comment, no doubt, was intended as an oblique criticism of the Seamen's Union which had refused to man the ships, 'Boonaroo' and 'Jeparit', which were carrying

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9. *The Australian*, 10 January, 1967.

10. The 'lame duck' Leader of the Opposition's support came from the following: Senators Ormonde (N.S.W.), Murphy (N.S.W.), Poyser (Vic.), Wheeldon (W.A.), Wilkinson (W.A.), Cavanagh (S.A.), and O'Byrne (Tas.); and MHR's A.W. James (N.S.W.), T. Uren (N.S.W.), J.F. Cairns (Vic.), G.M. Bryant (Vic.), and M. Cross (Qld.). Most of the other Labor Parliamentarians discovered (conveniently?) that they had commitments elsewhere on the days scheduled for protest. The Deputy Leader, Mr. Whitlam, for instance, had business in northern Queensland.

11. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 54, 28 February, 1967, p. 205.

war cargo to Vietnam.) With regard to the former Labor Leader, Mr. Calwell, Mr. Whitlam claimed he had "debauched" the Vietnam issue.

The newly elected Deputy Leader of the Parliamentary Party, Mr. L.H. Barnard, went one step further. He was reported to have intimated that the peace dissenters themselves were responsible for the war's continuation - "making Hanoi believe it should hang on while there was evidence of anti war propaganda in some countries".[12]

Hostile in action as well as words, the State Executive of the N.S.W. Labor Party attempted to outlaw the AICD to its members on the ground that an AICD circular had recommended assisting non-Labor candidates in the 1966 elections - that is, independent and Liberal Reform Party candidates. Whilst the charge was technically correct, the same circular had also appealed for the support of some ALP candidates who had requested assistance, and it had very carefully "stressed that it will be entirely a matter for individuals to make their own selection of the candidates they wish to assist".[13] The expulsion notice was to take effect in twenty-one days, but at the 'eleventh hour' the Federal

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12. *The Australian*, 2 June, 1967. Mr. Barnard's observations were made during a visit to Vietnam. At the same time he was alleged to have remarked that the ALP's old defence and foreign policy "has been overtaken by the march of history". Subsequently, he denied that he meant Labor should alter its Vietnam stand. Speaking in Canberra after his three-week tour of South-East Asia, he was reported as saying, "When I said this [that the Party should take a hard look at its Vietnam policy] I was referring to our policy as a whole in South-East Asia, in the light of British moves to withdraw from the area." (*Ibid.*)

13. *AICD Circular*, 22 November, 1966.

Executive intervened and overruled the proscription by a 10 to 2 vote - N.S.W. casting the only dissenting votes.[14]

Behind the N.S.W. Executive's attempted proscription lay the belief that "association of members of the ALP with the AICD has been and now

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14. Seventeen N.S.W. trade unions had appealed the 21 day expulsion notice. With only six days to go before the resignation deadline took effect, the Federal Executive's President, Senator J.B. Keeffe, then called a special Executive meeting to be held on 30th March to examine the N.S.W. Branch's decision. By the 10 to 2 vote the Federal Executive decided that on the basis of a 1963 Federal Conference decision which vested in the Federal Executive the sole prerogative for dealing with peace organisations, the N.S.W. Branch Executive did not have the authority to proscribe the AICD. However, the Federal Executive offered the N.S.W. Executive a face-saving motion: "...it has a right under the 1963 conference decision to place before the Federal Executive any complaint it may have against the AICD or any other organisation in N.S.W. which became subject to the 1963 decision." (Quoted in *The Australian*, 31 March, 1967). Since neither of the two N.S.W. delegates, Mr. C.T. Oliver, the State President, nor Mr. J. Colbourne, the State Secretary, offered to refer their information on AICD to the Executive, the matter was returned to the N.S.W. State body. There, according to a detailed article on the episode in the *Nation*, Mr. Oliver "finally bur[ied] the unfortunate issue by declaring, 'There should be no criticism of Senator Keeffe for having called the meeting...the decision had been both sensible and necessary.'" Concludes the article: "Had he [Oliver] and Mr. Colbourne not been 'forced to bat' for their state the decision by the Federal body would have been unanimous." (Eric Walsh, *'Labor Forward and AICD'*, *Nation*, 8 April, 1967). Walsh attributes the whole affair to the Assistant State Secretary, Mr. J.L. Armitage, and his entanglement with a right-wing group active in both trade union and state politics, known as 'Labor Forward', composed of ALP rightists, "stalwarts of the Democratic Labor Party and at least one member who has been a full-time employee of the National Civic Council". (*Ibid.*) For additional comments on the "proscription affair", see *The Bulletin*, 8 April, 1967; *News Weekly*, 5 April, 1967; Allan Fraser, *'A Matter of Image - Making the ALP Free'*, Sydney *Sun*, 4 April, 1967; *Newcastle Morning Herald*, 27 March, 1967; and *The Anglican*, 16 March, 1967.

is damaging to the political image and electoral prospects of the ALP".[15] A similarly deprecating view of the effect of peace demonstrations had been expressed in a special report on the 1966 elections prepared by the N.S.W. General Secretary, Mr. W.R. Colbourne, who argued that "the small section of ALP members who took part in these demonstrations [against President Johnson] provided the television and press with the type of propaganda they wanted to support their claim that the ALP was anti-American".[16]

As well as its altercations with the Labor Party, the peace movement encountered a barrage of criticism from the press, RSL, general public, public officials, and the police. The popular press, together with some of the more liberal journals like *Nation*,[17] uniformly denounced the fury of the demonstrations and some of the pre-election meetings. *The Courier-Mail*'s reporter, from as far away as Manila, criticised the anti-Johnson demonstrations, because they gave "Australia's image...another drubbing ....Almost every newspaper here", he wrote, "carried radio pictures of the student representatives of Australian culture who tried to hurl themselves under Johnson's car".[18] Not one of the major daily newspapers supported the Labor Party in its editorial pages. Stated *The Australian* -

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15. *Recommendations by the Officers Adopted by the N.S.W. State Executive of the ALP*, 10 March, 1967.
16. Quoted in *The Australian*, 25 February, 1967 (parenthesis added).
17. See issues of *Nation*: 15 October, 1966; 29 October, 1966; 3 December, 1966; and 21 January, 1967.
18. Gary Barker, *The Courier-Mail*, 24 October, 1966.

perhaps the most liberal of the nation's dailies - on the day of the election: "...we cast our lot with the Government" because the ALP "is devoid of fresh or practical ideas" with a "policy through which a Cobb and Co. coach could be driven and which guarantees no security at all."[19] At times the opposition of the press to peace movement policies became so intensive that newspapers even refused paid advertisements. Thus the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the Sydney *Daily Telegraph* declined to accept the Seamen Union's advertisement explaining their decision not to sail the ships 'Boonaroo' and 'Jeparit' to Vietnam.[20]

In the case of the RSL, one official was quoted as saying the demonstrators are "always prepared to support any anti-Australian policy at all". His remedy:

> *"A baton behind the bloody ear - there's nothing will calm the bloody ardor quicker than that. The froggy gendarmes know how to deal with demonstrators. You should have seen them whaling into this long haired mob during the Algerian troubles in France a few years ago."*[21]

Less vindictive but equally outraged were a large number of the correspondents to the *'Letters to the Editor'* columns and people holding positions of community influence. One headmaster at a speech night

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19. *The Australian*, 26 November, 1966.

20. Seamen's Union pamphlet, *We Cannot Support a War Against Children*, c. early 1967. The same 'ad' was accepted by some of the other newspapers, including *The Australian*.

21. William Yeo, President N.S.W. - RSL, quoted in *The Australian*, 7 February, 1967.

ceremony decried "the attention given to those gentry who find it entertaining to cast themselves in front of vehicles as a protest against one thing or another....We see very little support these days for the advocates of honor, truth, and beauty".[22] Another critic of the peace demonstrators informed the Student Christian Movement's national conference that "acts of protest such as blocking visiting statesmen's cars and throwing paint bombs damaged democracy".[23]

Responding to (and in some cases fostering[24]) the society's antipathy, many government and police officials tightened the enforcement of existing laws and, in one instance, introduced a new law. Premier Askin of N.S.W., who boasted that he told President Johnson to "run over the bastards", introduced a bill before State Parliament increasing the penalties for the types of violations incurred at demonstrations. Although he had said immediately following the Johnson demonstrations that the penalties would have to be reviewed, he denied at the time of the presentation of the bill it was aimed at preventing demonstrations.[25] The peace dissenters interpreted the matter differently.

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22. R.H. Morgan, Headmaster of Pittwater House Preparatory School, quoted in *The Australian*, 13 December, 1966.

23. Dr. R. Appleyard, Senior Fellow in Demography, A.N.U., quoted in *The Australian*, 9 January, 1967.

24. See accounts in *Nation*, 12 November, 1966; Brisbane *Sunday Truth*, 11 September, 1966; *National 'U'* (Publication of National Union of Australian University Students), Vol. 1967, No. 1, and Vol. 1967, No. 3; and *The Pamphlet on Civil Rights*, Monash University, S.R.C., November 1966.

25. *The Australian*, 18 January, 1967.

People attending 'peace gatherings' claimed they were inevitably scrutinised by plain-clothes police sitting in cars parked outside meeting halls. A national student newspaper alleged that ASIO held 1500 dossiers on university staff, administrators and students,[26] and one of the peace movement's most energetic and peripatetic campaigners, Mr. Francis James, continued to capture newspaper headlines with periodic claims that someone had broken into his files.[27]

Offsetting to a slight extent these highly disquieting events for the peace movement was the increasing number of statements from

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26. *National 'U'*, Vol. 1967, No. 1, Melbourne. The information was said to come "via a person claiming to have seen a number of security dossiers and to have a knowledge of some of the workings of the ASIO and the Special Branches in the States". The article maintained that, "Every university has a group of paid student informers, while the Special Branches rely on numbers of amateur 'James Bonds'". Following the *National 'U'* disclosure, a couple of former student agents came forth to confirm this fact. At the University of Queensland a 'cause célèbre' developed in 1968 when fairly reliable accounts of students involved in spying came to light. (See *Semper Floreat*, 27 September, 1968.)

27. Mr. James reported nine robberies within six months. Four times, he said, documents had been stolen, one of the documents allegedly containing information about the Chinese Atomic Energy Commission's perfecting of a new gas process for separating U-235 and lighter isotopes from uranium. (Brisbane *Telegraph*, 4 May, 1967.) Mr. James, who was a Vice-President of AICD, a Liberal Reform candidate in the N.S.W. electorate of Lowe in the 1966 elections, and is now missing in China, asserted just prior to the 1966 elections that a "mystery caller" had deposited in his car a copy of ASIO's file on himself. For a detailed account of this episode and some of James' personal background, see *Nation*, 26 November, 1966, and *The Australian*, 15 November, 1966; also Ian Moffitt, *'The Controversy Makers'*, *The Australian*, 18 February, 1967.

Australian churchmen calling for a moderation of the Vietnam policy. Australia's Roman Catholic Bishops issued a call for peace in Vietnam and support for the Pope's pleas for world peace, and coupled it with the reminder that "all citizens must share the responsibility of reviewing constantly the moral issues involved in the conduct of the war".[28] A few days later the Anglican Primate of Australia, Archbishop Strong, appealed to the Allied Governments "to stop any escalation" of the Vietnam war. The Christian conscience of the world, he observed, "was deeply disturbed by the continuance and intensifying" of the war. "It was wrong to blame one side exclusively where both were to blame;...an American initiative was to be ardently desired, and...all Christians must by their prayers be helping the forces of human reconciliation."[29] Another Anglican leader, the Archbishop of Perth, Dr. George Appleton, proclaimed his position unequivocally. He informed an inter-denominational conference that he "unashamedly opposed Australian participation in the war", and that the mounting horrors of Vietnam had made him a "full-blooded pacifist".[30]

Sixty clergymen of the Australian Branch of the International Committee of Conscience on Vietnam (in effect, the Committee for Canberra Vigil) asked the Federal Government "to align itself with mounting world opinion by urging the U.S. Government to halt bombing as a prelude to

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28. Sydney *Sun*, 13 April, 1967.
29. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 April, 1967.
30. *The Australian*, 4 May, 1967.

negotiation".[31] In Melbourne, a Catholic Vietnam Study group called PAX, which was composed of some leading Catholic laity, announced its findings, declaring "that the present American and Australian policy was wrong". The group "called for the cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and offensive operations in the South, a negotiated settlement, including the Viet Cong, and the withdrawal of foreign troops".[32] Also joining the church appeals for peace, the N.S.W. General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church - after a very stormy debate - expressed concern that expansion of the war could lead to a third world war, and urged the Government to provide more civilian aid on a similar scale to its military commitment.[33]

Whilst these and other church statements, in early 1967, added a new dimension to the Vietnam debate, many of the clergy - especially in the ecclesiastical churches - were inclined to 'harden' their postures in the second half of the year. More consistently gratifying, from the point of view of the peace movement, was the growing number of conscientious objectors, inspired, in part, by the success of William White in defying military service.[34] The movement was also heartened by

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31. *The Australian*, 20 April, 1967.

32. *ABC News Service*, 8 May, 1967.

33. *The Australian*, 25 May, 1967.

34. For a thorough record of the conscientious objector cases, see issues of *Peacemaker*, 1966-1968. William White was the young Sydney schoolteacher, who became a 'cause célèbre' when he defied a court order to take up non-combatant duties in the Army. Eventually he was granted another appeal - before a different judge - and won release from the Army. During his self-imposed ordeal, he became an issue of heated debate in the election campaign. A sympathetic account appears in Monty Dennison's *'Trials of William White'*, *The Bulletin*, 26 November, 1966.

the defection of the late Senator D.C. Hannaford (S.A.) from the Liberal Party over "the Vietnam issue", which he claimed, "is very much wider than the fighting that is taking place there. It is the policy of the United States of America which has been pursued down the years by different administrations and with which I disagree that is the crux of the matter....Over the years it has been based on an obsessive fear of Communism".[35]

As pleased and surprised as the peace dissenters were to hear a former Liberal Parliamentarian speak about "obsessive fear of Communism", their most notable victory was achieved in the election of veteran peace activist, Dr. D.N. Everingham, to the House in the Capricornia by-election of September 1967. Not unexpectedly, Dr. Everingham's maiden speech dealt with Vietnam and related foreign policy issues.[36]

Despite the occasional victory, though, the balance weighed very much against the peace movement in the months succeeding the 1966 General Elections. External social strictures, coupled with the low state of the movement's morale, not only arrested its growth but helped to split the movement into two distinct camps - militants and moderates. Moreover, when the socio-political climate began to improve slightly for the movement after 1967 - its position somewhat vindicated by events - the two divisions did not merge but hardened their stances.

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35. *CPD, S*, Vol. 33, 9 March, 1967, p. 418.
36. *CPD, HR*, Vol. 58, 14 March, 1968, pp. 142-146.

In effect, there developed two peace movements, each claiming a responsible stake for any victories that were achieved.

Militant and Moderate Schism

The division first broke into the open during the visit, in January 1967, of Air Vice-Marshal Ky. At a demonstration in Sydney against the South Vietnam leader, the protesters marched to Kirribilli House where they were stopped by police barricades. Some of the demonstrators led by Mr. Gould wished to move against the police; others were prevailed upon by Labor MHR T. Uren to disperse, and the militants' confrontation was averted.

The deep-rooted differences within the peace movement erupted again at an 'Anti-Vietnam War, Anti-Conscription Activists' Conference' held in Sydney from 27-30th January, 1967 to assess the election results and to plan for the future. Instigated chiefly by the convenor of Sydney VAC, the Conference evinced among many of the younger delegates a strong disapproval of the tendency of the old peace groups to "retreat" in the face of counter pressures from society. Not only were they in "retreat", asserted the critics, but more damaging in the long run was the fact that the old peace supporters were intent on pursuing their "sterile strategy of electoralism" and gaining influence through the Labor Party.

In this respect, the young militants were certainly correct. Only a fortnight after the peace movement's election debacle, the President of AICD had declared that "reliance must rest on the democratic process....

It is necessary to have a specific objective and that could very well be the Senate Election in 18 months' time".[37] In the same statement the President argued for continued good ties with two of the political parties.

> *"The Liberal Reform Group put up a remarkably good showing with a bare three weeks' preparation. The AICD provided the closest co-operation and support and this should continue without in any way weakening our co-operation with our friends in the ALP."*[38]

At the January *post mortem* Conference this same moderate approach was reiterated, in contradistinction to the militants' proposal for "solidarity with the Vietnamese people" - *i.e.*, the NLF. Whilst the moderates contended that "the main role of the peace and anti-war movement was to form a public opinion which would either elect a Labor Government pledged to withdraw our troops or be so strong as to persuade any Government to bring the boys back",[39] the "solidarity supporters...claimed the views of these delegates exhibited a readiness to accept rather than to combat confused and equivocal attitudes in the anti-war movement, an overestimation of the strength of the movement, and a preoccupation with electoral success rather than principle".[40] What was needed, insisted the militants, were "renewed, decentralised, to the people drives...in localities, in universities and Church fields", but especially in the trade unions - explaining to the people that their "objective interests did not demand aggressive wars in Asia, and were threatened by such things as conscription".[41]

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37. A.G.H. Lawes, *op.cit.*
38. *Ibid.*
39. *Report of Anti-War Activists Conference*, Sydney, 27-29 January, 1967.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*

Although both factions saw the need for a change in societal attitudes and agreed that "the most significant" reason for the election defeat was "the enormous impact on popular thinking of the established media", they stressed different ways of overcoming "the vicious and hysterical campaign in favour of the Vietnam War conducted, on Government behalf, by every conceivable medium of propaganda".[42] Moderates, like the President of AICD, advocated the necessity of "non-violent and orderly procedures in all our activities", maintaining that "if a change of policy is the objective, then demonstrations are only one part of the many sided effort which is required. On their own they will not achieve the objective".[43]

Whilst not disputing the point about demonstrations (if "undirected"), the militants postulated a strategy which contained few, if any, provisions for the techniques of conventional politics, and absolutely no intentions of retreating because of a hostile society's pressures and recriminations. The Monash Labor Club, a leading proponent of the new militancy, argued that "it was vitally important to re-raise the whole issue of our involvement in Vietnam and to raise it in a completely new context".[44] Their proposal was to chock Australians into an awareness of what the issues were. "Accordingly", explained a pamphlet, "we decided...to declare

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42. R. Gould, Convenor, Sydney VAC, *Call for an Australia-wide Peace Conference of Activists for Early 1967*, c. December 1966.

43. A.G.H. Lawes, *op.cit.*

44. *Committee for Aid to the National Liberation Front*, pamphlet, Melbourne, 28 August, 1967.

our full support for the National Liberation Front and prove that we meant it by collecting funds for them....[A]lthough the reaction to our actions was hostile there was a noticeable shift towards supporting our right to take this position and towards opposing the war itself. Thus people who were previously unenthusiastic about the war but did not support an immediate withdrawal were now saying that they completely opposed the war but did not support the N.L.F. This was now a 'moderate' position!".[45]

In the demoralised atmosphere that hung over the peace movement in 1967, the Committee for Aid to the NLF (set up on 21st July, 1967) saw itself as a "consensus-breaker" - as forcing people to commit themselves one way or the other and as being non-containable within the existing system. This was in direct contrast to the drift Australian politics had taken since the Federal elections, claimed the militants. "During 1967", recalled one militant newcomer to the movement, "institutional politics congealed into one big consensus on all the most important issues facing Australia....Dissent through the normal channels and in the normal arenas had become programmed into the system."[46] Thus the problem, as posed by the militants, was to break through the consensus. Yet often when they attempted what they thought might achieve this, they were thwarted by the moderates. For instance, at a Melbourne demonstration outside the American Consulate on 4th July, 1967, a clash developed between moderates and the

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45. *Ibid.*

46. Michael Hamel-Green, *'Vietnam: Beyond Pity'*, *Australian Left Review*, No. 24, April-May 1970, pp. 56 & 57.

militant Monash Labor Club when the latter attempted to denounce the U.S. as the aggressor in Vietnam and express this view symbolically in the burning of the American flag.

Such interdictions from the moderates only served to bolster the resolve of the militants to experiment with innovative techniques in order to overcome the stasis of consensus politics. One of the militants' most ardent spokesmen (ironically a former Executive Committee member of the ANZ Congress) justified the actions of the Committee for Aid to the NLF with the following argument:

> *"Despite the threats of the Prime Minister and the warnings of peaceaucrats the only meaningful action is that which is consensus-breaking. Attempts to change the system from within its own framework are absorbed in the pretences and double dealing that are the stuff of consensus politics....Only actions which drive people out of their traditional modes of thought can produce an awakening to the realities of imperialism. Only illegal acts can expose the injustice of the law."*[47]

Another militant attributed the history of peace movement failure not only to the accommodation of peace movement *actions* within the system but also to the assimilation of its *demands* into the political environment. "The peace movement", he pointed out, "has always obscured the real issues at stake in the struggle for a world without war. It has advanced demands of peaceful co-existence which have aided the major imperialist powers, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to maintain their *status quo*

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47. Humphrey McQueen, *'A Single Spark'*, *Arena*, No. 16, Greensborough, Vic., 1968, pp. 55-56.

against the revolutionary workers, students and peasants."[48] His call was for revolution at home.

There were degrees of militancy expressed by the militant faction. Not all of them were prepared to adopt a revolutionary posture and actually challenge the ideological pinions of the society; nor were all the militants prepared to stand with Brisbane's radical leader, Mr. B. Laver (whose political career ironically began as convenor of the local VAC group and as an executive member of the Qld. Peace Committee), and proclaim that "the real issues at stake are whether we support socialist revolutions in the struggle against the exploitation of imperialism, and that the goal or "way to peace lies in conducting successful socialist revolutions in the major imperialist countries".[49] Instead, many of the militants insisted on defining the issue as U.S. aggression in Vietnam or Russian aggression in Czechoslovakia, and the goal as the unilateral withdrawal of all troops from foreign soil - positions that were still militant by Australian society's norms, but comparatively less so than those propounded by the super militant ideologues. What all the militants did share was a willingness to use militant means if such actions conformed with their other beliefs. The common tactics of the militants were defined by arch militant, Mr. A. Langer, to be:

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48. Brian Laver, *Statement to author*, 26 January, 1970 (in reference to position he was advocating in 1967 and holds today).

49. *Ibid.*

> *"1. Making the war as unpleasant as possible for the government by disruptive demonstrations, resistance to conscription, etc.*
>
> *2. Mobilising a widespread mass movement against the war by linking it with issues of direct concern to ordinary Australians."*[50]

Negatively, the militants shared an intense dislike for the moderate wing of the movement - a feeling which could dissolve into amused disdain whenever they heard about such bland political activities as the older peace supporters' formation of a peace chess club (called the "Peaceful Pawns") to compete in tournaments around Sydney.

The established section of the movement was adopting a consolidating and defensive strategy along a broad front, what one veteran peace leader called "a continuing program of activity designed to hold what had been gained and to combat the efforts of those striving to take us back to a bipartisan 'All the Way' position".[51] The major public activity consisted of arranging tours and meetings for overseas visitors - at which great care was taken not to offend Australian populist sentiment. Thus the 'October Mobilisation' Project, which featured as its guest speaker Brig. General Hugh Hester from the United States, adopted the following defensive slogan: "Support Our Boys in Vietnam - Not Those Who Send Them

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50. Albert Langer, *Viet Protest News* (VCC Newsletter), No. 19, Melbourne, December 1968. In this article the author analyses the differences between the militants and moderates. Not surprisingly, as a super militant himself, he places importance (like B. Laver) on the criterion of a person's revolutionary thought.

51. G.R. Anderson, *Secretary's Report to Annual General Meeting*, 19 June, 1967.

There". Within the old peace groups themselves, the leadership encouraged social activities such as the above mentioned peace chess club, film nights, speech lessons, and dances. The older, moderate wing usually spoke about the need to deal tactfully with the militants, but its comments also revealed traces of impatience of the kind more commonly associated with the peace movement's inveterate foes. Thus the AICD Secretary observed in his 1966-67 Annual Report:

> *"...there has been a natural tendency within the organised movement to demand a more militant expression of its revulsion against the barbarous immorality of the war.*
>
> *"This trend has no doubt also been influenced by the impact of aspects of the generation conflict expressing youth and student resistance to society's paternal imposition of unacceptable social codes and concepts upon them.*
>
> *"However understandable it may be in these circumstances for many of us to lapse into outraged feelings of impatience and intolerance there is need to guard against pressures to impose upon the movement as a whole the advanced position of its militant components."*[52]

Virtually, as these words were spoken, however, the breach between the factions was widening. In Melbourne and in Sydney the militants were organising separate Vietnam Solidarity Committees, and in Brisbane the Students for Democratic Action had moved far outside the orbit of the Qld. Peace Committee. The common conviction of the militants was that the moderates had become unwitting instruments of the 'opponents of peace' - that the distinction between the *established* peace groups and

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52. *Ibid.*

the peripheral regions of the *Establishment* was, in fact, becoming increasingly blurred. As Humphrey McQueen of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee proclaimed: "as long as the Peace Movement calls for negotiations it does the work of the United States Information Service". Rather, the task of the movement is to "call for the defeat of U.S. Imperialism...identif[ying] Imperialism in Vietnam with Capitalism in Australia", and "develop[ing] a new unity between the exploited in this country and the oppressed in Asia".[53]

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53. Humphrey McQueen, *Vietnam: the Face of Imperialism*, Vietnam Solidarity Committee pamphlet, Caulfield, Vic., *c.* 1967. See Appendix G for a list of the aims of the Committee.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The dissertation has concentrated on three areas of the peace movement. Firstly, after tracing the pre-1960 historical background, it has examined in detail a specific project - the holding of the Melbourne Peace Congress - viewing this as the 'springboard' of the organised movement that evolved in the 1960's, and as a prototype of the kind of pressures normally encountered by the peace dissenters from the macro-society. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Congress was to stimulate community-wide interest and concern about the great peace issues. While the organisers were moderately successful in attracting a large number of delegates from various occupational groupings to participate in a discussion of a wide range of issues related to peace and international co-operation, outside the Congress - in Parliament, in the press, and among the populace - the debate was largely restricted to the question whether the Congress was Communist manipulated and open to free discussion. The Liberal-Country Party Coalition made a concerted effort to discredit the Congress, even personally contacting people to discourage them from attending. As a result, little public interest was ever engendered over the actual peace issues discussed by the delegates. Only in the end was a minor victory achieved, as the Labor Party managed to channel the parliamentary debate into a question of Government violation of individual civil liberties.

In retrospect, the Congress' most significant achievement was probably the way in which the separate state organising committees laid the foundation for the formal movement that subsequently emerged. In Queensland and in N.S.W. the continuing Committees served as the 'core' groups of the movement; and in Victoria, despite a much more diffused movement, the superior resources of the ANZ Congress made it one of the more influential groups. The remaining smaller states sustained a much lower level of activity in relation to their size - the pacifists assuming a more prominent position than in the Eastern mainland states.

The second section of the thesis has looked at the peace groups within two states, Queensland and Western Australia, and described their activities and relationship with one another. The groups that existed in Queensland between 1960 and 1966 were seen to be dominated by a 'core' group, the Qld. Peace Committee, which in turn enjoyed a close tie with the class dissenters at the Trades Hall. On the other hand, the small movement in Western Australia tended to be built around *ad hoc* committees, with the humanitarian, religious, and class dissenters joining forces in response to specific issues. The structure of the Queensland movement paralleled that in N.S.W., though the latter's 'core' group became increasingly less dependent on the class dissenters, while the structural pluralism operating in Western Australia more closely approximated the form and *modus operandi* of the movement in Victoria.

The final section of the thesis has focused on the broad developmental pattern of the Australian movement during the first eight

years of the past decade. Three periods have been abstracted to highlight the changes that occurred in the nature of issues undertaken, the number of peace groups and types of dissenters comprising the movement, and the militancy of its tactics. Despite an element of overlapping, the three periods have been demarcated into the years that immediately followed the 1959 Melbourne Congress, the events leading up to the dénouement of the 1966 Federal election, and the post-election response of the movement to the overwhelming defeat it suffered at the polls.

In the early years the movement was inclined to be moderate in tactics, in the sense that it made little effort at establishing any countervailing force of power and directly challenging authority. It tended to agglomerate and abstract issues far removed from the immediate concerns of most Australians, and it usually promulgated inclusive type solutions. Except for a few groups like CND, the pacificist section of the movement consisted almost entirely of the scions of the 1959 Melbourne Congress whose support continued to be rooted primarily in the left-wing trade unions.

The Vietnam and conscription issues aggravated strains in Australian society that tended to reverse this earlier paradigm. For some Australians, at least, the old answers no longer seemed to work. They perceived a "system...unable to make possible the reliable satisfaction of certain values which are held to be essential".[1] The strain in the

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1. Anthony Wallace, *Culture and Personality*, Random House, N.Y., 1964, p. 144.

society, as is often the case, led to "large numbers of people...seeking answers they do not have, reassurances that the answers they do have are right, or ways of implementing answers...."[2] In such a situation it was almost inevitable that the peace movement should expand rapidly, for it not only provided answers but offered durable and altruistic ideals, most of which, it was felt, could be implemented if the Government were defeated in the 1966 General Elections.

As the movement approached its election dénouement, it proliferated greatly in both number of groups and in overall size. Its base of support widened from an influx of humanitarian, intellectual and youthful dissenters; and it became increasingly more militant under the influence of its growing student and youth section. In the relatively sanguine pre-election atmosphere pervading the movement, militancy was tolerated - indeed, sometimes even encouraged and engaged in - by the older peace activists, including the officials of the long standing established peace bodies.

The crushing election defeat was a major set-back to the movement. An important avenue for expressing dissent - the electoral process - was blocked to the movement for what appeared would be an interminable period. Few of the dissenters *really* thought the forthcoming Senate elections offered any hopeful prospects. Moreover, a victory at the polls was now of dubious value, since the movement's electoral conduit, the ALP, had

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2. C. Wendell King, *Social Movements in the United States*, Random House, N.Y., 1956, p. 13.

veered to the right on issues of foreign policy and in many quarters was anxious to dissociate itself from any ties with peace movement activities. Finally, in the immediate post election period, the movement faced the condemnation of the society on a wide institutional and popular front.

Within the movement there was a binary response to the election defeat and the antipathy manifested by the society. One faction, mostly the older dissenters, retreated into moderate politics and a mood of quiescent consolidation; the second faction assumed a militant stance, becoming in some instances so militant as to want to make war to achieve peace. Rather than bring the troops home from Vietnam, exclaimed the most extreme militants, the first step is to bring the war home.

For whatever reasons - ideology, pacific outlook, or simply strategical analysis - not all militants subscribed to such a radical doctrine as violent revolution for Australia. If they were committed to revolution it was as a long term, distant proposition; or perhaps they envisaged a different kind of revolution - *e.g.*, a cultural or non-violent one. However, what all militants did have in common was a willingness to use some type of militant tactic in the pursuit of their immediate peace objective - whatever it might happen to be. They were determined to hold to their maximum demands; to forego immediate and incremental gains for the long term total pay off; to challenge directly the power structure (thus hoping for over-reactions of blatant injustice, mis-allocations of resources, and exposures of the system's own inherent

contradictions); and throughout the entire process to mobilise a popular movement capable of threatening and diminishing the pervasive power of the 'established regime'.

In contradistinction, the moderates advocated, not power confrontations but the altering of public opinion and changing of policy by working through the conventional channels of pluralist democracy. The distinction between the two factions is perhaps best illustrated by the differing interpretations they placed on the reasons for President Johnson's decision to halt the bombing of most of North Vietnam. Stated the President of AICD, the archetype of the moderate peace group:

> *"...the fact is undeniable that the force of public opinion generated and directed by the peace movements around the world has forced this historic event; and we have played our part in this. Doubtless the Hawks and the do-nothings will all be scrambling now to get on the band wagon, but we know where the strength and drive for peace has come from - it has come from organisations like A.I.C.D. and from peoples of many lands who have refused to give up. They have shown conclusively that the technique of democracy can be made to work for peace and the force of public opinion does have its effect."*[3]

On the other hand, Brisbane's militant SDA interpreted the Johnson decision in this light:

> *"Though the Johnson decision might be seen as a last minute attempt to put poor Humpty-Dumpty together again, it basically represents a realistic recognition of the military and political power of the Vietnamese*

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3. A.G.H. Lawes, *AICD Newsletter*, Vol. 4, No. 12, November 1968.

> *people, and the ability of the 'non-cooperatives' at home to create wide-scale political chaos - something no ruling elite can long endure."*[4]

The militant/moderate factional schism had been precipitated by the accentuation of strains within the society in tandem with a range of social controls directed at the movement. Yet the division can also be attributed to a more basic underlying dilemma that has universally affected peace movements composed of pacificists. This is that insofar as a movement opposes particular acts and wars it is a movement of resistance, but insofar as it demands peace in the abstract it is a movement of revolution. The first function, the negative act of opposing organised, institutional violence, can usually take a moderate form (assuming the society tolerates the exercise of fundamental civil liberties). The second function, the positive act of trying to create the conditions that will foster peace, almost inevitably necessitates the adoption of a militant posture. Or, expressed in slightly different form, the first function can most likely be done without violence, while the second usually involves the movement, either directly or indirectly, in the use of violence.

Caught in this basic dilemma,[5] peace supporters at all times tend to stress one or the other of the two functions, yet often they are able to

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4. *SDA circular*, Brisbane, *c.* November 1968.
5. Allan Ashbolt is currently writing a book highlighting this dilemma of peace movements, about which he has written to the author: "I wonder, though, if this paradox should be regarded as insoluble, or rather seen as a dialectical unity in which there is an interchange of purpose and vitality between the negative and positive functions." (Letter, 9 June, 1970.)

work together as the Australian movement did during the 1966 election campaign. It is when the counter pressures exerted by the society are perceived to be overly oppressive, as occurred after the election, that the dilemma usually reifies into factional entities.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

DECLARATION OF HOPE

- adopted by delegates to the Melbourne Congress, November 1959

This Congress of representatives of Australian and New Zealand citizens of diverse interests and opinions believes that another world war would be an unlimited disaster to the human race. We, therefore, affirm that the objective of all nations should be total disarmament, that the first steps towards this should be taken at once and should be accompanied at all stages by an accepted system of inspection.

In view of the admitted danger to the health and future of the human race, we urge the immediate banning of nuclear tests, for which an adequate system of detection has already been proposed.

The transition from an armament economy to a peace economy must be made on an orderly, planned basis. The money, resources and manpower now absorbed in arms production should be used to raise the living standard of people everywhere but especially in under-developed countries.

We believe that the attainment of these objectives involves the increased effectiveness of the United Nations. To help achieve this, we urge the admission of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and of all other non-member nations.

We deplore any breach of international peace, and affirm that there are no differences between peoples which cannot be settled by negotiation.

We believe that the responsibility for war is never one-sided and that all nations should forgive past wrongs. We believe that the development of peaceful relations, co-operation and respect between all nations is essential and possible.

We recommend the promotion of free, cultural, scientific, industrial, sporting and other exchanges between countries, the removal of all travel restrictions and the unimpeded flow of information.

We welcome discussion between the heads of nations culminating in agreement between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower that a Summit meeting must be held. We believe that this should take place without delay.

Encouraged by the public support for the Congress, we believe that people everywhere, working to achieve the aims of this declaration can ensure international co-operation and disarmament.

APPENDIX B

MAIN PEACE ORGANISATIONS (1960-67)

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Pacificist

Australian Pugwash Committee

Canberra Peace Committee

Vietnam Action Committee

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Quaker Peace Committee

NEW SOUTH WALES

Pacificist

Association for International Co-operation and Disarmament

Catholics for Peace

Committee Against Atomic Testing

Committee for Canberra Vigil

Committee for Peace in Vietnam

Ex-Services Human Rights Association

Hiroshima Commemoration Committee

Newcastle Committee for International Co-operation and Disarmament

New South Wales Peace Committee

Project Vietnam Committee

Save Our Sons (Sydney, Newcastle & Wollongong)

South Coast Peace Committee

Sydney Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

University of New South Wales Study Group on Vietnam

Vietnam Action Committee (later changed to Campaign)

Vietnam Solidarity Committee

Women for Peace

Youth Campaign Against Conscription (Sydney, Newcastle & Wollongong)

Pacifist

Australian Quaker Peace Committee

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Peace Pledge Union

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

QUEENSLAND

Pacificist

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Brisbane Professionals for Peace

Ex-Services Human Rights Association

Hiroshima Day Committee

Queensland Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Queensland Peace Committee for International Co-operation and Disarmament

Save Our Sons

Students for Democratic Action (later changed to Society)

Vietnam Action Committee

Youth Campaign Against Conscription

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Quaker Peace Committee

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

SOUTH AUSTRALIA

Pacificist

Campaign for Peace in Vietnam

South Australian Committee for International Co-operation and Disarmament

South Australia Peace Committee

Vietnam Protest Committee

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Peace Pledge Union

Quaker Peace Committee

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

TASMANIA

Pacificist

Hobart Peace Forum

Launceston Peace Quest Forum

Vietnam Action Group

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Quaker Peace Committee

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

VICTORIA

Pacificist

ANZ Congress

Australian Peace Council

Australian Peace Liaison Committee

Ballarat Anti-Vietnam War Campaign

Committee for Aid to the National Liberation Front

Congress for International Co-operation and Disarmament

Ex-Services Human Rights Association

Hiroshima Day Committee

La Trobe Valley Vietnam Committee

Melbourne Pugwash Seminar

Pax (Catholic Vietnam Study Group)

Peace Quest Forum

Save Our Sons

Victorian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Victorian Peace Council

Vietnam Day Committee (later changed to Vietnam Co-ordinating Committee)

Vietnam Solidarity Committee

Vietnam Study Group

Women for Peace (Blackburn)

Youth Campaign Against Conscription

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Federal Pacifist Council of Australia (the Australian Section of War Resisters' International)

Quaker Peace Committee

Pacifist Movement of Victoria

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Pacificist

Church and Community Committee on Vietnam

Save Our Sons

West Australian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

West Australian Peace Council

Pacifist

Conscientious Objectors Advisory Committee

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Quaker Peace Committee

* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

* Not strictly a pacifist organisation.

APPENDIX C

FOUNDATION MEMBERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN PEACE COUNCIL (1949)*

W.F. Allen (Federation for Resistance to War)

Mrs. R. Bell (President, New Housewives' Association)

Mrs. D. Blackburn (M.H.R.)

G.H. Burchett (Communist journalist)

J.F. Cairns (University lecturer)

C.B. Christessen (Editor, *Meanjin*)

A.J. Cregan (President, Vic. A.R.U.)

F. Dalby Davison (Author)

Rev. A.M. Dickie (Presbyterian)

Brian Fitzpatrick (Historian, Journalist and Secretary of Australian Council for Civil Liberties)

T.M. Gleeson (President, Vic. Clerks' Union)

Rev. F.J. Hartley (Methodist)

Rev. V. James (Unitarian)

J.W. Legge (Scientist)

Miss Judith Lyell (Student Christian Movement)

Leonard Mann (Author)

Miss Rachel McLaren (Presbyterian Youth Organisation)

M.C. Nunan (Vice-President, Vic. League of Ex-Servicemen)

J. Rogers (Director, Australia-Soviet House)

N. Rothfield (President, Jewish Council)

Canon W.G. Thomas (Church of England)

Dr. R.C. Traill (Scientist)

Miss Valerie Wadsworth (Uni. International Co-op. Club)

Miss Heather Wakefield (Student Christian Movement)

* *You Can't Ban Peace*, APC leaflet, April 1950.

APPENDIX D

AICD EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (1966)

President:	Dr. A.G.H. Lawes	Dental Surgeon
Vice-President:	Mrs. P. Latona	Housewife, Women for Peace, WILPF
	Mr. W. Rigby	Former state parliamentarian, now official in Miscellaneous Workers' Union
	Mr. F. James	Publisher and Managing Editor of the *Anglican*
Treasurer:	Mr. D. Allen	Public accountant
Secretary:	Mr. G.R. Anderson	Full-time official
Committee members:	Rev. A.D. Brand	Methodist clergyman
	Mr. R. Bruggy	Amalgamated Engineering Union official
	Mr. E. Boatswain	Building Workers' Industrial Union official
	Mr. A. Carey	Psychology lecturer, University of New South Wales
	Miss J. Curthoys	Student, Sydney University Vietnam Action Committee
	Mr. W. Gollan	Former headmaster
	Mr. R. Gould	Bookseller and convenor of VAC
	Mrs. M. Hill	Housewife, Women for Peace
	Mrs. P. Hopwood	Housewife, Women for Peace, Union of Australia Women
	Mr. D. Hancock	Miscellaneous Workers' Union official
	Bishop J.S. Moyes	Former Bishop of Armidale
	Mrs. A. Michaelis	Psychologist, Secretary of WILPF, New South Wales
	Mr. J. Mackay Sim	Representative
	Dr. I.V. Newman	Botany lecturer, University of Sydney
	Miss H. Palmer	Teacher and Editor of *Outlook*
	Mr. Barry Robinson	Secretary of YCAC, New South Wales
	Mr. I. Swords	Engineer
	Prof. E.L. Wheelwright	Associate Professor of Economics, University of Sydney
	Prof. S.E. Wright	Professor of Pharmaceutical Chemistry, University of Sydney
Honorary auditor:	Mr. W.L. Brown	Public accountant
Legal adviser:	Mr. M. Isaacs	Solicitor

APPENDIX E

GENERAL POLICY STATEMENT ADOPTED BY CONTINUING STATE COMMITTEES OF 1959 MELBOURNE PEACE CONGRESS, AT MEETING, IN SYDNEY, 18 FEBRUARY, 1961

Changing World Situation

The Australian nation is becoming more and more deeply involved in dangerous preparations for world war, by the Government's adherence to old policies which do not take account of the rapid changes in the world around us.

In recent years, the arms race has led to the pileup of nuclear and rocket weapons of such enormous destructive power and expenditure that agreement for general disarmament has become an urgent necessity.

The increasing economic difficulties of many sections of our community today are being aggravated by the diversion of great sums into non-productive military expenditure, and away from the needs of our people and the useful development of our country.

It has become understood by the majority of people and governments that countries of different social systems must find the way to live side by side without settling their differences through war - they must build their future in peaceful co-existence.

The recent years have been marked by the emergence into independent statehood of many of the people of Asia and Africa previously subjected to the control of foreign imperial powers.

Some of these are building strong societies, while those yet unfree are fast moving to claim their independence.

These historic changes are of special significance to Australia as a European nation in Asia, and have been recognised in the decisions of the General Assembly of the U.N. calling for universal, general disarmament, the prevention of war and the abolition of colonial regimes.

Today the peace of the whole world depends not merely on the almost universal desire of people for peace, security and friendly international relations, but on the degree to which people and their governments, *actively declare themselves* through policies and actions that strengthen peace and offset trends towards war.

Present Foreign Policy Dangerous

An examination of the policies of the Australian Government shows that, far from taking such a positive position, it has in general followed policies making for international discord and tension, reliance on armaments, military pacts and even military actions, and an attitude of discouragement or repression of national liberation movements abroad.

These and other Government foreign policies have drawn wide criticism from many sections of the community because of their subordination to the policies of the U.S. and the U.K.

The following principal aspects of Australian foreign policy are all negative, out of step with world developments and dangerous to the security of Australia and to world peace:-

1. Maintenance of a high rate of arms expenditure, while making no independent contribution to international discussion of possible ways to disarmament.
2. Handing over of part of Australia for use as bases and testing grounds for the war machines of the United States, Britain and possibly other powers.
3. Participation in the South East Asian Treaty Organisation, a military pact not representative of the main nations of Asia and in general serving the interests of nations outside Asia and not the national interests of the Asian peoples.
4. In the name of "defence", gearing of Australian military forces and planning to pacts and alliances such as S.E.A.T.O., thereby separating us from the aspirations of the peoples of South East Asia.
5. Opposing the establishment of normal relations with the Chinese People's Republic, despite the swelling demand in the U.N. for such relations.
6. Failing consistently to associate Australian policy with that of the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world in the condemnation of colonialism, and in particular, abstaining from the resolution to end colonialism in the recent U.N. Assembly.

Such policies have brought upon Australia the criticism of other nations because of their Cold War character, to which Australian Government leaders apparently see no alternative.

Criticism has struck also at those Australian policies based on race discrimination towards the Aboriginal people and the New Guinea people.

The time has come to end this dependence on the policy dictates of other governments, this reliance on armed forces and the threat of force in relations with our nearest neighbours, and this resistance to the great liberating movements of many countries.

We call on all sections of the Australian people - the people working in production and those directing it; the men and women of the professions, the sciences, the arts; the people of different religious beliefs and ideologies; the young and the older - to discuss now, and actively seek independent Australian foreign policies for peace and friendly relations.

Future Policy Must Be Positive

In our opinion such policies, devised to serve the interests of peace and also of our own nation, must include -

- Public support of the principle of peaceful co-existence.
- Positive proposals for disarmament, including the cessation of nuclear weapons testing, manufacture and stock-piling.
- Clear support, in principle and in deed, of the U.N. Assembly decision on the abolition of colonial regimes and immediate action to encourage the independence movement of the Congolese, Laotion and other peoples, and the emancipation of the New Guinea and Aboriginal peoples of Australia.
- Withdrawal from existing pacts and alliances based on interference, including armed intervention, in the domestic affairs of South East Asian peoples.
- Friendly and normal relations and exchanges, based on equality and mutual respect, with all nations, particularly the Chinese People's Republic and other Asian nations.
- Vastly increased technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, without political conditions.
- Repeal of all legislation (such as sections of the Crimes Act) which may, in any way, be used to restrict or discourage public discussion of foreign policy and the struggle for peace.

What You Can Do

Almost every Australian has good reasons for needing changes of policy, along such lines, to secure a peaceful future.

We confidently call, then, for deliberate discussion of these issues - in the places of work and the places of study, in homes and in neighbourhoods, in organisations of trade, profession, sport or civic life.

We call, further, for the recognition that the active defence of peace is the responsible business of every citizen, to be expressed in deputations, in written protests and proposals, in meetings, marches and a hundred other ways, particularly when actions occur that damage peace and international relations.

We urge support for any organisation that promotes public discussion and activity for peace, whether Australian or international in character, since we are convinced that, despite the great danger of war from some quarters, public action on a world scale is capable of securing peace.

APPENDIX F

MEMBERSHIP OF COMMITTEE FOR CANBERRA VIGIL, MAY 1965*

Rev. Ivan W. Alcorn (Methodist, Qld.)
Rev. Geoffrey Barnes (Presbyterian, Vic.)
Rev. D.G. Brimacombe (Methodist, Vic.)
Canon F.W. Coaldrake (Church of England, N.S.W.)
Rev. Norman Faichney (Presbyterian, Vic.)
Rev. John Garrett (Congregationalist, N.S.W.)
Rev. S. Henshall (Congregationalist, W.A.)
Rev. W.J. Hobbin (Methodist, N.S.W.)
Rev. Dr. Arnold Hunt (Methodist, S.A.)
Mr. David Hodgkin (Quaker, A.C.T.)
Rev. K.B. Leaver (Congregationalist, W.A.)
Rev. Rex Mathias (Methodist, A.C.T.)
Bishop J.S. Moyes (Church of England, N.S.W.)
Rev. Gordon Powell (Presbyterian, N.S.W.)
Rev. Harry Rowe (Baptist, N.S.W.)
Rev. C.R. Sprackett (Presbyterian, N.S.W.)
Rev. Ralph Sutton (Methodist, W.A.)
Rev. M.C. Trenorden (Methodist, S.A.)
** Rev. Alan Walker (Methodist, N.S.W.)
Rev. Lyle Williams (Church of Christ, Vic.)

* Office located at 139 Castlereagh Street, Sydney.

** Convenor

APPENDIX G

AIMS OF THE VIETNAM SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE*

Given this past and present (history of Vietnam), and the nature of U.S. imperialism we deem our responsibilities to be:

(1) Opposition to American and Australian aggression in Vietnam.

(2) To work for the withdrawal of all Australian and foreign troops from Vietnam.

(3) Recognition of the National Liberation Front as the authentic representative of the people of Vietnam, resisting foreign invasion and striving for a social, economic and political revolution in Vietnam.

(4) Support only for those negotiations acceptable to the NLF.

(5) To arrange medical and civil aid for the Vietnamese people.

(6) Distribution of documents and information concerning the aims, composition and history of the NLF.

* *Vietnam: the Face of Imperialism*, Vietnam Solidarity Committee pamphlet, Melbourne, *c.* 1967.

SELECTIVE AND ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Nothing of scholarly rigour and non-advocacy has been written about the Australian peace movement (1960-67), with three possible exceptions:

Henry S. Albinski : *Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription*, Duke University Press, Durham, North Carolina, 1970, Chaps. 5, 6 & 7.

J.W. Berry : *'Who Are the Marchers?'*, *Politics*, Vol. III, No. 2, November 1968.

J.W. Berry : *'The Vietnam Marchers'*, Henry Mayer (ed.), *Australian Politics: A Second Reader*, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1969.

Ralph V. Summy : *'Militancy and the Australian Peace Movement, 1960-67'*, *Politics*, Vol. V, No. 2, November 1970.

The first work only deals with the rôle of the peace movement in the context of the Australian debate over the issues of Vietnam and conscription, and is limited primarily to a collation of press clippings and other statements about the peace movement. Albinski sorely lacks first-hand and detailed knowledge of the *modus operandi* of the movement. On the other hand, my own article, which is a highly condensed version of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis, while it may benefit from personal contact and 'inside' knowledge of the movement, is restricted in its perspective to an analysis of issues undertaken, tactics employed and personnel involved. Even more limited in aspect is the survey conducted by Berry on the social backgrounds and political affiliations of participants in a few of the Sydney mass marches.

The remaining material that specifically analyses the peace movement *qua* movement deals exclusively with the issue of communist penetration, and, for the most part, is very polemical. Taking the anti-communist position are:

Anonymous : *'Who Are the Demonstrators'*, *The Bulletin*, 26 March, 1966.

Garfield Barwick : *CPD, HR*, Vol. 25, 10 November, 1959, pp. 2524-28.

Harold Crouch, James Jupp, Leon Glezer, Peter Samuel (eds.) : *The Peace Movement*, 2nd edition, Dissent Pamphlet, Melbourne, 1964.

P.T. Findlay : *Protest Politics and Psychological Warfare - The Communist Role in the Anti-Vietnam War and Anti-Conscription Movement in Australia*, Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1968.

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Denis Strangman : *'The Peace Movement'*, *Social Survey*, Vol. XIII, October 1964; Vol. XIII, November 1964; and Vol. XIV, February 1965.

Fred Wells : *The Peace Racket*, Ambassador Press, Sydney, 1964.

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Since the pro-movement forces do not particularly relish adopting a defensive posture, only two fairly systematic attempts have been made to refute the communist manipulation charge (and they have been by non-peace officials).

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A large part of the material for this thesis has been obtained from the following four sources:

(1) The author's personal experiences in the movement (I was an Executive Committee member of the Qld. Peace Committee, a member of the Brisbane Professionals for Peace, and a founder of the Students for Democratic Action).

(2) Access to the files of the following organisations: N.S.W. Peace Committee, AICD, W.A. Peace Council, W.A. CND, Qld. Peace Committee, Brisbane Professionals for Peace, SDA, ANZ Congress, VCND, VDC, and Australian Peace Council (material on the activities of APC, 1952-58, has been deposited in the archives at A.N.U.).

(3) Collection of circulars, constitutions, newsletters, pamphlets, *etc.* of the main peace bodies. (I shall continue to hold these in my personal files.)

(4) Informal talks with the major personalities involved in the movement.

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S.H. Wattleworth, Launceston Peace Quest Forum : Letter, 11 February, 1966.

INTERVIEWS

Shirley Abraham	:	Co-editor of *The Peacemaker*, 22 August, 1966.
G.R. Anderson	:	General Secretary of AICD, and Joint Secretary of N.S.W. Peace Committee, 18 January, 1966.
P. Ashcroft	:	Secretary of SOS, N.S.W., 10 January, 1966.
Trevor Ashton	:	Secretary of YCAC, Victoria, 18 August, 1966.
Sam Goldbloom	:	General Secretary of ANZ Congress, and of Australian and Victorian Peace Councils, 23 August, 1966.
Robert Gould	:	Convenor of Sydney VAC, and of SCND, 4 January, 1966.
Roger Holdsworth	:	Secretary of VDC, 20 August, 1966.
Joseph Kiers	:	Executive Committee member of ANZ Congress, 21 August, 1966.
Phyllis Latona	:	Vice-President of AICD, and official of WILPF and Women for Peace, 9 January, 1967.
W.J. Latona	:	Secretary of FOR, Vice-President of N.S.W. Peace Committee, former editor of *The Peacemaker*, 9 January, 1967.
A.G.H. Lawes	:	President of AICD, 18 January, 1966.
Jean McLean	:	Secretary of SOS, Victoria, 18 August, 1966.
Humphrey McQueen	:	Executive Committee member of ANZ Congress, and founder of Vietnam Solidarity Committee, 18 August, 1966. Also numerous conversations.
Alex Macdonald	:	Vice-President of QPCICD, 8 January, 1966.
Brian and Veronica Maltby	:	Founders of Sydney CND.
Bishop J.S. Moyes	:	Executive Committee member of AICD.
Rev. David Pope	:	President of VDC and of VCND, 19 August, 1966.

Jean Richards	:	Convenor of Australian Friends Peace Committee, 20 January, 1966.
W. Rigby	:	Vice-President of AICD, 15 January, 1966.
Barry Robinson	:	Secretary of YCAC, N.S.W., 10 January, 1966.
John Mackay Sim	:	Executive Committee member of AICD, 18 January, 1966.